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1 Introduction 
Financial statements represent a major source of information for various market participants 
and other stakeholders, hence their validity and reliability are of utmost importance. In its 
Report to the Nations of 2018, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) 
estimated that the losses of occupational fraud exceeded $ 7 billion for the respective period.1 
Although occupational fraud covers corruption and asset misappropriation in addition to 
financial statement fraud, the latter overwhelmingly causes the most damage per case. 
Accounting fraud and financial statements that are not fully in line with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) severely compromise market efficiency. Accordingly, 
regulators, policy-makers and auditors all strive to deter, prevent, and detect financial 
statement fraud to preserve market participants’ trust in corporate disclosures, especially in 
audited statements like annual reports. Although various recent measures aimed at fraud (e.g. 
the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,also known as 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act – SOX) have probably reduced the occurrence of fraudulent 
activities, risks remain. In its summary of performance and financial information for the 
fiscal year 2016, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stated that 
“rooting out financial and disclosure fraud must be a priority for Enforcement”.2 In addition 
to the in-depth analysis of individual transactions, a range of predictors from publicly 
available data indicating an increased likelihood of accounting errors for a particular firm 
may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of accounting fraud identification. 
The existing literature documents the evolution of financial statement fraud detection. 
Initially, financial information was mostly gathered from financial statements and in 
conjunction with capital market data was used to predict fraudulent cases. It is an obvious 
consequence of manipulation that financial statements do not correctly reflect the economic 
situation of a firm. Managers must make considerable effort to conceal their fraudulent 
actions in order to hide manipulations from auditors and the recipients of the financial 
statements. Although accounting fraud originates in an initial manipulation, further 
fraudulent alterations in subsequent periods are often required to obscure and hide the initial 
fraud scheme. For example, a firm may illegitimately shift earnings from future to current 
periods to hide financial distress or boost performance. However, in subsequent periods, the 
                                                 
1 ACFE (2018), Report to the Nation. Retrieved from: http://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2018/. 
2 SEC (2016), Summary of Performance and Financial Information. Retrieved from: https://www.sec.gov/ 
 files/2017-03/sec-summary-of-performance-and-financial-info-fy2016.pdf. 
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firm may feel compelled to mask prior fraud in order to continuously meet market 
expectations. Accordingly, manipulations may last over several periods and it might prove 
particularly challenging to distinguish between fraudulent and truthful reports.3 Previous 
literature suggests that approaches that are limited to baseline financial ratios that rely on 
annual data have low predictive power, whereas a time series analysis of financial statements 
or the provision of additional context to the raw company financials might improve fraud 
detection considerably (e.g. Abbasi, Albrecht, Vance, & Hansen, 2012). 
Recent research has broadened the focus from raw financial information to the additional 
consideration of the textual analysis of corporate narratives, which might reveal further 
information with predictive power (e.g. Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak, 2010a; Purda 
& Skillicorn, 2015). Textual analysis in accounting and finance is applied to examine how 
management creates narratives and facilitates examination of the interaction of attributes of 
corporate disclosure and the underlying management and firm characteristics. To predict 
fraud, this perspective on the management’s decision-making process is of utmost 
importance. It is plausible that it is managers who commit or direct fraudulent accounting 
activities. Therefore, the narratives created by these managers are supposed to reveal 
potential clues of manipulated financial reports. 
Extensive research has been conducted on the topic and has linked various characteristics 
of corporate narratives to firm performance and management characteristics. From a wider 
perspective, the results suggest that the textual components of corporate disclosure are able 
to reveal subtle details of a firm and its management. Moreover, managers can and probably 
do influence recipients’ absorption of the given information by manipulating the textual 
components. For financial statement fraud detection, where subtle details beyond the raw 
financials and from the inside of the firm and the management may be important, utilizing 
textual analysis offers a great opportunity to identify additional clues. Therefore, in this 
study, the quantitative and qualitative (textual) data of 10-K filings are utilized to identify 
fraudulent accounting practices. The quantitative data comprise company financials and 
other corporate characteristics, while the qualitative data include narratives from textual 
sections. 
A combination of both types of predictors, tested in an environment that reflects real-
world applicability, while ensuring the reliability and robustness of the results, has yet to be 
                                                 
3 In this study, the terms truthful and non-fraudulent will be used interchangeably, for further substantiations 
see section 4.1.1. 
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conducted. Therefore, this study’s research goal is the development of a detection model for 
future financial statement fraud, relying on qualitative and quantitative information from 
annual reports. 
1.1 Accounting Research and Nature of the Study 
This study in financial accounting focuses on the use of publicly available data from annual 
reports to detect fraudulently altered financial statements. Financial accounting is essentially 
considered as the measurement, summarization and communication of the economic 
activities of an organization to outside recipients (Sutton, 2006, p. 2). Although the type of 
organization is not restricted to corporate activities, financial accounting has gained 
particular practical importance from the need to hold businesses accountable to their 
creditors, owners and other stakeholders. Accounting practices have been developed by 
accountants in their everyday business as well as through the involvement of governments, 
which have increasingly recognized the need to engage in rule setting to protect 
shareholders’ and stakeholder’ interests (Schroeder, Clark, & Cathey, 2019, pp. 27–29). 
Initially, academic accounting research was scarcely deemed relevant or present and did not 
play a decisive role in the development of the profession (Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002, 
pp. 94–113). However, over time, accounting scholars have had a greater impact on the 
development of financial accounting, especially with the formation of numerous government 
agencies and professional bodies in which academic exchange with the research community 
is possible. This development was driven by a multitude of factors, especially of an 
environmental nature, such as economic growth and the social and political situation and 
thus varying considerably across countries. 
Of particular interest in this regard was the shift towards positive accounting research in 
the United States of America (USA) in the 1980s (Ryan et al., 2002, pp. 106–109).4 
Positivism is a derivative of empiricism and states that knowledge regarding a subject is 
derived from the observation of natural phenomena, their appearances and properties as well 
as their relations (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 17). Consequently, positivists and empiricists argue 
that true knowledge can only be derived from perceptions within a reality that is value-free 
and independent, with meaningful statements verified by observation.  
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, positive accounting research began to flourish in the 1960s. See the review of Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) for a detailed discussion. 
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Within empirical research in accounting, two major streams can be identified: behavioural 
accounting research and market-based accounting research (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 103). The 
former deals with the generation and absorption of financial information (Hofstedt, 1976, 
pp. 44–45), whereas the latter draws upon the impact of financial accounting information on 
capital markets (Lev & Ohlson, 1982, pp. 251–252). In the context of empirical accounting 
research, the research question is typically answered by a set of statistical tests. In this way, 
empirical research relies on variables that depict the properties of an event or the phenomena 
of an observed object (Ryan et al., 2002, p. 118). The measurement of the variables can be 
used to distinguish the research design in the social sciences between qualitative and 
quantitative research (Bazeley, 2004, p. 142). For qualitative research, the variables are 
constructed from qualitative data like textual data, whereas quantitative research focuses on 
data in numerical form. However, there also exist mixed-model or mixed-method 
approaches, whereby qualitative and quantitative data are used in conjunction. 
In a perfect world, the data used to test a hypothesis would be derived from controlled 
experiments (Ryan et al., 2002, pp. 122–131). When conducting empirical research, scholars 
in finance and accounting mostly rely on quasi-experimental research designs, rather than 
actual experiments, as opposed to the common design in the natural sciences. This is due to 
the fact that the researcher is usually unable to directly manipulate the variables under study. 
In empirical accounting research, an ex post facto design is often the only possible solution, 
as the event of interest has already occurred and the variables must be chosen afterwards, 
without the direct control of the researcher during the occurrence of the event of interest. 
When studying financial statement fraud, it is essential to identify the drivers behind 
fraudulent actions (what brings a person to fraudulently alter financial statements?) and the 
clues that can help to detect fraudulent behaviour (how can a person/company that has altered 
the statements be identified?) In addition to the general interest in identifying and statistically 
testing the potential determinants of fraud, utilizing these findings to build a sound detection 
model represents a second step. Although both steps build upon each other, the research 
design and therefore the evaluation of the outcome can substantially differ. Indeed, whereas 
the former primarily focuses on explanatory statistical techniques to test a hypothesis and to 
report (for example) on the significance of specific determinants, the latter is interested in 
performance evaluations like the fraction of detected cases. Creating a detection model is 
neither a novel nor fundamentally innovative idea. However, the concept behind the 
development of the model and the potential to assess the performance of different models in 
conjunction may generate a decisive contribution. 
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In information science, the so-called design-science paradigm has been developed to 
support the creation and innovation of new technology or artefacts like models, methods, 
constructs, and instantiations (Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004). Design-science 
originated in the engineering discipline and at its core, constitutes a problem-solving 
paradigm. An artefact, for example in the form of a detection model, is developed and 
applied to an environmental need, relying on a rigorous knowledge base that is constituted 
of a theoretical and methodological foundation.5 The theoretical foundation rests in the 
domain knowledge about a particular subject of interest, whereas methodological 
foundations are often associated with the skills required for empirical work, like statistics, 
programming languages or machine learning fundamentals. Design-science has developed 
its own research methodology guidelines and frameworks to support researchers in 
conducting high-quality research (e.g. Hevner et al., 2004; Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger, 
& Chatterjee, 2014). These generally outline the importance of rigorous methods for the 
construction and evaluation of the design artefact and the need to ensure a precise and 
verifiable contribution.6 Peffers et al. (2014) state that the frameworks and guidelines should 
not be followed blindly but rather emphasize good practices to help researchers in this often 
interdisciplinary and unstructured field to conduct good research. 
Within the business sphere, design-science seeks to offer the desired solutions for readily 
defined problems using domain and design-science knowledge (van Aken, 2005, pp. 20–22). 
In accounting research, design-science approaches have often been established in areas 
where the research object interferes with information technology (IT) systems, but they 
remain rather scarce.7 In the fraud detection context, for example, Abbasi et al. (2012) used 
a design-science approach to develop a MetaFraud model that combines a detection process-
model for quantitative variables. In this way, it can answer the hypothesis about the 
usefulness of data from quarterly reports for detection purposes by evaluating the detection 
performance of models with different data sources. Especially in the fraud or bankruptcy 
detection (prediction) literature, a large number of studies rely on a research approach that 
has been influenced by design-science and that often depends on machine learning 
approaches. This study builds upon the guidelines for design science to ensure the quality of 
                                                 
5 See the information systems research framework in Hevner et al. (2004, p. 80). 
6 See Hevner et al. (2004, p. 83) for the seven guidelines of design science or Peffers et al. (2014, p. 54) for 
the DSRM framework. 
7 For further details see Geerts (2011) on accounting information systems. 
6 
 
the results and to enable comparison with the outcomes of similar studies, an essential aspect 
of contributing to the fraud detection literature. 
This study mainly falls in the behavioural accounting literature stream as it deals with the 
potential to find clues for fraudulent manipulations in annual reports. Access to SEC 
enforcement actions and annual reports from the EDGAR system provides the basis for the 
study’s ex post facto design. Through a mixed-model approach, qualitative and quantitative 
data are utilized both solely and in conjunction to create sound and comprehensive detection 
models. The construction and validation of the detection models are carried out under the 
guidelines of design-science and common machine learning practices. In the following 
section, the general structure of the study will be outlined. 
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1.2 Structure of the Study 
 
Figure 1 – Framework of the study 
The study is divided into six parts, as depicted in Figure 1. After the introduction in the first 
chapter, the theoretical foundation is outlined, with chapter 2 comprising four subchapters. 
First, definitions of fraud in general and financial statement fraud in particular are discussed 
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Foundation
3. Literature Review
4. Methodology
6. Conclusion
Fundamentals of Financial Statement Fraud
Fraud Theories
Fraudulent Schemes
Participants of Fraud Detection
Sampling
Machine Learning Methodology
Design Questions
Feature Generation
Enhancing Questions
5. Results
Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research
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and the economic implications of fraud are presented. Thereafter, an overview of influential 
and elaborated fraud theories is provided, with a special focus on potential fraud factors that 
can be incorporated into the fraud detection model. In the following subchapter, typical 
schemes regarding the fraudulent manipulation of financial statements are presented. As 
with the previous chapter, potential factors that may help in identifying fraud are discussed 
and identified for the future goal of developing a comprehensive fraud detection model. In 
the final subchapter of this part of the study, the participants involved in fraud detection and 
their need for reliable fraud detection models are outlined. 
In the third part of the study, a broad literature review of qualitative empirical accounting 
research regarding the examination of narratives from annual reports for fraud detection 
purposes is presented. In conjunction with chapter 2, the research questions and hypotheses 
are defined. 
The fourth chapter begins by describing the sampling process, before explaining the 
generation of the qualitative and quantitative features of the fraud detection models. The 
following subchapter describes the machine learning approach, first by highlighting the 
validation procedure and the learning methods on which this study relies, before explaining 
the four classifier approaches. For each classifier, the results for the hyperparameter tuning 
process are highlighted and later utilized to answer the research questions. 
The results in chapter 5 are presented following the questions and hypotheses derived 
from the main research goal in the third chapter. A distinction between design and enhancing 
questions is made: whereas the former deal with the general set-up of the fraud detection 
model, the latter are designed to validate the results and increase accessibility, comparability 
and relatability. Following the presentation of the results, the limitations are discussed and 
further research possibilities are outlined. 
The study closes with a summary and a conclusion, outlining the usefulness of the results. 
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2 Theoretical Foundations 
Financial statement fraud detection, as suggested by the term, comprises three parts that 
stand for the different disciplines primarily involved in the topic, namely accounting (as 
regards financial statements), fraud theory and its borrowing from sociology, psychology, 
criminology and computer science (through the automated detection approach relying on a 
machine learning foundation). In the second chapter, the theoretical basis behind the 
accounting and fraud background will be laid out to ensure the thorough development of a 
reliable financial statement fraud detection approach in the second half of this study. 
2.1 Fraud and Financial Statement Misrepresentation 
In its 2018 Report to the Nations, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE)8 
assumed that companies lose 5% of their annual revenue to all kinds of fraud that occur in 
the corporate sphere.9 This amount represents the mean loss of over 2,000 estimations from 
fraud experts around the world. When talking about fraud, this study focuses on the 
manipulation of financial statements. However, fraud is diverse and comes in different 
forms. In the following sections, the different types of fraud will be identified and separated, 
with particular attention paid to financial statement fraud. 
2.1.1 Categories of Fraud 
Fraud occurs in different forms. By identifying similarities and differences between 
fraudulent actions, a structure can be established to help elaborate on particular occurrences 
of fraud (such as financial statement fraud) within the greater picture. A commonly adopted 
classification of fraudulent schemes is the fraud tree released by the ACFE (e.g. Singleton 
& Singleton, 2010; Zack, 2013).10 The original version is discussed in the following 
paragraphs and depicted in Figure 2, although it has been adjusted and modified to 
encompass a number of special cases and developments in the fraud literature, the basic 
structure remains unchanged (e.g. Mackevičius & Kkazlauskienė, 2009). Instead, additional 
                                                 
8 The ACFE is a non-profit organization founded in 1988 in Austin, Texas. It focuses on the detection and 
prevention of fraud and white-collar crime and offers educational training in the field. 
9 ACFE (2018), Report to the Nations – Global Study on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. Retrieved from 
https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2018. 
10 For the latest version, see ACFE (2018), Report to the Nations – Global Study on Occupational Fraud and 
Abuse. Retrieved from https://www.acfe.com/report-to-the-nations/2018. 
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categories are included or existing categories are structured in different ways (Sabau, 2012, 
pp. 110–112). Relatedly, other fraud taxonomies tend to have a high degree of similarity 
with the original fraud tree (e.g. Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht, & Zimbelman, 2016, pp. 9–
13; Gottschalk, 2018, p. 4).11 Common differences from other typologies are attributable to 
the scope of fraud with which the ACFE is mainly concerned, that is, occupational fraud 
(Albrecht et al., 2016, p. 10). This covers the fraudulent actions of employees or owners that 
result in direct or indirect damage to the organization; in contrast, fraud committed on a 
customer level like insurance or credit card fraud as well as fraudulent actions outside of the 
business sphere such as charity fraud are not covered. 
The fraud tree, which is regarded as the most comprehensive blueprint of occupational 
fraud, divides fraud into three main categories: corruption, asset misappropriation, and 
financial statement fraud. The categories are further structured into subcategories, spanning 
across 58 fraud schemes. A scheme is a plan or an arrangement used to attain a particular 
object, in this context to benefit the perpetrator through the fraudulent action (Gao & 
Srivastava, 2007, p. 3). 
Corruption covers schemes in which an employee abuses his or her influence or capability 
in a business-related transaction in a way that contravenes his or her duties as an employee 
to obtain a direct or indirect benefit (Albrecht et al., 2016, pp. 522–524). Such schemes 
include conflicts of interest, bribery, illegal gratuities, or economic extortion. A basic 
example of corruption under conflicts of interest would be a purchase scheme in which a 
vendor overbills a company in business-related transactions in which an employee of the 
company has an undisclosed interest. Corruption schemes are often based on related-party 
transactions in which the relationship is rarely known (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 83–
84). 
Under asset misappropriation, schemes are categorized in which employees steal, abuse 
or misuse the resources of their organization (Albrecht et al., 2016, pp. 512–515). Asset 
misappropriation usually affects resources within the personal sphere of influence of the 
respective employee, which are typically those they are entrusted to manage. The schemes 
can be separated in terms of the resources of interest to the perpetrator, mostly cash and 
assets, for example from inventories. Schemes comprise larceny, skimming and fraudulent 
disbursements like check tampering. 
                                                 
11  See Singleton and Singleton (2010, pp. 54–68) for a comprehensive overview of different fraud 
taxonomies. 
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Financial statement fraud captures schemes in which employees intentionally misstate or 
omit information, leading to materially altered financial information of the organization.12 
The involved employees are often in management positions, which led to the development 
of the term “management fraud” that is often used analogously for financial statement fraud 
(Albrecht et al., 2016, p. 10). Typical schemes can be categorized in terms of net worth/net 
income over- and understatements. Overstating revenue or understating expenses are 
common schemes, resulting in misleading, overly positive financial statements. Financial 
statement fraud is usually committed by executives of organizations out of personal 
motivation such as bonuses or shareholder pressure (e.g. Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 4–7).
                                                 
12  A detailed discussion of definitions of financial statement fraud will be given in the subsequent section 
2.1.2. 
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The three categories overlap to a certain extent, as cases of occupational fraud examined 
by the ACFE show. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the 2,690 cases reported from 125 
countries across the three categories for the report of 2018 as well as their overlaps. Most 
commonly, schemes are related to asset misappropriation and corruption, whereas financial 
statement fraud occurs least frequently. Where cases fall into multiple categories, asset 
misappropriation combined with corruption constitutes the most frequent overlap, followed 
by a combination of schemes from all three categories. Those broader schemes can be 
explained by the general process of committing fraudulent actions, which often includes 
cover-up techniques, resulting in additional violations (Zack, 2009, pp. 7–8). In particular, 
asset misappropriation schemes are predestined for concealment and therefore potentially 
lead to financial statement fraud. 
By combining the most recent descriptive statistics of occupational fraud by the ACFE 
with the examination of fraudulent actions by Singleton and Singleton (2010), Zack (2013) 
and Gottschalk (2018), Table 1 provides a broad overview of the categories and their 
characteristics. The cases are not exclusive to one category and may overlap. Relative to 
older reports, the overall figures show temporal stability, thus only the most recent figures 
are reported in Table 1.13 
                                                 
13  Median losses represent the only category where the values change considerably over time, especially for 
financial statement fraud. For further details and the assessment of cost-sensitive results, see section 5.2.4. 
Financial statement fraud (FSF) Asset misappropriation (AM) 
Corruption (C) 
AM   57% 
AM+C  23% 
C   9% 
AM+FSF+C 4% 
AM+FSF  3% 
FSF+C  1% 
Figure 3 – Overlap of fraud categories 
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Descriptors Corruption Asset misappropriation 
Financial statement 
fraud 
Usual fraudsters Insiders and outside accomplices Mixed Multiple insiders 
Median loss $250,000 $114,000 $800,000 
Frequency* ~14% ~87% ~9% 
Benefactors Fraudster Fraudster (against company) Company and fraudster 
Industries with 
highest relative 
frequencies of cases 
per category** 
Energy (1), 
manufacturing (2) 
Services (1), 
arts, entertainment and 
recreation (2) 
Construction (1), 
technology (2) 
Most likely overlap 
of categories Asset misappropriation Corruption Asset misappropriation 
Most common 
concealment 
method 
Creating/altering 
fraudulent physical 
documents 
Creating/altering 
fraudulent physical 
documents 
Creating/altering 
fraudulent physical 
documents 
Median duration ~22 months ~18 months ~24 months 
Most likely internal 
control 
weaknesses** 
Lack of internal 
controls (1), 
overriding of existing 
controls (2) 
Lack of internal 
controls (1), 
lack of management 
review (2) 
Lack of internal 
controls (1), 
poor tone at the top (2) 
Source of 
detection** 
Employees (1), 
internal control (2) 
Employees (1), 
internal control (2) 
Employees (1), 
internal control (2) 
* Sum can be larger than 100% due to overlap of categories. 
** (1) and (2) indicating the first and second most likely control weaknesses, source of detection 
or first and second most common industry. 
Table 1 – Characteristics of fraud categories 
The overview in Table 1 suggests that although financial statement fraud occurs the least 
often, the median loss per case is considerably higher than that for the reaming categories. 
Moreover, financial statement fraud schemes last the longest, with an average length of about 
two years before being unveiled. The deviation in the relative occurrence of schemes from 
particular categories across industries suggests that different schemes are predestined or 
perhaps easier to carry out in certain industries (Gottschalk, 2018, pp. 19–24). The 
percentage of cases of financial statement fraud to total cases in the industry is lowest for 
energy with 3% (in comparison to 16% of total cases for construction and technology), while 
energy reports the highest percentage of corruption, with 53% of total cases. This overview 
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suggests the existence of industry-specific characteristics that influence the occurrence of 
particular schemes. 
Regarding internal company characteristics, the methods of concealment, the control 
weaknesses, and the detection sources can further be used to characterize the three different 
types of fraud. The internal factor that influences the occurrence of fraud the most according 
to the studies is the configuration of the internal control system. Internal control weaknesses 
in particular create opportunities to commit fraud of all types. The possibility of overriding 
internal controls is common to corruption schemes, while a lack of management review is 
more concerned with asset misappropriation. For financial statement fraud, poor tone at the 
top, which may be translatable into corporate culture, is the internal control factor that fosters 
fraudulent behaviour the second most often.14  
The primary method of concealment and the sources of detection are rather similar for 
different types of fraud. The primary method for each category is the alteration of documents, 
which is deemed necessary to avoid obvious salience. The primary source of (initial) fraud 
detection according to the ACFE and Gottschalk (2018, pp. 31–40) comprises tips, often 
from employees.15 Considerably less common in second place are internal control systems.16 
Unfortunately, both studies only provide fundamental insights into the different sources, 
rendering it almost impossible to make accurate statements as to the specific categories. For 
this study, financial statement fraud is the primary concern, although the preceding overview 
adds to the general understanding given the interconnectivity of different fraudulent actions. 
The following sections will take a deeper dive into financial statement fraud and facilitate 
an in-depth understanding of the subject, before discussing fraud theory and identifying ways 
to detect this undesirable behaviour. 
2.1.2 Defining Financial Statement Fraud 
Examining the reasons behind and finding ways to detect financial statement fraud has been 
the objective of regulators, governmental institutions, auditing and accounting associations 
                                                 
14 Fraud theories related to corporate culture are further discussed in section 2.2. 
15 Gottschalk (2018) utilizes a different taxonomy for fraudulent schemes and examines cases of white-collar 
crime that encompass similar but not identical categories to the ACFE’s occupational fraud report. 
16  For additional detailed information about the participants of financial statement fraud detection, see section 
2.4. 
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and, scholars alike (Vanasco, 1998).17 Defining fraud properly is essential to reliably and 
clearly distinguish relevant cases from plain errors or honest mistakes. The most influential 
definitions are offered by standard setters concerned with financial statement fraud as well 
as scholars studying the subject. 
External auditors are provided with guidelines to help identify fraudulent reports. In the 
USA, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)18 has been publishing 
auditing standards since the 1940s.19 Within the AICPA, the Auditing Standards Board 
(ASB) is responsible for standard setting. In the aftermath of the major accounting scandals 
of the 2000s and the emerging lack of trust in external audits, the Sarbanes Oxley Act was 
enacted in 2002, resulting in the creation of the Public Company Accountant Oversight 
Board (PCAOB). The PCAOB oversees the audits of public accountants and should restore 
trust in audited financial statements. The PCAOB’s authority (among other areas) lies in the 
issuing of applicable auditing standards. However, through SOX §103, the PCAOB can also 
adopt modified or unmodified standards from other institutions such as those issued by the 
ASB. Having two standard-setting bodies has led to a certain degree of divergence between 
the standards issued by the ASB and the PCAOB (Cullinan, Earley, & Roush, 2013, 7-8). 
Particularly applicable in the financial statement fraud context are the AU-C Section 240 – 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit20 (Supersedes AU Section 316) issued 
by the ASB and the AS 2401 – Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit21 
issued by the PCAOB. 
The definition of fraud is similar to that of the AU-C 240 and the AS 2401. A 
misstatement is deemed fraudulent if the action leading to the misstatement was made 
intentionally, as opposed to errors, which occur unintentionally.22 According to both 
guidelines, the two relevant types of misstatements arise either from fraudulent financial 
reporting or from the misappropriation of assets.23 For both types, an intention to misstate 
financial statements is the core characteristic of fraud. According to AS 2401.06, 
                                                 
17 See Vanasco (1998) for an extensive literature review of definitions and the role of professional 
associations, governmental agencies and international accounting and auditing bodies in promulgating 
standards for fraud prevention. 
18 Similar institutions exist in other countries, such as the Institute of Public Auditors (IDW: Institut der 
Wirtschaftsprüfer - Institute of Public Accountants) in Germany, which releases the IDW’s 
pronouncements like the IDW Auditing Standards or IDW Accounting Principles. 
19 The organization was named Institute of Public Accountants until 1957. 
20 Retrieved from https://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-C-
00240.pdf. 
21 Retrieved from https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS2401.aspx. 
22 Compare AU-C 240.03/AUC-C 240.11 and AS 2401.05. 
23 Compare AU-C 240.03 and AS 2401.06. 
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intentionality can be assumed when “(m)isstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting are intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial 
statements designed to deceive financial statement users where the effect causes the financial 
statements not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP)”. Before discussing intent, AU-C 240.A1/A2 hints at the 
three factors of the fraud triangle (opportunity, rationalization and incentive/pressure) that 
when combined instigate fraudulent actions, before describing the potential circumstances 
surrounding fraudulent behaviour.24 AU-C 240.A4 states that determination of intent falls 
beyond the scope of an audit, whose “objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether 
due to fraud or error”. The standard further describes how fraudulent manipulations may be 
accomplished as well as their characteristics in paragraph A5 – A7. 
The definitions that scholars have developed over time tend to be rather similar, typically 
differing only in wording or small nuances to emphasize specific details. Elliott and 
Willingham (1980, p. 4) define financial statement fraud as “the deliberate fraud committed 
by management that injures investors and creditors through materially misleading financial 
statements”. This definition has not significantly changed over time and still contains the 
relevant constituent characteristics of financial statement fraud. Goel, Gangolly, Faerman, 
and Uzuner (2010, p. 27) have created a similar definition, simply broadening the scope 
regarding the aggrieved party to view financial statement fraud as the “illegitimate act, 
committed by management, which injures other parties through misleading financial 
statements”. Moreover, Wallace (1995), Flesher (1996) and Arens, Loebbecke, Elder, and 
Beasley (2000) have all integrated deception and concealment in their definitions as an 
additional factor of financial statement fraud.25 
Both streams of definitions highlight the intentionality of the perpetrators behind the 
actions and the deceptive nature of the manipulations, transcending mere misreporting in 
annual reports. In this regard, not every misstatement is financial statement fraud. 
Empirically studying fraud is accompanied by the problem of identifying fraudulent cases. 
Therefore, it is usually necessary to rely on external sources that have identified fraud or that 
are eligible to serve as proxies for fraud. Potential proxies of fraud and typical ways in which 
fraud is identified in studies of financial statement fraud will be discussed in section 4.1.1. 
                                                 
24 The fraud triangle is discussed in section 2.2.2. 
25 See Vanasco (1998, pp. 4–6) for a detailed discussion of fraud definitions. 
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2.1.3 The Evolution of Financial Statement Fraud 
To understand and identify fraudulent actions and thereby derive prevention, detection, and 
deterrence mechanisms, it may be worth exploring the evolution of financial statement fraud, 
particularly attending to cases and developments that have helped to facilitate the 
development of fraud detection-related disciplines. Occupational fraud has most likely 
existed since the beginning of commerce (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley, 2012, 
p. 556). Historically, identifying trustworthy market participants was laborious and largely 
relied on rudimentary biometrics (Woodward, Orlans, & Higgins, 2003, pp. 25–26). 
Detecting and deterring fraudsters has been relevant ever since. The shortcomings of modern 
corporations through abuse and fraud was recognized by Adam Smith (1776, p. 130) with 
the first major cases of occupational fraud probably dating back to the late 17th and early 18th 
centuries to the English East India Company (Robins, 2007, p. 37). The Company, which 
the English East India Company was also referred to, started as a marginal importer of spices 
and developed into one of history’s biggest multinational corporations, pairing a trading 
monopoly with military power (Robins, 2007, pp. 31–34). Its eventual fall can most likely 
be traced back to management malpractices driven by shareholder pressure to yield 
immediate and excessive returns and lacking regulatory supervision and internal control 
(Robins, 2012, pp. 85–88). With regard to financial statement fraud, the first major cases 
may also be dating back to the same period of excessive trade. With the South Sea Bubble 
emerging in the early 18th century, the South Sea Company, which was founded in 1711 and 
was funded through government bonds, claimed exclusive trading rights with Spanish South 
America (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 3). Given that its profits were lower than expected, 
the South Sea Company started to require additional funds. By circulating false reports about 
trade success, the company stock climbed, reaching unrealistic heights. As soon as the 
directors involved in the scheme came to sell their stock, confidence in the company eroded 
and eventually, the stock crashed. The government began to investigate the books of the 
company, revealing a massive accumulation of fraud and corruption with both company and 
government officials involved. Although this was considered one of the first major 
accounting and fraud scandals, it also prompted the advent of chartered accountants in Great 
Britain and the certified public accountant (CPA) profession (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, 
p. 4). 
Another historical scheme worth mentioning is the case of Kreuger & Toll of 1932 
(Lindgren, 1982). The international conglomerate covered a multitude of businesses but was 
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most renowned for its near-monopoly in the match industry. Its securities were widely held 
in Europe and the USA. Its size and consequent operational complexity could hardly be 
captured in its financial statements because feasible accounting principles did not exist at 
that time. After Ivar Kreuger died in 1932, his manipulations of the financial statements were 
revealed and resulted in immense losses for investors. The scheme led to increased demand 
for audited financial statements and thus brought about the importance of the auditing 
profession. It has even been said that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 were influenced not only by the stock market crash of 1929 but also directly by 
the Kreuger & Toll schemes (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 5).26 
The significance of fraud has barely changed over time. However, the number and the 
severity of known cases increased sharply around the 2000s (Dechow, Ge, Larson, & Sloan, 
2011, pp. 26–31).27 Accounting fraud scandals like Waste Management (1998), Enron 
(2001), WolrdCom (2002), Tyco (2002), Conseco (2002) and HealthSouth (2003), just to 
mention some of the most prevalent ones, have shocked professionals in auditing and 
accounting as well as capital market participants (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 3–4). The 
magnitude of these cases is especially apparent when considering the largest bankruptcies in 
US history, with Enron ($65.5 billion), WorldCom ($103.9 billion) and Conseco ($61.5 
billion) representing three examples of financial statement fraud that had severe 
consequences (total assets at the time of the discovery of fraud) (Abbasi et al., 2012, 
pp. 1293–1294). Measured in terms of market capitalization, the collapse of Enron resulted 
in a loss of $70 billion, and when combined with WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco and Global 
Crossing, its losses have been estimated as amounting to up to approximately $460 billion 
(Rezaee & Riley, 2009, p. 14). To understand fraud and develop reliable and effective 
detection systems, it is essential to discuss the potential evolution of fraudulent behaviour 
and cases that may have resulted in its exacerbation. 
In recent literature, scholars and practitioners have identified a number of (albeit 
changing) factors that in the last 20 years have fostered fraudulent behaviour, with particular 
focus on manipulations of company financials (Zack, 2013, XIV). Before presenting an 
explanation for the accumulation of fraudulent cases, it should be mentioned that the number 
of cases detected greatly depends on the engagement of regulators and capital market 
supervision and it is therefore highly contingent on the release of fraud detection or 
                                                 
26 The acts required financial statement audits for listed companies. 
27 See also Figure 12 and section 4.1.1 for additional information on the distribution of cases in this study. 
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prevention acts, for example the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, which led to an 
increase in pending cases for the years around 2010 (Jackson, 2015, pp. 27–30). Changes in 
detection rates are additionally attributable to the general underlying circumstances, like 
social, environmental, or political factors. However, despite all efforts, the mere existence 
of fraud or different fraudulent schemes in general did not change. Rezaee and Riley (2009, 
pp. 3–4) have examined various types of fraudulent schemes over a considerable timeframe 
between the 1980s and the early 2000s and have argued that history appears to be repeating 
itself, even despite political reforms and the efforts of professional institutions to improve 
fraud prevention, detection and deterrence. Although the severity of schemes varies, the 
authors have found cases at both ends of the timeframe for each type of scheme, with a 
clustering of cases shortly after the millennium. The factors that seem to have affected this 
trend can be summarized into three categories, the first two dealing with the social and 
economic environment at a private or a business level and the third factor with the 
opportunity to commit fraud. 
The first reason revolves around changes in trading behaviour as institutional investors 
began to focus more on raw financials than did private investors, whose investment decisions 
were more likely based on a belief in the products and the vision of the company, resulting 
in increased pressure on executives to present compelling numbers and thereby satisfy their 
investors (Jackson, 2015, p. 31). The second reason pertains to a potential change in the 
personalities of executives. Achieving and maintaining affluence and its associated social 
status may lead to unethical and perhaps greedy behaviour (Tunley, 2011, p. 314). Both 
reasons are combined when management compensation is tied to financial performance for 
example through stock options, which became increasingly popular around the 2000s 
(Jackson, 2015, p. 31). A third factor concerns the auditing profession and its role in 
determining financial statement fraud. Until the mid-1980s, the profession scarcely 
perceived itself as having a responsibility to detect fraudulently altered statements, leading 
to a lack of required skills and tools, rendering it ill-equipped and insufficiently interested in 
fraud detection at the beginning of the millennium (Wells, in Zack, 2013, XIV).28 Jackson 
(2015, p. 32) further argues that the auditing companies became increasingly dependent on 
additional consulting services, which developed to become the major source of revenue for 
the branch. Combined with the lack of auditor rotation, satisfying their customers in an 
unethical way by compromising audits potentially contributed to the surge of cases. 
                                                 
28 The so-called expectation gap and the role of auditors will be highlighted in section 2.4.6. 
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Additionally, weak and ineffective internal controls are supposed to have created 
opportunities for fraudulent actions (Jackson, 2015, p. 34). 
Fraud is not static. Rather, it evolves with the environment and adaptive detection models 
are necessary to account for this situation (Zhou & Kapoor, 2011). Singleton and Singleton 
(2010, p. 7) depict the fraud environment as a pendulum, swinging from one extreme to 
another, barely resting and in constant movement. They suggest that human nature, as well 
as business and legislative cycles combine to influence the fraud-bearing environment and 
thus the occurrence of fraudulent behaviour. Lee, Ingram, and Howard (1999, p. 783) 
suggest that it will never be possible to detect discreet fraudulent actions with ease, thus 
qualifying the mixed and sometimes seemingly poor results of fraud detection approaches 
and outliers in detection performance.29 To ensure the reliable detection of fraudulent cases 
and to consider the pervasive changes made to combat fraud, like SOX in 2002, it is 
necessary to test fraud detection models over longer timeframes and in real-world 
environments. 
2.1.4 Market Efficiency and the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine 
Having discussed the evolution of financial statement fraud, the ramifications for capital 
markets need to be ascertained. According to the efficient capital market hypothesis 
(ECMH), all stocks are perfectly priced according to their inherent investment properties, 
the knowledge of which all market participants equally possess (Fama, 1970). The ECMH 
comes in three forms (weak, semi-strong and strong) dependent on the nature of the 
information incorporated in the prices. 
The weak form states that only trading information regarding the instruments (e.g. shares 
or bonds) is already incorporated in prices. This type of information refers to historical 
information such as prices and volume. Thus, Fama (1970, pp. 386–387) suggests that prices 
follow a random-walk model, entailing the inexistence of patterns in prices and implies that 
future price movements are solely determined by information not contained in the price 
series. 
The semi-strong form then deals with the absorption of publicly available information 
such as announcements regarding the instrument, for example, the issuance of additional 
shares or financial disclosure like annual reports. The speed of the absorption of new 
                                                 
29  A comparison of the results of relevant studies in financial statement fraud detection can be found in table 
30 in section 5.2.5. 
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information is so high that no excess returns can be generated by trading with reliance on 
new public information. Moreover, the information absorbed is unbiased and therefore 
homogeneous across the market participants. In this way, an unexposed misstated financial 
report will influence prices based on manipulated information (Korsmo, 2014, pp. 13–14). 
The strong form postulates that all information, both publicly available and private, is 
incorporated in prices. In this case, an information monopoly does not exist and no one can 
earn excess returns. Fama (1970, p. 415) notes that the strong form is to be regarded as a 
benchmark of market efficiency against which deviations can be judged. Deviations at this 
point have already been brought forward, especially in regard to monopolistic information 
of specialized traders or company insiders (e.g. Niederhoffer & Osborne, 1966; Scholes, 
1970). With regard to fraud, perpetrators (e.g. managers) would enjoy a monopolistic 
information advantage if the fraudulent action were not uncovered or carried to outsiders. 
However, it may be possible due to managers’ trading behaviour, like exercising stock 
options (for example during unexpected times) that the information monopoly is weakened 
and hints of fraud are carried outside (Grove, Cook, Streeper, & Throckmorton, 2010, 
pp. 284–285). 
The ECMH has proved effective in addressing capital market inefficiencies. However, a 
degree of dissatisfaction has developed in the academic community. Bloomfield (2002) has 
formulated the incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH) to address the underreaction of prices 
to the release of accounting information. The incomplete revelation hypothesis states that 
information that is harder and therefore more costly to extract from financial reports is less 
completely revealed in prices. An important implication for the fraud detection literature is 
presented by managers’ decisions to make it more difficult to extract certain types of 
information from financial reports (for example bad news) and therefore they alter disclosure 
in such a way as to obfuscate its true nature (Courtis, 1998, pp. 461–462). The IRH, 
according to Bloomfield (2002), extends upon the ECMH and seeks to explain anomalies in 
price reactions as well as the disclosure decisions of companies. 
The impact of manipulated information on market prices is not only a problem from an 
economic but also from a legal perspective. The deception of investors who rely on the 
accuracy and efficiency of market prices has been debated extensively in the legal sciences 
(e.g. Macey & Miller, 1990). A number of corporate and securities laws are based upon the 
ECMH, including insider trading rules and more importantly for this study the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine (FOTM) (Korsmo, 2014, p. 5). The FOTM has been created by US courts 
and postulates that causality between untruthful information and resulting losses does not 
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require any proof; moreover, the release of untruthful information to the public is identical 
to the release of untruthful information to a certain party (e.g. Fischel, 1989, p. 908). Even 
if no actual party directly suffers from the manipulated information, fraud on the market is 
perceived as if there was an aggrieved party. Even if the purchase of stock or security does 
not directly rely on the information (but rather the information is processed into the market 
price), the company can be made responsible for the damage.30 In the case of Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, investors pleaded that the allegedly misrepresented information was publicly 
known, that the misstatement was of material nature, that the stock was traded in an efficient 
market and that the plaintiff traded the stock in the relevant period. The court furthermore 
stated that the link between the misrepresentation and the price the plaintiff paid must not be 
severed; otherwise, the FOTM presumption does not apply.  
Prior to FOTM, it was almost impossible to attain class certifications in fraud cases 
(Korsmo, 2014, p. 10). The courts found that first, most investors would not have read or 
heard the fraudulent financial report. Second, it was virtually impossible to prove that every 
individual investor had read the fraudulently manipulated report. (Nevertheless, in the 1960s, 
even before the postulation of the ECMH and its adoption into the legal academy, opinions 
existed about investors having to prove that they had actually read the misstated disclosure 
but relied on market prices to take investment decisions (Korsmo, 2014, pp. 11–12). 
Considerable criticism has been expressed towards the seemingly arbitrary adoption of 
the ECMH in the FOTM assumption. The courts did not postulate the form of the ECMH 
upon which they actually relied, especially problematic given the limited applicability of the 
theoretical underpinnings of each of the forms to financial statement fraud; they also failed 
to sufficiently emphasize the empirical verifications and instead focused on the theoretical 
concept of the ECMH (e.g. Carney, 1989; Macey & Miller, 1990; Jovanovic, Andreadakis, 
& Schinckus, 2016). The criticism did not only concern the FOTM assumption but 
regulators, too, as they relied inconsistently on the ECMH and its empirical evidence (e.g. 
Saari, 1977). Nevertheless, the criticism barely compromised the general idea of the 
conjunction of financial theory and the legal discipline, instead being more concerned with 
the manner of adoption. 
The FOTM assumption illustrates the reliance of the market on the truthfulness of 
corporate disclosure and incorporates economic theory behind the absorption of corporate 
                                                 
30 Relevant cases: Basic, Inc. v. Levinson (485 U.S. 224, 1988) and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton 
Co. et al. (563 U.S. 804, 2011). 
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information into corporate law. The intersection between accounting, finance, economics, 
and the legal discipline emphasizes the interdisciplinary nature of fraud and again 
demonstrates the importance of comprehensive fraud deterrence, prevention, and detection 
mechanisms to ensure functioning capital markets. The following section will highlight 
fraud theories to enhance understanding of fraudulent behaviour and identify aspects that 
might help to develop a sound detection model. 
2.2 Fraud Theory 
Fraud theories are created to explain the circumstances and motivation behind fraudulent 
actions, facilitating an understanding of their origins and providing a theoretical framework 
that can be utilized to develop tasks and tools to counter this unwanted behaviour (Elsayed, 
2017, pp. 2–4). Therefore, fraud theory is characterized by interdisciplinarity, covering 
topics from sociology, psychology and criminalistics (Ramamoorti, Pope, Morrison, & 
Koletar, 2013, p. 6). The objects of interest in most theories are usually the perpetrator, the 
action, and the environment. A holistic approach seems to be necessary to catch fraudulent 
activities in their entirety, although to date this has rarely been attempted (Dorminey et al., 
2012, pp. 570–576). 
The relevance of fraud theories for financial statement fraud detection has also been 
recognized by regulators and standard-setting bodies. For example, the American Institute 
of Public Accountants has adopted the fraud triangle in its Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 99 – Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The fraud triangle from 
Cressey (1950) is one of the most influential fraud theories and with its three basic factors 
of fraudulent behaviour (rationalization, opportunity and motivation) has laid the 
foundations for a number of theories that rely upon the original structure. Besides the 
fundamental theories, a number of new streams have been developed to capture all of fraud’s 
peculiarities. 
Maragno and Borba (2017) provide an extensive literature review of theoretical and 
empirical work on fraud and fraud theory. They highlight the evolution of fraud theories and 
depict the relationships between different approaches. The overview presented in Figure 4 
will be used as a basis for the discussion of influential fraud theories and will be expanded 
upon to reflect recent developments as well as additional models. The chapter will close with 
a summarization of the models and an indication of factors that might help in developing 
fraud detection models that rely on publicly available data. 
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Figure 4 – Fraud theory overview31 
                                                 
31 The fraud theory overview of Maragno and Borba (2017, p. 44) was adopted and complemented to reflect 
the additional theories discussed in this study. 
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2.2.1 White-Collar Crime 
As well as introducing the term “white-collar crime”, Sutherland (1940) provided one of the 
first explanatory attempts of the subject. He examined crimes covering economic and 
business-related activities and differentiated a “new” type of crime from the predominant 
topics, which mostly focused on street crime and violence primarily caused by poverty and 
associated psychopathic and sociopathic conditions. Regarding his definition, white collar-
crime is connected with violations of implied and/or delegated trust. It is obvious that the 
definition is closely connected to agency theory (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 557). Sutherland 
distinguished two categories of white-collar crime: misrepresentation of asset values and 
duplicity in the manipulation of power. His work plays an essential role in the perception 
and awareness of white-collar crime, developing the influential differential association 
theory from it (Sutherland, 1939; Sutherland, 1940; Sutherland, 1944; Sutherland, 1947). 
Sutherland’s work sought to fulfil two goals: to define and prove the existence and 
relevance of crime in an upper socioeconomic group; and to provide a generalizable theory 
behind crime in general (Dixon, 1995, pp. 561–562). Sutherland’s findings suggested that 
the main peculiarity defining and distinguishing white-collar crime from typical criminal 
activities at that time was the social status of the perpetrators. Indeed, the perpetrators were 
regarded as professionals with a high status in society, resulting in admiration that can lead 
to intimidation. He furthermore suggested that status would lead to fewer and less severe 
punishments because the criminal justice system was supposed to be less reliable in cases of 
white-collar crime, a supposition that was empirically confirmed by Snider (1982).32 Lastly, 
he noted that the consequences of white-collar crimes were more difficult to grasp than for 
common crimes. This was mostly due to an inability to identify victims in the diluted 
timeframe in which the delinquency took place and the lack of organization of the victims 
(Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 557). 
Besides the characterization of white-collar crime, Sutherland’s development of the 
differential association theory has provided an explanation of how a perpetrator becomes a 
criminal. He hypothesized that a person could learn criminal behaviour through interaction 
with others. This process encompasses values, motives, attitudes, and techniques. Hence, in 
an appropriate situation, when a favourable definition of crime outweighs an unfavourable 
                                                 
32 Snider (1982) compared the sanctions for white-collar crimes to other traditional nonviolent property 
offences (e.g. theft or possession of stolen goods), finding that white-collar crime seemed to be less severely 
punished in most cases, as he hypothesized. 
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one, a person may engage in criminal behaviour. In this regard, Sutherland created the basis 
for most subsequent theories by explaining how a person develops the capacity to commit 
fraud and how he or she finds the opportunity to realize the fraudulent scheme. 
Considerable criticism of the white-collar crime theory and its adaptation has been 
formulated. Perri, Lichtenwald, and Mieczkowska (2014, p. 77) criticize the lack of 
empirical evidence and the active work of Sutherland against the development of an 
interdisciplinary multi-factor approach.33 Although Sutherland’s model appears to constitute 
a multi-factorial approach to explain fraud, it mostly focuses on sociological factors while 
barely considering fundamental ideas from other disciplines like biology, economics or law 
(Perri et al., 2014, p. 74). Coleman (1987, pp. 434–435) argues that the theory has outlived 
reality and that the very broad concept of white-collar crime needs to be separated into 
different kinds of crimes. Moreover, the theory can only explain how the perpetrator 
becomes a criminal, rather than providing insights into the motivation behind it. Shapiro 
(1990, pp. 362–363) mentions the imprisoning nature of the framework of white-collar 
crime, which has dominated the fraud literature for many years and has in the process 
constrained the debate. Especially the focus on the sociological background of the 
perpetrator has limited the outcome to individual characteristics rather than the modus 
operandi of the crime (Dixon, 1995, p. 565). With the fraud triangle, which will be explained 
in the next section, the behavioural aspects of crime have been considered and some 
shortcomings of the white-collar crime theory have been overcome (Ramamoorti, 2008, 
pp. 524–526). 
2.2.2 The Fraud Triangle 
The fraud triangle, as depicted in Figure 5, is a popular model explaining the preconditions 
behind the fraudulent behaviour of individuals. It was developed from the same theory 
behind white-collar crime but seeks to generalize the factors to a greater extent and offers a 
broader explanatory fundament (Dorminey et al., 2012, pp. 557–558). The theory is based 
on a survey among prisoners convicted of embezzlement and has become the foundation of 
a large body of literature dealing with white-collar crimes (e.g. Cressey, 1950; Cressey, 
1953). Similarities in answers to the survey were condensed to non-shareable 
financial/economic problems, the opportunity and knowledge to commit the violation, and 
                                                 
33 Sutherland’s standing in the sociological and criminological fields dominated the debate for years. For a 
comprehensive review, see Perri et al. (2014). 
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the ability to adapt one’s self-perception in order to justify the violation as non-criminal. 
Therefore, the three factors every fraudulent action had in common were extracted and the 
triangle of pressure, rationalization, and opportunity was created.34 
 
Figure 5 – Fraud triangle 
Pressure, sometimes referred to as motivation or incentive, is the cause of the resultant 
action and consists of individual perceived needs (Cressey, 1950, p. 742). In the business 
context, pressure revolves around financial motives at an individual or company level 
(Schuchter & Levi, 2016, pp. 109–111). Overstating revenues to artificially boost the 
company’s performance could be an incentive that affects the company level but may also 
have an impact on the individual sphere when the related performance goals are defined in 
a bonus scheme. Hence, the individual and business levels are difficult to separate in the 
underlying context, as they are generally closely connected. The self-enriching behaviour in 
this example can be altered to self-preservation when the risk of a negative impact on one’s 
position in the company and associated financial and social status is concerned (Dorminey 
et al., 2010, pp. 18–19). In the aforementioned example of incentives, by not meeting the 
defined performance goal. Beyond plain financial motives, pressure may also arise through 
personal traits. The origin of fraudulent behaviour can rest in an individual’s personality 
when egocentric behaviour like aggrandizing one’s ego or an increased desire for power may 
result in illegitimate manipulations (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 45). In general, 
                                                 
34 Opportunity and pressure are sometimes described as perceived factors of the fraud triangle (e.g. Dorminey, 
Fleming, Kranacher, & Riley Jr., 2010) owing to the arbitrary and individual nature of the two factors. In 
the following, the two factors will only be termed “opportunity” and “pressure”. Also see Lokanan (2015) 
for a deconstruction of arguments from the literature. 
Pressure
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motivations, incentives or pressure occur in different ways and need to be identified on a 
personal level (Gottschalk, 2018, pp. 8–11).35 
Rationalization, the second factor of the fraud triangle, addresses the justification of the 
perpetrators. Rationalizing the fraudulent behaviour must be in accordance with individual 
moral values. Violators often do not see themselves as criminals and justify their actions by 
external factors such as underlying circumstances. When referring to the example of 
overstated revenues and the resulting bonus payments, the justification could be the 
individual’s belief that he or she deserves the gratification. Another commonly observed 
justification from Cressey (1953) deals with the fraudster’s perception of the damage or harm 
resulting from the action. Given that the company is usually the victim, the consequent harm 
to indirectly affected individuals is not taken into consideration or is valued less. The 
reasoning may even involve benevolent justifications, where the fraud committed is done 
for the good of others or for a greater good in general (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 46). 
Gottschalk (2018, pp. 24–28) has reviewed the neutralization theory, which was introduced 
by Sykes and Matza (1957) but only became popular in the field of fraud and white-collar 
crime in recent years. The theory explains the reasoning of fraudsters behind their violations. 
These individuals tend to deny the damage caused or ignore the victims associated with the 
damage and lack responsibility for the violation in general. The neutralization theory may 
help in identifying rationalization attempts and relies on 13 neutralization techniques. Some 
of these attempts relevant for financial statement fraud that have not been examined to date 
include the individual’s “opinion” that the violation was a legal mistake that should not be 
forbidden or regulated. With regard to the complex nature of accounting rules, altering 
financial statements beyond legal permissions for whatever reason might be rationalized by 
the opinion of having the right to do so. Another closely related neutralization technique is 
a dilemma leading to a trade-off between benefits and costs, where the violation is accepted 
following consideration of all interests and alternatives.36 Overall, the range of possible 
justifications is vast and is based on a multitude of factors that influence each individual’s 
moral standards, rendering them difficult to identify. 
The third factor of the fraud triangle is related to the knowledge and the opportunity to 
perform the actions causing or related to the fraud scheme. Knowing the internal control 
mechanisms and the associated probability of being detected plays an important role in 
                                                 
35  Gottschalk (2018, p. 9) relied on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to identify motives on different levels. 
36 Per definition, a dilemma represents a state of mind in which it is not obvious what is wrong or right. 
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influencing the potential perpetrator to engage in fraudulent behaviour (Rezaee & Riley, 
2009, pp. 67–68). The factor opportunity also deals with the inherent possibility of 
committing the crime, implying access to relevant resources and an ability to manipulate 
them accordingly. Access is usually granted through trust and a level of faith in the skills 
and honesty of an individual. In terms of overstated revenues, manipulators most likely come 
from the accounting department or are managers and executives with respective access to 
and knowledge of the systems. The development of colluding groups may also be possible 
(Ramamoorti et al., 2013, p. 52). 
Cressey was not the only scholar to conduct field research by surveying fraudsters. 
Indeed, Dellaportas (2013) interviewed 10 male accountants who were serving custodial 
sentences for committing fraud or related offences. His goal was to examine the reasons 
behind fraudulent activities as well as the fraudsters’ point of view as professionals in the 
field of accounting, bringing the answers in relation with traditional theories like the fraud 
triangle. His results suggested that opportunity rather than motivation (pressure/incentive) 
play a decisive role and may be the key to countering fraudulent actions. Schuchter and Levi 
(2016) gathered additional empirical evidence. In their study of 13 cases of fraud from 
Switzerland and Austria, they found that not all factors from the fraud triangle are a 
necessary precondition for fraud. In contrast to Dellaportas (2013), they noted that from a 
motivational standpoint, a monetary incentive is not sufficient, while pressure from inside 
the company is an essential driver behind fraudulent violations. Another empirical study was 
conducted by Skousen, Smith, and Wright (2009), who operationalized the three factors of 
the fraud triangle using 26 variables, mainly constructed of information from financial 
statements. They matched 86 fraud firms with non-fraudulent firms to test the influence of 
the suggested proxies using logit regression analysis. Five proxies for pressure and two for 
opportunity showed a significant impact. Overall, empirical evidence specifically testing 
factors from the fraud triangle remain rather scarce.37 
Amongst professionals, the fraud triangle has become very popular in understanding 
fraud and developing the techniques to detect and deter it (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 19). 
With the implementation of the fraud triangle in the Statement on Auditing Standard 99 – 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (2002), the fraud triangle has even 
                                                 
37 However, the variables from Skousen et al. (2009) are based on other studies’ results, e.g. Persons (1995) 
and Kaminski, Sterling Wetzel, and Guan (2004), which are not directly related to the fraud triangle factors. 
In the present study, a similar set of variables is tested, with further explanations provided in section 4.1.4. 
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become part of the auditing process, raising auditors’ awareness of the factors behind 
fraudulent behaviour. 
However, scepticism about the fraud triangle’s (and to some extent, its conceptual 
offspring’s) appropriateness in explaining fraudulent actions at more than a simplistic level 
(e.g. Lokanan, 2015; Huber, 2017). Moreover, the basic concept from Cressey (1953) was 
extracted from cases of embezzlement and is arguably not transferable to every kind of fraud 
(Huber, 2017, p. 31). Lokanan (2015) has noted that the focus on a strict and individualized 
framework like the fraud triangle may draw attention from other decision-making 
approaches that may explain fraud more effectively in particular cases. This is especially 
true for different types of fraud that cannot be explained by the fraud triangle, such as the 
existence of predatorial fraudsters. For such predators, motivation and rationalization play a 
minor if not unimportant role, as they will commit fraud by opportunity (Dorminey et al., 
2012). Moreover is the implementation of the fraud triangle into the auditing standard 
criticised. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) have compiled the fraud triangle and game theory 
to develop a best practice approach for auditors with the assistance of the fraud triangle 
framework. They suggest the basic implementation of the fraud triangle into the auditing 
standard to hardly represent a successful way of utilising fraud theory in the auditing practice 
and hint at individual, unpredictable auditing procedures to be best suited for the task of 
detecting fraud. The following sections will highlight improvements to the fraud triangle 
with the aim of tackling the aforementioned shortcomings and enhancing understanding of 
fraudulent behaviour. 
2.2.3 Derivatives of the Fraud Triangle 
The fraud triangle has served as the parent of a number of thematically related offspring, 
which have been developed since its origins in the middle of the 20th century.38 The 
limitations of the fraud triangle lie in its perspective and in the typecast of the fraudster 
(Dorminey et al., 2010, pp. 19–22). Indeed, the fraud triangle operates from the fraudsters’ 
perspective, rendering two factors (pressure and rationalization) unobservable. Furthermore, 
the fraud triangle does not consider pathological fraudsters or at least does not explain their 
actions. Dorminey et al. (2010, p. 21) postulate that the fraud triangle works well for 
accidental fraudsters but is less suitable for more deliberate types of fraud (predators or 
                                                 
38 For a detailed discussion about the critics of Cressey’s work, further read Rogovin and Martens (1992). 
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collusion). For those types, the explaining factor is mostly opportunity, rather than 
rationalization or pressure. The shortcomings were revised and the model was further 
developed into a fraud diamond that additionally includes incentive and capability 
(sometimes referred to as capacity) instead of pressure (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004).39 
Capability and incentive are easier to observe and are also able to explain the fraudulent 
actions of different types of fraudsters, like predators. Incentive corresponds to pressure from 
the older model but is more closely tied to the business environment, where the observable 
pressure is more likely to be based on incentives due to compensation schemes. The factor 
of capability focuses on personal traits and abilities. In contrast to opportunity, which exists 
in the context of the fraud diamond rather than being associated with environmental factors, 
capability is directly targeted at the perpetrator (Schuchter & Levi, 2016, pp. 111–112). 
Capability plays an important role given opportunity and incentive. It is associated with the 
knowledge to commit the violation as well as character traits that might help during the 
fraudulent act and the process of rationalization.40 Hence, Wolfe and Hermanson (2004, 
p. 38) have argued that although pressure and opportunity exist to commit fraud, alongside 
a potential rationalization of the crime, it is essential for the fraudster to have the capability 
to conduct and conceal the action. With the aforementioned changes to the fraud triangle, 
the fraud diamond seems to be better suited to explain fraudulent actions and develop 
detection and deterrence strategies.41 
Another offspring from the fraud triangle that seeks to enhance understanding of some of 
its factors is the fraud scale. The fraud scale, akin to other theories like Machiavellianism, 
attempts to improve knowledge about fraud by facilitating understanding of one of the more 
complex factors derived from the fraud triangle: the rationalization of the fraudster. 
Albrecht, Howe, and Romney (1984) introduced the fraud scale as an improvement to the 
fraud triangle in the case of occupational fraud, especially for financial statement 
misrepresentation. In their extensive study, they surveyed internal auditors (internal audit 
directors) on fraud demographics, perpetrator characteristics, specific causes and auditor 
directors’ perspectives (Albrecht et al., 1984). They attained data from 212 internal auditors 
during the 1980s and were able to build their fraud theory based on 82 different variables, 
mostly focusing on company and perpetrator characteristics. They argued that motivation 
                                                 
39 Different names have been developed for the fraud diamond. For instance, Kassem and Higson (2012) refer 
to the fraud diamond as the “New Fraud Triangle”. 
40  See section 2.2.6 and the effectuations on Machiavellianism for further understanding. 
41 For a detailed comparison of both models, see Abdullahi and Mansor (2015). 
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and pressure to meet analyst perceptions were already easily observable in this context. To 
better assess the likelihood of fraud, they omitted the rationalization factor and instead 
introduced a new factor, integrity, referring to ethical behaviour based on the personal code 
each person adopts. According to these authors, integrity is observable through a person’s 
decisions and related decision-making processes. When the three factors are considered 
simultaneously, the fraud scale can provide a tool to assess the probability of fraud (e.g. high 
pressure and motivation and low integrity indicates a high probability of fraud). 
2.2.4 ABC Fraud Theory 
Social psychology offers explanation attempts of fraud committed through the management 
by studying the relationship between individuals and the organization (Greller, 1980, 
pp. 171–172). Potential aspects cover the individual’s role in a group, basic group processes 
and the identification of an individual inside the organization (Greller, 1980, pp. 172–173). 
As the nature of management usually revolves around group processes, studying fraud from 
this very perspective may deliver additional insight into the occurrence of fraud.  
The ABC theory for fraud was introduced by Ramamoorti et al. (2013) and refers to the 
organizational factors most closely associated with interpersonal relationships in companies. 
Ramamoorti et al. (2013, p. 23) suggest that fraud is a natural human activity that must be 
studied in terms of emotions and the state of mind, with greater emphasis thus placed on 
behavioural science rather than Sutherland’s sociological approaches. The acronym ABC 
stands for apple, bushel, and crop. The three elements describe the three levels that should 
be considered when analyzing fraudulent behaviour. The first level is the individual sphere, 
the second level describes a colluding group, and the third level expands to the entire 
organizational culture. The wording originally referenced the bad apple spoiling its 
neighbours. Two main questions that need to be asked when examining fraud arise from this 
metaphor. 
The first deals with the number of persons involved in a fraudulent action. Ramamoorti 
et al. (2013, pp. 49–50) present anecdotal evidence from cases of rogue traders who caused 
immense losses for their respective corporations. In most cases, it seems that the perpetrator 
acted on his or her own and without any help from others. However, it is to question if this 
is actually true, or if colluding groups were able to conceal their involvement, resulting in 
the incomplete exposure of the perpetrators. Greller (1980, p. 172) suggests that the three 
functions of a group, namely the task function, sentient function and the reference function 
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play a major role in forming colluding groups of perpetrators in the case of management 
fraud. As Greller mentions, for example does the reference function help granting a level of 
rectitude of the fraudulent actions, while the sentient function offers a sense of relief and 
understanding and reduces alienating tendencies of the perpetrator through manipulating 
financial statements (which is the task function in this scenario because of the management’s 
involvement in the preparation of the financial statements). These aspects might spread from 
certain groups and negatively influence the entire company, providing organizational and 
environmental factors that foster fraudulent behaviour. Especially the tone at the top may 
induce a trickle-down effect through the organization and result in a culture that may benefit 
the development of unethical behaviour like fraud (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 79–82). As 
mentioned in section 2.1.1, when categorizing the different types of fraud, poor tone at the 
top is deemed one of the most prevalent internal weaknesses in the case of financial 
statement fraud. 
The second question arises from the most recent view of behavioural forensic on the ABC 
theory. With the bad apple spoiling its neighbours, the existence of remaining good apples 
is of interest for forensics. Macey (2013, pp. 83–88) argues that the coexistence of “good 
and bad apples” can very well be seen in recent scandals like Arthur Anderson, where 
employees remain valuable to the industry despite the company’s collapse. In addition, 
employees who are reluctant or unwilling to converge towards the colluding fraudulent 
groups yield high potential for fraud detection through whistle-blowing mechanisms (Rezaee 
& Riley, 2009, p. 81). These mechanisms seem to operate as cases like WorldCom have 
shown, where whistle-blowing of the Vice President’s internal audit led to the discovery of 
a major accounting scandal (Scharff, 2005). With regard to the business level, it has 
furthermore been assumed and found that individuals or groups further up in the 
management chain commit larger and more severe fraudulent actions (e.g. Heath, 2008, 
p. 600; Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 59–63). Hansen (2009, p. 33) argues that occupational 
fraud committed by top-level employees or groups of top-level employees is especially 
difficult to detect because higher positions are associated with more trust. These positions 
are more difficult to oversee or supervise and provide a confined space for actions and 
arrangements. Overall, organizational structure and individual idiosyncrasies are regarded 
as a major factor within the ABC theory. 
The implications of the ABC theory for fraud detection and deterrence efforts primarily 
rely on human resource management. Background checks and ethics training are regarded 
as viable solutions to counter the emergence or spreading of such behaviour. In particular, 
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the spreading of unwanted behaviour should be tackled by establishing an ethical foundation 
that does not tolerate fraudulent behaviour. Internal controls are regarded as ineffective when 
colluding groups with top-level support engage in schemes (Ramamoorti et al., 2013, p. 52). 
Therefore, fraud factors capturing the characteristics of internal control systems may also be 
suited to help detect weaknesses and the greater opportunity for fraudulent behaviour. 
2.2.5 MICE and SCORE Model 
Another theoretical concept that provides explanations for fraudulent actions has the 
acronym MICE (Kranacher, Riley, & Wells, op. 2011, pp. 13–14). MICE is hardly 
comparable to the fraud triangle or diamond because it focuses on a less holistic approach, 
and instead focussing onto motivational factors for fraudsters (Dorminey et al., 2010, pp. 20–
21; Kassem & Higson, 2012, p. 194). The model divides motivation into four factors: 
money, ideology, coercion, and entitlement (ego). Whilst money is rather straightforward, 
ideology captures actions of some (perceived) greater good, in line with the personal belief 
of fraud being justified in this very case. Examples of ideology include tax evasion and 
terrorist financing (Dorminey et al., 2010, p. 21). Coercion occurs when individuals become 
accidentally or unwillingly part of a fraud scheme and are often forced to assist the fraudulent 
actions. Ego or entitlement refers to the psychological theory of criminal behaviour rooted 
in the mental processes of individuals. Stotland (1977) provides examples of the self-centred 
factor, suggesting that a sense of superiority and admiration are essential for white-collar 
crimes.42 The recent literature dealing with prominent cases like Enron, WorldCom, 
Adelphia, Phar-Mor and ZZZZ assumes that motivation behind recent cases is best explained 
via a combination of money and entitlement (Dorminey et al., 2012, p. 563). Overall, the 
MICE concept is rather simplistic but nevertheless provides an additional and potentially 
even complementary framework to the fraud triangle/diamond to explain fraudulent actions. 
Vousinas (2019) has introduced the fraud pentagon model, with the acronym SCORE. 
The five letters stand for stimulus, capability, opportunity, rationalization, and ego. The five 
factors are derived from a combination of the fraud diamond and the MICE model. Vousinas 
(2019) further expanded upon his initial model by adding collusion as a sixth factor, resulting 
in the fraud hexagon, also called the SCCORE model. Collusion plays an important role, as 
already highlighted in the ABC theory, when groups inside the company act together, 
                                                 
42 This can even be related to Sutherland (1940), whose white-collar crime theory was primarily based on the 
social status phenomena of a socioeconomic upper class. 
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making it even harder to detect the fraudulent violation. The fraud pentagon/hexagon seeks 
to provide a better and more complete approach by combining popular theory. However, as 
of now, there is no empirical justification for the model being better suited than its 
predecessors are. 
2.2.6 Machiavellian Behaviour 
The factors of opportunity and pressure from the fraud triangle have been researched 
extensively and are widely accepted as being associated with fraud, however, the third factor, 
rationalization, is only tangible at the level of individuals, rendering it rather difficult to 
observe (Murphy & Dacin, 2011, pp. 604–605). Rationalization is important in reducing the 
negative emotional effects triggered by fraudulent behaviour. These negative effects may 
include encountering self-conscious moral emotion, for example in the form of guilt, caused 
by the known violation of societal norms or by discomfort with performing a counter-
attitudinal behaviour. Sloane (1944, p. 12) defines rationalization as the “mental process of 
justifying conduct by adducing false motives”. Therefore, it is important for an effective 
rationalization to be believable to the person constructing it (Murphy & Dacin, 2011, p. 613). 
The predisposition to misreport may be observed in the form of an attitude or a character 
trait (Murphy, 2012, p. 244). Whereas attitudes are less stable and may change over time, 
character traits are said to be largely consistent over a person’s lifetime. Machiavellianism 
is regarded as a character trait that describes people engaging in manipulative behaviour 
towards others for their own purposes (Christie & Geis, 1970, pp. 1–10). Such individuals 
tend to be more opportunistic and act in self-interest, while being more inclined to fraudulent 
behaviour (cheating) when the probability of detection is low (e.g. Cooper & Peterson, 1980; 
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & Smith, 2002; Murphy, 2012). 
Murphy (2012) conducted an experiment in which participants were given the 
opportunity and the motivation to misreport. Based on the theory, Machiavellianism should 
be associated with a higher probability to misreport, as also supported by her findings.43 In 
addition, Machiavellians were found to feel less guilty after the violation. Murphy further 
argues that misreporting is rational behaviour for a Machiavellian in the sense of an 
individual acting in his or her own best interest, like a homo economicus maximizing utility. 
The Machiavellian theory underlines the importance of character traits as a potential 
                                                 
43 Murphy mentioned that her experimental design did not account for potential punishments for misreporting, 
which is a typical deterrence mechanism that may influence Machiavellians in their decision-making. 
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predictor for fraudulent behaviour (and there might be more traits involved, too) (Paulhus & 
Williams, 2002). Therefore, signals of character traits may be taken into consideration when 
designing fraud-detection mechanisms. However, in reality, this might be difficult and one 
is dependent on more accessible clues (Skousen et al., 2009). One source with the potential 
to be translated into character traits and thus constitute a potential predisposition towards 
fraudulent behaviour is the written word, which tends to convey deceptive clues (e.g. Goel 
et al., 2010).44 
2.2.7 Fraud and the Principle Agent Theory 
Management fraud can also be studied from the perspective of agency theory, especially 
when focusing on the conflict between the parties involved, the so-called principal-agent 
problem (Elsayed, 2017, pp. 4–6). The principal-agent problem arises from the very core of 
agency theory when one person or party (agent/s) is assigned to make decisions on behalf of 
another person or party (principal/s) in a contractual relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). This may occur in different settings, for example in the business 
context with the manager as an agent and the stockholders as principals but is also applicable 
to political science, where politicians and voters form the counterparties. 
One of the causes rests in the potential existence of information asymmetries constituting 
qualitative or quantitative information advantages of one of the involved parties (Akerlof, 
1970, pp. 489–491). What causes information asymmetry are differences in access to 
information, the expertise to understand it and physical (geographical) and social distances 
between the involved parties (McGuire, 1988, p. 7). For example, in the business context, 
the manager has considerably better access to company information, especially regarding 
the financial situation. Information asymmetry and opportunity to commit fraud are closely 
connected (Ndofor, Wesley, & Priem, 2012, p. 1780). Opportunity as part of the fraud 
triangle is a necessary and sufficient precondition of fraudulent behaviour and is especially 
pronounced in an environment with high information asymmetry. 
Moreover, agency theory is based on several assumptions that may help to explain 
fraudulent actions. Besides being typically rational and risk-averse, people (agents) are also 
assumed to act in self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 492). When acting in self-interest, the 
agent might not be inclined to report the true and fair view of the company. The existence of 
                                                 
44  A detailed discussion is provided in the sections 3.1. and 3.2. 
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information asymmetry makes it impossible for principals to detect whether the reported 
numbers are truthfully reflecting the company situation. However, the consequences of the 
fraudulently reported numbers do not only harm the principals but all stakeholders with 
different levels of severity based on the dependence between the parties (Hill & Jones, 1992, 
pp. 134–136). In addition, information asymmetry may lead to moral hazards. These 
describe agents’ tendency to engage in unwanted behaviour, which may lead to individual 
benefits, knowing that someone else is bearing most of the risk (Arrow, 1963, pp. 961–962). 
Moral hazards originated in the economics literature on welfare and insurance, where insured 
people might increase their risk exposure, knowing that they are secure and disassociated 
from potential costs (Baker, 1996, pp. 252–253). The difference in knowledge of the risk-
taking party against the risk-bearing party about its own intentions and actions constitutes 
an information asymmetry.  
One possibility to solve the aforementioned conflicts is to align agents’ interests with 
those of the principals. This can, for example, be achieved by establishing appropriate 
compensation schemes that act as an incentive to pursue the desired outcome, or by internal 
and external corporate governance tools in the form of monitoring or disciplinary 
mechanisms (Wiseman, Rodríguez, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2012, p. 206).45 In addition, the market 
for corporate control or other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms to 
monitor and discipline agents may help overcome the agency problem (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, 
& Dalton, 2007, pp. 23–24). Typically, agents face a combined set of mechanisms that must 
be adjusted on a regular basis (Ndofor et al., 2012, p. 1794). For example, stock options 
could be a possibility to expand the risk sphere from the shareholders towards the managers. 
In addition to the direct interweaving of the agents’ and the principals’ fate, monitoring the 
execution of stock options by managers may yield important information. Indeed, Gerard 
and Weber (2014) identified patterns in the execution of stock options of managers shortly 
before they engaged in fraudulent schemes. 
Although, stock options resulting in the agent potentially becoming a principal and tying 
their fate closely together, the recent accounting scandals are said to be negatively influenced 
by the excessive use of stock options as a form of management compensation. Hake (2016) 
argues that stock options are rather leading to a short-term than a long-term view and 
increase the likelihood of accounting manipulations in order to profit from capital gains 
                                                 
45 A comprehensive overview of the relationship of corporate governance and fraud can be found in section 
2.4. 
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rather than long-term profitability. Besides efforts to counter the unwanted behaviour of 
managers by establishing suitable mechanisms, principals can also decide to limit the leeway 
in which this might appear. Especially in cases where principals have little to no control over 
agents, such figures might reduce their vulnerability by limiting agents’ discretion (McGuire, 
1988, p. 8). 
Overall, applying agency theory to financial statement fraud can help to build an 
understanding of the relationship between agents and principals and the mechanisms that 
may reduce the risk of fraudulently altered corporate reports. Moreover, it can assist in 
identifying potential clues for fraud detection purposes, which will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
2.2.8 Implications for Fraud Detection 
The fraud theories discussed in the previous sections have sought to explain fraudulent 
actions from different angles. Given the existence of multiple points of view, when trying to 
create effective fraud deterrence, prevention and detection mechanisms seem to be of vital 
importance in capturing as many factors as possible. This section will identify how fraud 
theory has been operationalized so far as well as the extent to which this study can rely on 
the theoretical foundations of the models presented to date. The availability of and access to 
the required information to capture the factors may constrain efforts in the first place. 
Moreover, some factors of fraud theory are rather difficult to capture, especially those meant 
to be surveyed on an individual level (Skousen et al., 2009, pp. 66–67; Nakashima, 2017, 
p. 27). 
However, given that the type of fraud examined in this study influences a communication 
vehicle, namely the annual report in which the perpetrator is more or less directly 
communicating with the deceived receivers, communication patterns that are potentially 
derived from the individual level may be deducible (e.g. Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Hence, 
not every factor of each model can be implemented into the detection approach, or at least 
not at the same level of depth and most likely not with the same suitability. Presumably, a 
detection model building upon a holistic view and therefore covering many of the factors in 
different dimensions by enriching the data set with additional sources performs better than a 
mere focus on isolated factors (Dorminey et al., 2012).  
Operationalizing variables from fraud theory is important, yet not always possible. In the 
case of quantitative predictors, this study relies on previous findings and adopts the 
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association between measurements and fraud factors. Few studies have actively sought to 
build upon whole concepts of fraud theory like Skousen et al. (2009) did with the fraud 
triangle. In most cases, only single factors such as pressure are examined (and even then, the 
link to related theory is often missing). 
Three basic factors, namely rationalization, opportunity, and motivation/pressure 
constitute the core of fraud theory. These factors, which made up the original fraud triangle, 
form the basis for further substantiations. Relative the well-studied and therefore established 
factors of fraud detection models of opportunity and motivation/pressure, rationalization has 
received little attention (Murphy, 2012). Rationalization can scarcely be observed from the 
outside. Even with theories that seek to expand upon rationalization (like Machiavellianism), 
the fraud diamond or the fraud scale, finding an appropriate way to operationalize this factor 
by exploiting publicly available information in general or from the company financials (as 
is most common) in particular represents a major challenge. In contrast to opportunity and 
motivation, rationalization is mainly rooted in the mindset of each person and is thus 
manifested in diverse forms. The closest we can potentially get with the data from annual 
reports is by analyzing the narratives, especially those subject to a high degree of 
management discretion (Goel et al., 2010, pp. 28–29). These may capture patterns that can 
be associated with character traits and attitudes, like deceptive nature, that scratch the surface 
of this fraud factor. Lendez and Lorevec (1999, pp. 48–49) suggest that management 
characteristics influence the financial reporting procedure of a company, potentially enabling 
the possibility of identifying fraudulent clues through reporting peculiarities in financial 
reports. 
The factors of opportunity and motivation or pressure can be captured more easily, as 
they are typically closely tied to the company, hence necessary data are more readily 
available. In particular, financial pressure is observable through financial information 
available in the balance sheet or income statement. Opportunity as a manifestation of 
institutional peculiarities, like the design of the internal control mechanisms, is to a certain 
degree also readily observable through publicly available information. However, when 
expanding both factors by adding more explanatory theories, like MICE for identifying 
motivational elements or ABC theory for group cohesion and interpersonal relationships, the 
operationalization of these factors becomes significantly more difficult. Elliott and 
Willingham (1980, pp. 35–39) already suggested to rely on the work of Sutherland and 
Cressey and operationalize the hints from sociology like differential association theory to 
assess the likelihood of learning and spreading of unwanted behaviour. In general, as soon 
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as the personal (and interpersonal in the case of ABC theory) sphere of managers is reached, 
determining appropriate predictors from publicly available information is hardly possible. 
Therefore, to come as close to a holistic approach as possible, relying on corporate narratives 
may help proxy for the factors that cannot otherwise be captured. 
Despite attempting to translate the fraud factors into abstract variables, fraud theory 
literature has also created far more directly observable clues (Albrecht et al., 2016, p. 175). 
The clues are intended to sensitize auditors in particular to hints that may be associated with 
fraudulent activities. Generating an extensive list of such hints, also referred to as red flags, 
has been undertaken extensively in the fraud literature. Red flags are the fingerprints of 
fraud. They are derived from fraud factors or gathered on a case basis from empirical 
investigations (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 95–110). The literature has conducted 
extensive research on fraudulent cases over a considerable timeframe. The compiled results 
have led to the identification of red flags, which can be associated with factors of fraud 
theory. Albrecht et al. (1984) have composed a list of 82 potential red flags from an extensive 
range of different data sources. The red flags were not exclusive to financial statement fraud 
but fraud in general. Their hints could be classified into three levels: societal red flags, 
organizational red flags and personal red flags. Examples for the red flags include peer 
pressure to succeed on a social level, unrealistic performance goals on an organizational 
level and a feeling of being underpaid for the job on a personal level. Singleton and Singleton 
(2010) built upon the initial work of Albrecht et al. (1984), gathering a comprehensive list 
of fraud-specific red flags on the level of different fraudulent schemes. An example of a red 
flag for fictitious revenue schemes would be missing, incomplete, or fictitious customer data. 
For a scheme surrounding concealed liabilities, different auditors for different subsidiaries 
could constitute a red flag. Red flags have also found a way into professional standards. For 
example, SAS 99 – Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit incorporates a red 
flag matrix for different types of fraud and fraud factors. Overall, the tenets of SOX have led 
to the consideration of red flags in standards in different styles (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, 
p. 301). Based upon fraud theory, it can be hypothesized that detection models covering 
more factors or the same factors in greater detail yield better detection performance 
compared to models with less coverage (Elliott & Willingham, 1980, p. 35). Therefore, this 
study relies on the identification and extraction of fraudulent patterns from all parts of the 
annual report, specifically a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, to capture 
potential clues. 
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Given that annual or interim reports are concerned with fraudulent manipulations, the 
financial reporting process – with its underlying framework as well as its typical schemes –
needs to be discussed before identifying the potential detection mechanisms. Therefore, in 
the following sections, the foundation of an accounting and auditing standpoint will be laid, 
before explaining the feature generation and detection approaches. 
2.3 Fraud through Manipulations of Accounts 
The accounting standards according to which the reports are prepared and to which they 
declare conformity are willingly violated in the case of financial statement fraud. The 
difference in regards to an honest mistake rests in the intention of the preparers of the 
statements to manipulate the reports to deceive their readers (Zack, 2013, pp. 239–244). 
When detecting fraud, it is difficult to prove the intention behind altered financial statements 
(Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 40). The effectuations in this section will cover the most 
common practices of fraudulent alterations of financial statements that due to the effort and 
complexity that go into the execution of the schemes, very likely are not only an honest 
mistake (Wells, 2017, pp. 328–329). 
Based on the fraud tree in Figure 2, the schemes of financial statement fraud can be 
divided into six categories: net worth/income overstatements and understatements; timing 
differences; understated and overstated revenues; understated and overstated 
liabilities/expenses; improper asset valuations; and improper disclosure. Each of these 
categories will be covered following the structure of Zack (2013) and dividing fraud types 
into revenue bases schemes, asset-based schemes, liability- and expense-based schemes and 
derived schemes, thus accounting for the remaining types of fraudulent misrepresentations. 
However, as will be shown in the following sections, fraudulent cases are not exclusive to a 
certain category that can be explained by the interrelated nature of the financial statements 
and the surrounding disclosure. Fraudulent schemes typically affect balance sheets and 
income statements at the same time (Wells, 2017, p. 49). Furthermore, in practice, multiple 
fraud schemes are often conducted in conjunction, making it difficult to separate the cases. 
In anticipation of the upcoming development of a fraud detection model, Figure 6 depicts 
the distribution of the different fraud categories in this study’s sample. 
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Figure 6 – Fraud schemes in the sample 
The cases from the sample can mostly be assigned to revenue and liability/expense 
schemes, which together equate to almost 80% of all cases. Asset-based schemes seem to be 
rather rare, with only 20% of occurrence, while derived schemes are almost non-existent in 
this study’s sample. Dividing the cases into single categories is rather arbitrary, as about one 
third of the cases refer to several AAERs with multiple misstatement events and can 
therefore hardly be allocated. The distribution of schemes of financial statement fraud in this 
study’s sample is similar to the distribution of the Global Fraud Survey (2015), as published 
in Wells (2017, p. 321), in which expenses and liabilities schemes constitute the largest 
portion of cases with fictitious revenue schemes following slightly behind on the second 
place.46 The following sections will provide a basic insight into the financial statement 
reporting process and the most common fraudulent schemes. 
                                                 
46  The differences are most likely attributable to the scope of the study. The Global Fraud Survey, as the name 
suggests, incorporates a larger number of cases from different countries. 
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2.3.1 Financial Reporting and Annual Reports 
It has been shown that the financial reporting process requires a certain degree of oversight 
to guarantee the correctness of financial statements (Wells, 2017, pp. 309–311). The 
developments of the accounting and auditing professions, as partially depicted in section 
2.1.3, are the result of the need for reliable financial information issued by companies. The 
complexity of the financial reporting process has grown significantly over time and reached 
new heights in the aftermath of the severe fraud cases of the early 2000s and SOX (Rezaee 
& Riley, 2009, pp. 20–21). The participants involved and depicted in Figure 7 are the 
companies and their directors and officers, independent public accountants and oversight 
bodies, as broken down by the Treadway Commission in its report. 
 
Figure 7 – Financial reporting system47 
                                                 
47 In reference to Rezaee and Riley (2009, p. 32) and the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting (1987, p.18). Retrieved from https://www.coso.org/Documents/NCFFR.pdf. Altered 
to reflect the users’ influence on the oversight bodies. 
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The directors are responsible for true and fair presentation and thus conformity with 
applicable accounting standards. Therefore, the integrity and quality of financial reports 
reflect the commitment of the management to issue reliable, relevant and useful information 
about the company’s financial status (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 184–185). In this regard, 
management prepares and certifies financial statements, while the board of directors, 
including the audit committee, oversees the process. Independent public accountants engage 
in the process by rendering an opinion about the fair presentation of the financial reports and 
their conformity with applicable accounting principles. The purpose of lending more 
credibility and objectivity to the financial reports and therefore reducing information risk 
can only be achieved if the auditors are without any doubt independent and knowledgeable 
to fulfil the task (Wells, 2017, pp. 310–311). Despite those two directly involved parties 
(management and public accountants), several oversight bodies are concerned with the 
financial reporting process (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, p. 33). The oversight bodies influence 
the whole process, for example by releasing accounting standards and requirements as well 
as auditing standards. Moreover, oversight institutions like the SEC are responsible for 
capital market supervision, including the financial reporting process of publicly traded 
companies. However, the SEC may delegate its authority to other institutions, for example, 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) regarding the issuance of accounting 
standards or the PCAOB to regulate auditing firms (in the post-SOX era) (Wells, 2017, 
pp. 309–311). Finally, the recipients of the financial reports absorb the information and make 
decisions based upon the true and fairly presented view of the company. Potential feedback 
from the users to the oversight bodies exists, due to the possible influence for instance of the 
accounting standard-setting process according to the needs of the financial statement’s 
recipients (Harding & Mckinnon, 1997). 
The primary financial report and therefore the main communication vehicle is a 
company’s annual report. In the USA, under Rule 14a-3 of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, a company is required to provide annual reports to shareholders in conjunction with 
annual shareholder meetings. The annual report must consist of audited financial statements, 
the balance sheet of the two most recent fiscal years and statements of income and cash flow 
of the three most recent years (Securities and Exchange Act 1933, Chapter 240.14a-3 (b) 1). 
In addition, Regulation S-K and especially subpart 229.300 regarding further financial 
information organized in items 301-308 should be included in the annual report. Such 
information must include selected quarterly financial data, summaries of financial data for 
the last five years, segment information, management discussion and analysis of financial 
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condition and results of operations, quantitative and qualitative disclosure on market risks, 
market price of company’s stock over the last two years for each quarter, description of 
business activities and changes in disagreements with accountants on accounting and 
financial disclosure. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires additional information in 
conjunction with the annual report. SOX Section 301 and 401 and the related SEC 
implementations and rules require an annual audit committee report in conjunction with the 
annual shareholder meeting in the publication of the proxy statement, stating the mandatory 
activities of the audit committee (Wells, 2017, pp. 309–313). The disclosed information 
covers a review of the audited financial statements from the audit committee with the 
management, a judgement on the auditors’ independence and a recommendation that the 
financial statements be included in the annual report on Form 10-K (or 10-KSB for small 
businesses). 
Figure 7 is intentionally limited to the financial reporting process for public companies, 
as private companies in the USA are not required per se to issue annual reports or to release 
financial information to the public (Reardon, 2017). Due to special requirements or when 
negotiated with investors, private companies may have to comply with the same set of rules 
as public companies. In this regard, SEC enforcement actions apply both to public and 
private companies alike. In the press release 50-2019, the SEC charged the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of a start-up private company (called Jumio) for defrauding its investors.48 
However, such cases are rather rare and due to the limited availability of financial 
information, private companies are seldom included in studies dealing with fraud. An 
unusual example has been provided by Fleming, Hermanson, Kranacher, and Riley (2016), 
who examined differences in financial statement fraud between private and public 
companies. Their findings suggest that due to the stronger anti-fraud environments in public 
companies, fraudulent schemes are less obvious than their counterparts in private companies 
are. Moreover, cases in public companies appear to be larger, have a higher number of 
perpetrators and are less likely to be discovered by accident, requiring more sophisticated 
detection mechanisms.49 
The importance of truthful financial reports is vital for capital market efficiency. 
Therefore, the requirements for the financial reporting process and reports are closely 
                                                 
48 Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-50. 
49  Forming colluding groups to circumvent controls and cover fraudulent actions has been covered in section 
2.2.4. Depending on the size of the colluding group, internal controls can be rendered rather ineffective, 
requiring additional detection mechanisms to unveil the fraud. 
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supervised to ensure high-quality financial reports. However, financial statement fraud still 
occurs, even after enhancements to supervision and reporting requirements (Ogoun & Obara, 
2013). To further examine the challenge of fraud detection, the following sections will 
discuss financial reporting standards and accounting and auditing fundamentals before 
presenting an overview of the most prevalent fraudulent schemes through the manipulation 
of accounts. Afterwards, detection sources will be highlighted, before summarizing the 
theoretical background and developing a comprehensive detection model from there. 
2.3.2 Financial Statements and GAAP 
When examining financial statement fraud, it is important to elaborate on the very object of 
manipulation and its underlying principles. In the definition of financial statement fraud and 
its substantiations, the generally accepted accounting principles are often specifically 
mentioned, e.g. AS 2401.06: “[m]isstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting 
are intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements 
designed to deceive financial statement users where the effect causes the financial statements 
not to be presented, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles”. The loss of confidence in audited financial statements after the major 
accounting scandals shocked the accounting profession to its very core. Reporting truthful 
and reliable information is the foundation of the profession and is stated in numerous core 
principles issued by standard-setting bodies. The importance of these principles, especially 
in conjunction with fraudulent manipulations of financials statements and their schemes will 
be highlighted in this and the following sections. 
The generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are standards regulating the 
preparation and presentation of financial reports, including financial statements (e.g. Wells, 
2017, p. 303). The standards are developed and overseen by private accounting institutions 
and governmental regulators (e.g. Sunder, 1988, pp. 37–39). Besides nation-specific 
standards like the US GAAP or Canadian GAAP, there exist international accounting 
standards like the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that may be endorsed 
by countries to complement or replace existing nation-specific standards. However, with 
attention to global relevance, competition among accounting standards has led to the 
development of a duopoly, formed by the FASB and the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) (Meeks & Swann, 2009). Thus, the leading accounting standards today are 
the IFRS and US-GAAP (Leuz, 2003, p. 446). The FASB is a private, non-profit 
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organization designated by the SEC as the accounting standard setter for public companies. 
Companies with an interest in being publicly traded on US stock exchanges or in issuing 
securities for US markets have to comply with US GAAP. The IASB is the standard-setting 
body of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, developing accounting 
standards to be endorsed around the world. As of now, the IFRS are required by over 140 
jurisdictions. 
Accounting standards not only differ in their elaboration of rules but also in their 
underlying core principles. These core principles are the foundation of financial reporting, 
guiding the standard-setting bodies in developing additional or revising existing standards 
and serve as a guideline for users of the standards.50 The FASB has issued the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 – Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information in 1980, stating the requirements of high-quality financial reports.51 The FASB 
presents a hierarchy of qualities that make accounting information a desirable commodity 
(Wells, 2017, p. 303). According to FASB, relevance and faithful representation are the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics that make financial information useful (Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts 8, QC17). Moreover, the enhancing qualitative 
characteristics comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and understandability enhance the 
usefulness of information that is relevant and faithfully represented (QC19). 
Financial information is relevant if it makes a difference in the decision-making process. 
It should help recipients to assess past performance, predict future performance, confirm or 
correct expectations and provide feedback in earlier expectations (QC6-QC10). An entity-
specific aspect of relevance is materiality (QC11). Materiality of information could result in 
the change of a decision if the underlying information is omitted or misstated. Financial 
information is faithfully represented if recipients deem the information to represent the 
conditions that it purports. Therefore, information is faithfully represented if it is complete, 
neutral and free from error (QC12). Information is complete if the depiction includes all that 
is necessary for a user to understand the phenomenon being depicted (QC13). The neutrality 
of financial information specifies choices leading to different outcomes, to not be biased 
towards those outcomes but taken in order to reflect the true situation in the best way possible 
                                                 
50 For further information, see IFRS Conceptual Framework, available through https://www.ifrs.org/issued-
standards/list-of-standards/conceptual-framework/ and for US-GAAP the Statements of Financial 
Accounting Concepts, available through https://www.fasb.org/resources/ccurl/816/894/aop_CON1.pdf. 
51  The Concept No. 2 was superdeeded by the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 8, issued in 2010. 
Chapter 3 of the new concept is titeld Qualitative Characteristics of useful Financial Information and has 
amended the original concept and will be discussed hereafter. Concept 8 is available on the official website 
www.fasb.org. 
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(QC14). Error-free information is concerned with the description of the information and the 
process responsible for providing the information, both of which have to be free from 
omissions or errors. (QC15).  
The enhancing qualitative characteristics comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability may help to improve the usefulness of information and furthermore can 
determine how a phenomenon is depicted if alternatives are equally satisfying the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics (QC19). Comparability is achieved if information of 
one entity can be compared to similar information of another entity and with similar 
information of the same entity but from previous periods (QC20). Identifying and 
understanding similarities and differences among items is a core purpose of comparability 
(QC21). Comparability is thereby related to consistency, which refers to the consistent 
application of the same method for the same item of the same entity across periods or in the 
same period across entities (QC22). The verifiability of information is given if independent 
individuals using the same measurements arrive at similar conclusions or outcomes (QC26). 
Timeliness is concerned with the availability of information before it loses its capacity and 
capability of influencing the decision-making process (QC29). However, timeliness cannot 
make information relevant, even though a lack of timeliness can render information 
irrelevant. Finally, understandability of information is given if it is clearly and concisely 
presented (QC30). This does not imply that information has to be understood by everybody, 
which would potentially lead to the omission of complex topics, leading to incomplete and 
potentially misleading financial information (QC31). Besides the fundamental and 
enhancing qualitative characteristics, the FASB is concerned with the cost constraint on 
useful financial reporting (QC35-QC39). The cost constraint considers the trade-off between 
perceived benefits and the associated perceived costs of a particular disclosure. The benefits 
should exceed the costs in order to justify the adaption. However, quantification, especially 
of the benefits of information, is rather difficult due to the relative nature of the value 
attached to it through different individuals. Furthermore, practical implementation must be 
reasonable and appropriate for companies. 
Although effectuations are provided with regard to the FASB’s core concept, similarities 
to other standard setters are high, especially regarding the two primary characteristics of 
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relevance and faithful representation.52 Nevertheless, qualitative characteristics may differ 
slightly and shift the emphasis to different qualities, like understandability or transparency. 
The general problem with these sets of characteristics is that they are hardly simultaneously 
achievable without a certain trade-off (Smith, 1996). Smith (1996) has surveyed different 
user groups of financial statements, finding that reliability and relevance are the most 
important characteristics across groups, even when sacrificing the understandability, 
timeliness, completeness and comparability of the reports. The results suggest that 
truthfulness as an aspect of reliability is valued highly and that fraud prevention and 
detection are important in guaranteeing the credibility of financial reports.53 
Another problem with GAAP and financial statement fraud is attributable to differences 
in accounting information resulting from the application of different country-specific 
versions. A prominent and often discussed case surrounded Daimler Benz and the adoption 
of US GAAP in 1993. The net income reported for 1993 under German GAAP accumulated 
to 0.6 billion DM while under US GAAP Daimler Benz reported a loss of 1.8 billion DM 
(historical exchange rate was 1.65 DM/USD for 1993).54 This rather extreme example 
emphasizes the potential differences in the outcome regardless of the fact that the company 
did comply correctly with US GAAP and German GAAP (Shil, Das, & Pramanik, 2009, 
p. 196). 
To account for differences across accounting standard-setting bodies, the following 
section will highlight the accounting standard convergence process in the light of financial 
statement fraud, before explaining accounting-based fraudulent schemes. 
2.3.3 Accounting Standardization, Convergence and Fraud 
The requirements set by accounting standards provide the framework when distinguishing 
between correct and misstated financial statements. Tweedie and Seidenstein (2005) claim 
that the uncertainty that results from low-quality financial reporting and corporate 
governance is severely punished by investors, as evidenced in the aftermath of the 
accounting scandals of the 2000s. Therefore, ensuring high-quality financial reporting 
                                                 
52  For IFRS, the Conceptual Framework (issued in September 2010 and revised in Match 2018) Chapter 2: 
Qualitative Characteristics of useful Financial Information suggests similar (albeit not identical) 
requirements. In the Appendix to Chapter 3 of the Statement of Fonancial Accounting Concepts No 8., the 
FASB mentions the joint efforts with the IASB and links to references to the IASB literature (BC3.2) 
53  The examination was concerned with characteristics from different standard setters, including the FASB 
and the ASB. 
54 Annual reports retrieved from https://www.daimler.com/documents/investors/berichte/geschaeftsberichte. 
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through accounting standards represents the basis for efficient resource allocation and 
economic growth. Accounting standards vary over jurisdictions and must constantly be 
revised to keep pace with the constant development of the business environment. This has 
resulted in a multitude of standards available to companies, although through countrywide 
corporate law restrictions, the effective number of standards considered for use in crafting 
financial statements is limited (Shil et al., 2009, pp. 197–198). The trend towards 
internationalization and professionalization can be related to a wide range of factors, 
including the globalization of capital markets as well as demographic changes and the 
increased complexity of business transactions (Volmer, Werner, & Zimmermann, 2007, 
pp. 457–459). According to Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), the most likely explanation for 
the international immobility of capital flows lies in the informational advantage that 
domestic investors enjoy over foreign investors. The effort to understand multiple 
accounting standards in order to confidently invest in a foreign country has a negative impact 
on transaction costs. Having a single set of accounting standards or converged standards has 
the potential to decrease information asymmetry and transaction costs and thus strengthen 
international capital flows (Chen, Ding, & Xu, 2014). The positive impact of the adoption 
of international accounting standards like IFRS on information barriers has been extensively 
proved at a theoretical and empirical level. Easley and O'Hara (2004) have used a rational 
equilibrium model to demonstrate that companies can influence their capital costs by 
adopting different accounting standards, as the quality (precision) and quantity of 
information vary across standards. Tarca (2004) has studied the voluntary adoption of 
international standards like IFRS or US GAAP in the United Kingdom (UK), France, 
Germany, Japan and Australia, finding that especially large and internationally operating 
companies engage in the application of international standards, emphasizing their usefulness 
in accounting convergence due to the greater comparability of financial reports. Lambert, 
Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) have noted that higher accounting information quality can 
result in lower risk premiums within a model, consistent with the CAPM. In general, 
empirical evidence on IFRS adoption reveals rather positive effects (Chen et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, some findings report higher costs of capital for certain countries and periods, 
such as Daske (2006) for a sample of German firms and the IFRS transition phase between 
1993 and 2002. 
In this study, a sample is drawn from companies that are required to file in accordance 
with US-GAAP between 1996 and 2010. During this period, the convergence of accounting 
standards accelerated immensely in line with the first joint efforts of FASB and IASB to 
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release common international accounting standards (e.g. Zack, 2009, pp. 17–18). Regarding 
financial statement fraud research, the convergence project and the establishment of 
international accounting standards have facilitated a broader view of the topic and enabled 
studying the subject in greater detail. The following paragraph will highlight important 
milestones in the convergence process, before discussing their influence on financial 
statement fraud. 
During the International Congress of Accountants from 1904 in St. Louis, USA, the first 
ideas for international accounting standards were presented (Shil et al., 2009, p. 196).55 The 
call for internationally agreed accounting standards intensified in the 1960s, related to an 
increase in international investments. Indeed, differences in country-specific regulations had 
resulted in a lack of comparability of financial statements. In the aftermath of the 8th 
International Congress of Accountants in 1962, the expressed need for internationally 
accepted standards led the AICPA to establish the Committee on International Relations to 
start working on a potential harmonization process. The International Accounting Standard 
Committee (IASC) started to develop accounting standards of international relevance in 
1973, successfully releasing its 25th standard by 1987. The steady work of the IASC in 
releasing new and improving on existing standards in the 1990s contributed to their adoption 
by companies, accounting professionals and other standard-setting institutions. However, 
until that point (mainly during the 1970s and 1980s) the IASC and other major Anglo-
American standard setters achieved only minor compatibilities in the existing standards 
(Street & Shaughnessy, 1998b, p. 203). Harmonization attempts were intensified by the 
FASB after 1991 when its first strategic plan for international activities was released (Herz 
& Petrone, 2004, p. 634). The strategic plan involved joint projects with other accounting 
standard setters and active participation in the IASC’s accounting standard-setting process, 
among others. In 1994, the first joint project concerning the revision of the earnings per share 
standard between the IASC and the FASB marked a milestone in the harmonization efforts. 
Besides the collaboration between the FASB and the IASC, the formation of the G4 in 1993 
set the starting point for joint projects between the FASB and its counterparts from the UK, 
Canada and Australia (Street & Shaughnessy, 1998a, p. 132).56 The IASC joined the group 
as an observer member, strengthening its relationship with national standard-setting bodies.  
                                                 
55 It is now known as the World Congress of Accountants and the International Congress of Accountants from 
1904 St. Louis (USA), or sometimes referred to as the 1st World Congress of Accountants. 
56 The “G4” later formed the “G4+1” when New Zealand joined the group. It abandoned its work in 2001 
after the IASB was founded. 
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Between 1999 and 2001, the IASC restructured itself as the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB).57 The 2000s saw improved collaboration between the major 
standard setters and increased recognition for international accounting standards. Two 
important milestones of the early 2000s were met, when in 2002 the European Union (EU) 
decided to adopt IFRS, according to which companies would prepare their consolidated 
financial statements from 2005. In the same year, the Norwalk Agreement between the 
FASB and the IASB was settled. This was seen as one of the most important steps in the 
convergence process, declaring four goals, namely the joint development of standards, the 
short-term elimination of differences, the elimination of differences remaining after the 
initial convergence phase until 2005 and the vision to stay converged (Tweedie 
& Seidenstein, 2005, pp. 597–601). The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) from 2006 
elaborated on the Norwalk Agreement by adding precise topics to the list of convergence 
projects on which both standard setters had to work. In the opinion of the boards involved, 
remaining differences should be reduced by new common standards, although projects 
outside of the agreements did exist.58 The next big driver in the convergence process was 
the SEC’s affirmation of the IFRS for foreign issuers. However, at that time (around 2011), 
US-GAAP was regarded as the higher quality standard by the SEC, leading to increased 
effort by the IASB to conform its standards to GAAP (Baudot, 2014, p. 981). Greater 
pressure for improvements in accounting standards and the convergence process also came 
from the governmental actors of the G20 in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Baudot, 
2014, pp. 974–976). In 2009, these demanded noticeable convergence progress until 2011, 
which was not met by the standard setters. During the period of intensified efforts, less and 
less common ground could be found as problems started to emerge related to underlying 
principles, leading to a stagnation of the convergence process (Baudot, 2014, pp. 982–984). 
It should be remembered that despite the collaboration, the two standards operated in a 
competitive relationship. In 2013, the Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF) was 
founded by the IFRS Foundation to enhance the cooperation of worldwide accounting 
standard setters. With the FASB as one of the members of the ASAF, the exchange between 
the major standard setters is now also possible through the forum that was created.59 
                                                 
57 An official chronological overview is available at https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/who-we-are/#history. 
58 The MoU was updated in 2008. Both versions are available on the FASB website at http://www.fasb.org.  
59 The ASAF holds 12 seats, one for Africa, three for the Americas, three for Europe, three for Asia and two 
appointed members, subject to maintaining the geographical balance. 
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The influence of different accounting standards and convergence on financial statement 
fraud has yet to be extensively studied. Nevertheless, some vital contributions have been 
made to the fraud literature. Chen, Hu, Lin, and Xiao (2015) have studied fraudulent cases 
of dual-listed companies, identifying GAAP differences between the financial reports of 
companies filing for the same periods in different countries that might be used to detect 
financial statement fraud. They divided the differences into an expected or explainable and 
an abnormal gap. Their findings suggest that larger abnormal gaps are associated with 
fraudulent manipulations of financial statements. Meeks and Swann (2009) have exposed 
the costs and benefits of standardization and their contributions to wealth creation. They 
argue that monopoly standards have a negative impact on market discipline, which may lead 
to less transparent and more manipulated financial reports, among other disadvantages. 
McAfee and Guth (2014) discussed similarities and differences between US GAAP and 
IFRS and discussed opportunities of fraudulent manipulations in a conversion process from 
the rather rule-based US GAAP to the principle-based IFRS. They further assume that the 
highly prescriptive nature of US GAAP hampers the accounting and auditing profession in 
preventing financial statement fraud, as especially apparent during the 2000s accounting 
scandals. 
In the following four sections, the most prevalent fraudulent reporting schemes will be 
highlighted. Thereby, the focus will be on US GAAP, as it represents the applicable 
accounting standard for the companies in this study, although as stated in the aforementioned 
remarks, through convergence and the international relevance of US GAAP, this study is not 
limited to the US market. 
2.3.4 Revenue and Sales Schemes 
Many cases of financial statement fraud are associated with the manipulation of revenue. 
Revenue and its recognition have been an important topic for accounting standard setters 
ever since (Wells, 2017, p. 332). In defining general underpinnings or specifying the details 
of particular transactions, standard setters are in a constant struggle to keep up with the 
development of businesses. This is not only the case for revenue recognition but also all 
standards in general. For example, as a major project of the US-GAAP/IFRS convergence, 
the IASB released IFRS 15 in 2014, combining the former IAS 11 (construction contracts) 
and IAS 18 (revenue). The FASB issued the new ASU 2014-09 (codified in ASC 606) in the 
same year, completing the joint effort to improve revenue recognition. This study relies on 
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a sample of cases covering 15 years, which is why the following sections will not go into 
specific details regarding accounting standards and will instead provide a broader scope. 
The ACFE’s fraud tree, which has been used as an introduction to fraud in general and 
financial statement fraud (see section 2.1.1 and Figure 2), will again be utilized to structure 
the most prevalent types of fraud schemes. The fraud tree distinguishes between net 
worth/net income overstatements and understatements. The major objects of manipulation 
are revenues through overstating, assets through improper valuation and expenses and 
liabilities through understating, which can also be taken from Figure 6, presenting the 
fraction of each of the schemes in this study’s sample (Wells, 2017, p. 321). Each of the 
following sections will deal with one of the objects, starting with revenue.  
Zack (2013, p. 6) classifies revenue manipulation schemes into four categories: timing 
schemes, fictitious or inflated revenue, misclassification schemes and gross-up schemes. 
These will be followed in the upcoming effectuation, as they answer the when, why, where 
and how of revenue recognition, thereby providing a comprehensive overview.60 As 
previously mentioned, most schemes in practice are not exclusive to one category and 
instead extend across multiple categories through the interrelated nature of financial 
statements (Wells, 2017, p. 332). 
Timing, the when of fraud schemes, deals with shifting revenue between periods outside 
of the legal possibilities that accounting regulations offer (Wells, 2017, pp. 335–340). Most 
commonly, revenue is recognized too early, boosting the current period’s performance and 
leading to a problematic lack of revenue in the period that should actually be under study. 
The practice often results in a downward spiral, when additional manipulations are necessary 
for later periods to cover up for the revenue that has been recognized too early. This short-
sided manipulation, often termed “management myopia”, is induced by the expectations and 
goals that one expects to meet (Merchant, 1990, pp. 297–299). Timing schemes can be 
established in different ways, the most straightforward being the alteration of records. 
Transaction documents are dated backwards to ensure the possibility of recognizing the 
revenue in the required period. This alteration can be done with or without the knowledge of 
the transaction party. Construction contracts offer another possibility to shift revenues. When 
revenue recognition is based on the percentage of completion method, as commonly used 
under US-GAAP and IFRS, the amount of total revenue recognized in each period depends 
                                                 
60  Zack (2013) offers an in-depth review of common financial statement fraud cases. Some examples to clarify 
the execution of different schemes based on his review will be brought up in the upcoming sections. 
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on the amount of costs accrued in the period in relation to the total estimated costs (Zack, 
2013, pp. 12–15). Especially the accrued costs in any period may be subject to manipulations 
when overstating results in high revenue recognition for the respective period. The double-
booking or misclassification of costs related to other projects is often manipulated in the 
percentage of completion context (Sidorsky, 2006, p. 12). Boosting sales by channel stuffing 
is another possible scheme based on timing irregularities to artificially pretend that one is 
running a successful business. Channel stuffing is a scheme in which sales are generated by 
pushing excess inventory along the distribution line, for example to retailers, at the end of 
the period or quarter (Jackson, 2015, p. 83). Knowing that a substantial fraction will most 
likely be returned in the following period, the scheme empties one’s inventory while 
generating fictitious sales (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 80–81). 
Fictitious and inflated revenues provide two possibilities to boost firm performance 
(Zack, 2013, pp. 33–42). The former refers to fabricated transactions that have not happened; 
the latter to actual transactions that have been artificially inflated in scale (Singleton 
& Singleton, 2010, p. 81). Compared to timing schemes, where the date of recognition rather 
than the amount of revenue from transactions is altered, fictitious and inflated revenue 
schemes affect the underlying value of the transaction. In practice, transaction partners may 
exist, yet false sales are recorded or the transaction partners and their respective sales are 
made up. Completely fabricated transactions, especially when fictitious customers are 
involved, are usually more easily detectable by irregularities in customer master files. These 
types of transactions may be more difficult to recognize, when regular customers, which are 
covering the perpetrator, are involved. Another possibility to fabricate fictitious revenue is 
the top-side adjustment in which entries are recorded in the financial statements but fail to 
be found in formal accounting records like the general ledger (Jackson, 2015, p. 127). 
Misclassification schemes deal with intentionally wrongfully classified transactions. 
Misclassification can have a material impact on financial statements when incorrectly 
classified transactions misstate positions. This would not have an impact on the bottom-line 
outcome. However, key performance indicators referring to manipulated lines may present 
misleading information and influence the economic decisions of the financial statement’s 
recipients. One-time income transactions or non-recurring costs that occur outside of regular 
business operations and are unlikely to reoccur in the future are shifted to positions 
representing core business activities (Zack, 2013, pp. 47–50). Another possibility is the false 
recording of financing agreements as revenue. Thus, a company sells to another entity (e.g. 
another company or a bank) with the intention of repurchasing the goods at a later date at a 
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premium price. This transaction results in additional funds for the selling company, for 
which it pays interest in the form of the repurchase premium (Zack, 2013, p. 48). However, 
under ASC 470-40-25, the company selling a product to another company and in the related 
transaction agrees that the repurchase of the sold product (or a substantially identical one) 
must record a liability to the extent that the repurchase and the financing arrangements are 
covered. The company is not allowed to record the transactions as sales and must remove 
the goods from the balance sheet. 
In gross-up schemes, revenue and associated costs are inflated simultaneously, making 
the company appear larger, without the primary goal of influencing profitability (Zack, 2013, 
p. 57). In addition to generating artificial transactions, round-trip transactions are another 
example of gross-up schemes. Round-trip transactions boost the revenue of two or more 
companies, without creating any economic benefit, by arranging a series of transactions, 
starting and ending at the same point (Wells, 2017, p. 333). Company A may sell unused 
assets to Company B, with the arrangement of Company B selling the same assets back at a 
similar price in the future. Such deals are also called “lazy Susans”, deriving from the 
rotatable services that used to distribute food among people. Distinguishing between 
legitimate transactions and illegitimate “lazy Susans” requires an in-depth investigation of 
transactions to identify sequences associable with a gross-up scheme via round-trip 
transactions (Zack, 2013, pp. 59–61). 
2.3.5 Asset Schemes 
Following the structure of Zack (2013), asset-based schemes are divided into four categories: 
improper capitalization of costs, inventory schemes, overvaluation in the context of fair 
value accounting and improper asset impairments. 
The improper capitalization of costs leads to an overstated net income, as expenses are 
illegitimately capitalized as assets, taking them from the income statement to the balance 
sheet (Wells, 2017, pp. 343–344). For capitalized assets, expenses are recognized as 
depreciation or amortization over future periods. The schemes are commonly related to 
assets that are developed internally by the company, assets failing to provide future benefits, 
the capitalization of research and development costs or administrative costs, the 
capitalization of start-up costs, and the illegitimate capitalization of advertising costs. 
Ryerson (2009) has examined AAERs dealing with improper capitalization for the years 
2001 to 2008 and suggests that distinguishing misstatements between accounting errors and 
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fraud is difficult because the degree of uncertainty in the requirements is rather high. For 
fraudulent cases, the intention could mostly be referred to as the necessity of meeting internal 
or external expectations, leading to earnings manipulation through improper capitalization. 
Inventory schemes revolve around the concept of misreporting the quantity or value of 
inventories in order to misstate (usually to overstate) their true condition, which is usually 
reinforced via the manipulation of records (Wells, 2017, pp. 347–349). Inventory-related 
schemes are common due to the complex and challenging nature of inventory valuation and 
the difficulties involved in the auditing of inventories (Kirkos, Spathis, & Manolopoulos, 
2007, p. 998). There are plenty of possibilities available to manipulate inventories, the most 
common regarding quantity being counting items multiple times or reporting fictitious 
inventory not owned by the company (Wells, 2017, p. 348). Misstating the value of 
inventories can be achieved by allocating inventory to higher manufacturing overhead costs 
or failing to recognize an impairment loss. Inventory schemes are often used for earnings 
manipulations, affecting the balance sheet and income statement alike (Rezaee & Riley, 
2009, p. 98). 
Fraudulent schemes based on the manipulation of fair values to illegitimately benefit from 
wrongfully achieved asset valuations also fall into asset-based schemes. Determining fair 
values involves a high degree of estimations and judgements, rendering the process 
susceptible to fraudulent alterations (Zack, 2009, pp. 9–11). In most accounting standards, 
fair values can be achieved using a number of valuation approaches in a hierarchical order.61 
The highest priority class consists of valuations based on market prices in active markets or 
identical assets (level 1). Second-priority valuations are based on market observables, due 
to a common shortage of level 1-quality data (level 2).62 The last priority contains valuations 
based on un- or scarcely observable inputs, where the company must rely on a significant 
number of assumptions to ascertain a valuation result (level 3). It is possible to determine 
fair values either internally or through external parties, but due to the complexity of the 
subject, involved parties require proper expertise and knowledge. Under fraudulent 
intentions, the management might lean towards a preferred fair value, thus trying to influence 
the valuation process (Zack, 2009, pp. 211–212). Potential manipulations may occur through 
the appraisers, who might be bribed to deliver the desired outcome, or even be fictitious, the 
valuation and especially the valuation report being entirely fabricated. The fair value 
                                                 
61 See IFRS 13 or SFAS 152 for specific details on fair value valuation. 
62 Lower level valuations are only applicable if the prerequisites for higher level valuations cannot be 
achieved. 
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measurement may also be affected through the available data basis. According to the 
hierarchical order of the valuation approaches, the potential for manipulations increases with 
the extent to which the measurement parameters become less observable, augmenting the 
degree of estimations and judgements on the valuation outcome. In most actual cases, 
companies exploit fair value manipulations to increase their book value. Benston (2006) has 
criticized the extensive use of the level 3 valuation of Enron and has assumed that by tying 
compensation schemes to targets evaluated through fair values, its managers were inclined 
to engage in fraudulent manipulations. 
Furthermore, in the light of fair value accounting, impairments and especially impairment 
losses are susceptible to manipulations (Zack, 2009, pp. 99–102). The general idea behind 
impairments is the consideration of a permanent reduction in the value of an asset; for 
example, in the case of investments, this may occur when the carrying amount exceeds the 
price that it could be sold for, leading to a potential fair value manipulation. The difference 
between both values is written off, resulting in the decline of the value of the respective asset 
on the balance sheet. In practice, determining the impaired value differs in detail between 
accounting standards.63 However, assessing the new value contains a high degree of 
estimation and judgement, in a similar way to the fair value valuation. Manipulations usually 
occur by limiting the resulting loss or the classification of the losses.64 
2.3.6 Expense and Liability Schemes 
Fraudulently boosting corporate performance or conveying the impression of a stronger 
financial situation can also be achieved by manipulating expenses and liabilities. Similarly 
to revenue, the alteration of expenses can lead to timing differences and understatements and 
the counterpart to the generation of artificial revenue or assets and the omission of expenses 
and liabilities (Zack, 2013, p. 131). Pushing expenses in later periods may induce the same 
downward spiral effect, which becomes apparent in the case of shifted revenue. The need to 
cover up the manipulation with additional future periods has the potential to lead to a longer-
lasting scheme. Compared to revenue schemes that rely on the manipulation of sales, 
expense and liability schemes are said to be much easier to be committed, because falsifying 
                                                 
63 See IAS 36 or ASC 360-10 for specific information on impairment. 
64 Under US-GAAP and IFRS, depending on the assets, impairments may be distinguished between temporary 
and non-temporary, resulting in different classifications of impairment losses. This change may affect 
financial ratios where losses are no longer part of another comprehensive impact and influence net income 
through profit and loss. 
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the required documents is a considerably higher effort for a comparable effect in the case of 
sales (Wells, 2017, p. 342). 
Shifting expenses in later periods can usually be achieved by manipulating invoices and 
in the case of omission, hiding invoices and therefore not reporting the respective liability 
under the accounts payable. Similarly, related parties can be involved in scamming relevant 
documents to defer expenses and/or payments (Zack, 2013, p. 132). Depending on whether 
accrual or cash accounting is the underlying basis for recognition purposes, the correct 
moment of the recognition of expenses may diverge. However, under US-GAAP and IFRS 
only accrual accounting is legitimate, where the recognition is taking place when the 
expenses (or revenues) are accrued. The manipulation of expenses is often tied to revenue 
schemes, further stimulating a boost in performance in time and value (Singleton 
& Singleton, 2010, p. 81). 
In the case of understated liabilities, the subject of the manipulations is usually derived 
from the type of liability and the constituent features that determine its initial and subsequent 
measurement (Zack, 2013, pp. 141–144). These are usually the respective interest rate, the 
time over which it is amortized or manipulations to the process of fair value measurement if 
the fair value option under US-GAAP and IFRS is chosen. Understating can then also be 
achieved by simply altering the documents or as part of the fair value fraud schemes. Another 
possibility, which is especially hard to detect and is usually undertaken by large and 
internationally operating companies, is the moving of liabilities to a subsidiary that is either 
not audited or audited by a different auditor (Wells, 2017, pp. 342–343). In this case, the 
liability is completely omitted from the company’s balance sheet. 
2.3.7 Derived Schemes 
In the final section of this chapter, relevant schemes derived from those discussed so far will 
be highlighted. These include the concealment of illegal acts as well as the often closely 
related disclosure fraud. As part of disclosure fraud, the section discusses illegitimately 
prepared consolidated statements or business combinations like mergers and acquisitions. 
Asset misappropriations, as part of the ACFE fraud tree and explained in section 2.1.1, 
are not directly referable to financial statement fraud, as they do not per se lead to an 
illegitimate presentation or material alteration of said statements. However, to conceal the 
asset misappropriation, typically the manipulation of accounts is necessary, potentially 
leading to financial statement fraud in the process, which can also be recalled in Figure 3. 
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These actions are usually carried out by higher level employees or executives with access to 
the accounting tools (Wells, 2017, pp. 299–302). In the case of embezzlements, usually 
invoices are manipulated to appear business-related and are then paid by the company 
instead of the respective employee (Zack, 2013, pp. 172–173). In this regard, the 
concealment of illegitimate bribes by hiding them in other transactions or making up fake 
transactions to cover up the delinquency affects the financial statements. However, 
manipulations like those previously mentioned do not represent financial statement fraud, as 
they are not typically intended to manipulate in order to deceive the users of the financial 
statements but rather to conceal other schemes of occupational fraud, thereby altering 
transactions in the process. Moreover, concealing acts are usually carried out in a precautious 
manner to avoid drawing excessive attention, leading to little meaningful alteration of the 
financial statements (Zack, 2013, p. 247). 
Nevertheless, disclosure schemes, like consolidation schemes, represent a material 
manipulation to deceive the users of financial statements (Zack, 2013, p. 157). Through the 
consolidation of the financial statements of the parent company and its subsidiaries, the 
corporate group is presented as a single economic entity. Regardless of the applicable 
accounting standards, the general idea behind consolidation fraud schemes revolves around 
the illegitimate omission of financially weaker subsidiaries and in counterpoint the inclusion 
of stronger ones. In both cases, the requirements for consolidation are not met by the 
respective accounting standard, rendering the consolidated statement misstated or 
fraudulent. 
Akin to the types of fraud that surround consolidations, schemes arising from mergers 
and acquisitions have a material impact on the resultant financial statements once the 
acquisition procedure is complete. These schemes involve the illegitimate consideration of 
estimations and judgements in the course of the accounting process to combine different 
entities (Zack, 2009, pp. 91–93). In this way, fraud can occur in different stages. The first 
stage involves differentiation between a business combination and an acquisition of assets. 
Whereas a business combination involves the transfer of control over the business, an asset 
acquisition does not constitute a handover of control but only the respective assets (Zack, 
2013, p. 165). The process can result in different outcomes. For example, the acquired 
business can become a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquirer. Second, only the assets of 
another company are acquired. Third, in the case of a roll-up merger, a new entity is created 
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from the parties involved.65 The difference between the three exemplary outcomes with 
regard to fraudulent schemes is the associated price of the transaction. In the case where 
assets alone are acquired, only the assets are priced, whereas a business combination usually 
does result in additional goodwill. The potential impact of misclassifying asset acquisitions 
as business combinations is the long-term inflation of assets.66 
For business combinations under US-GAAP and IFRS, the so-called pooling-of-interest 
method, where the book values of the assets and liabilities are taken over in the allocation 
process, has been prohibited since 2001 (Zack, 2013, p. 165). Under the purchase method 
(acquisition method) of accounting, a fair value measurement of the respective positions is 
required. The fraud risk mainly revolves around the wrongful allocation of the purchase price 
to assets not subject to depreciation or amortization as well as assets with longer lifespans.67 
In this regard, the allocation of a portion of the purchase price to intangible assets that do 
not qualify for separate recognition would also be an example of a fraud risk factor that needs 
to be considered. 
Finally, fraud can also be carried out when creating disclosure. According to Zack (2013, 
p. 189), disclosure fraud can be divided into four categories: omissions, incomplete 
disclosure, misrepresentation of information and confusing disclosure. Omitted and 
incomplete disclosure both share that the requirements of the underlying accounting 
standards regarding the disclosure of information are not met but differ in the extent to which 
information is omitted (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, p. 103). Incomplete disclosure ignores certain 
pieces of information about a topic, whereas omitted disclosure leaves out the topic 
completely. Misrepresented and confused disclosure occurs when the given information is 
incorrect or is presented in such a way that the recipient is unable to clearly assess and absorb 
it. Confusing disclosure may not be a fraudulent misrepresentation per se but serves as a 
potential indicator of other fraud-related actions (Wells, 2017, pp. 344–345). In practice, the 
omitted or altered information is usually of a negative connotation, thereby presenting the 
company’s situation in a better light. A good example again is Enron, which in compliance 
with GAAP disclosed information on special purpose entities but intentionally obfuscated 
                                                 
65  Assets acquired or transferred do not per se constitute a business but require the associated set of activities 
capable of managing the underlying assets for the purpose of providing an economic benefit Zack (2009, 
pp. 91–92). 
66  In most standards, goodwill is subject to impairment rather than amortization. 
67  This study will not go into further detail; see Zack (2009, pp. 93–95) for detailed analysis of manipulations 
of fair values in the case of business combinations. 
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the information so that hardly anyone could understand its ramifications (Jackson, 2015, 
p. 250). 
2.4 Sources and Participants of Fraud Detection 
As discussed in the previous sections, the reliability of standardized financial statements is 
important. In the following, fraud deterrence, prevention, and detection are discussed and 
different approaches are highlighted. In this regard, the need for audits to ensure compliance 
with accounting standards and different types of audits will be highlighted. This foundation 
serves as an initial evaluation of the demand for a reliable fraud detection tool based on 
publicly available accounting information. 
2.4.1 Crime Signal Detection Theory 
Crime signal detection theory provides a foundation for explaining the ability to detect 
fraudulent actions (Gottschalk, 2018, pp. 38–41). The ability of the detector to actually 
detect the stimulus is affected by the characteristics of both. On the side of the detector, 
perceptual sensitivity, which is determined by the physical and psychological state, specifies 
one’s ability to discriminate signal from non-signal events (Szalma & Hancock, 2013, 
p. 1741). Beyond that, detectors may have different capabilities to distinguish between 
information-bearing recognition (patterns) and random patterns that only distract from actual 
information (noise) (Gottschalk, 2018, p. 38). This may be due to differences in 
competences, experience, expectations, and signal alertness. Pattern recognition is 
contingent on one’s ability to contextualize. By being able to understand and explain 
relationships between information elements, patterns can be identified. In addition, 
psychological factors like personal bias in judgements may distort the result. The detector 
should not be a single person, but rather individuals working together in a team with the 
same goal. Indeed, team cognition may improve detection performance if converging 
perspectives and knowledge exists, but where it is ineffective, it can lead to failures in 
coordination, resulting in poorer detection capabilities (Wildman, Salas, & Scott, 2014). 
On the level of the signal, the primary factor is intensity: stronger, more intense signals 
are easier for the detector to recognize. Another factor that is particularly important in reality 
is the signal value. This depicts the uncertainty of a stimulus to fall into either category. For 
example, the categories may be manipulated or unmanipulated. At the time of the decision, 
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the detector acts with uncertainty, as the true nature of the stimulus is usually revealed later. 
When combining both signal and detector characteristics, a threshold can be determined, 
which is translatable to the likelihood of fraud being detected. Gottschalk (2018, p. 39) has 
created a ranking of potential detectors for white-collar crime, based on certain basic factors 
from crime signal detection theory. He suggests that journalists, for professional reasons, 
tend to have the greatest potential to act as crime detection sources, as compared to the 
internal control function and external auditors, which are ranking lower.68 
Determining optimal decision thresholds, such as when a stimulus results in an action by 
the detector and a potential hit, is difficult. In many cases, hits are primarily influenced by 
intuition and subjective judgements, even when objective points of comparison exist 
(Phillips, Saks, & Peterson, 2001, p. 300). Thus, detection quality is mainly influenced by 
the discretion of the respective individual detector (the examiner). Verification procedures, 
such as the use of additional examiners are common and usually increase the positive hit rate 
but do not necessarily ensure better results. Technological advances have helped to identify 
patterns that would not otherwise have been uncovered through human examiners, or human 
examiners would have encountered severe difficulties in correctly recalling patterns through 
memorization and comparison (Phillips et al., 2001, p. 294). Even with the help of multiple 
examiners and the utilization of objective clues and hints, it is doubtful that detection results 
are comparable. 
This study builds upon the idea that examinations of financial statement fraud require 
technological support, as examiners are constrained by materiality in general and the 
complexity of fraudulent behaviour in particular. As crime signal detection theory suggests, 
numerous factors influence detection capability, especially when stimuli are difficult to 
capture. Besides applying fraud theory and utilizing hints that have proved to be successful 
in previous studies, the high dimensional pattern analysis of corporate narratives may 
increase detection performance. The number of predictors and length of patterns provides 
one of the most extensive analyses available to date and may offer the potential to 
incorporate unknown or unrecognizable patterns. With the help of a machine learning 
approach and a comprehensive sample, the results may be of interest for everyone concerned 
with financial statement fraud.69 In practice, individuals concerned with the detection of 
                                                 
68 However, the factors have been examined and assessed in a rather subjective way, rendering the validity of 
the examination questionable. 
69 Machine learning is a subfield of artificial intelligence as it fulfils tasks based on the fundamentals of human 
intelligence, for example, the recognition of patterns from extracted data. Section 4.2 lays out the machine 
learning approach of this study. 
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fraudulent manipulations of company financial statements can be identified at an internal or 
external company level. Depending on the stage, the different groups that may ensure the 
truthfulness of the financial statements or uncover the manipulation will be highlighted 
hereafter. 
2.4.2 Fraud Prevention, Detection, and Deterrence 
Unwanted behaviour like fraudulent manipulations must be countered to avoid negative 
consequences for capital market efficiency. Deterrence, prevention and detection are the 
three major overarching fraud-related control categories under which specific approaches 
fall (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 84–89; Wells, 2017, pp. 359–361). Therefore, the three 
categories are separated based on their effects and relative to the timing of the fraudulent 
event. Prevention and deterrence are techniques to ex ante reduce the likelihood of fraudulent 
actions, whereas detection mechanisms are designed to ex post respond to fraud and uncover 
fraud, as can be seen in Figure 8. However, approaches do not exclusively belong to one 
category. For example, knowledge about a specific reliable detection tool or high detection 
rates can deter and therefore prevent fraudulent behaviour from happening (Rezaee & Riley, 
2009, p. 88; Wells, 2017, pp. 370–371). 
Deterrence is based on three factors: certainty, swiftness and severity of punishment 
(Wells, 2004, p. 2). Certainty is the perception and fear of potentially being caught, with 
swiftness depicting the immediacy of the actions against the perpetrator. The severity of 
punishment covers consequences like disciplinary, criminal, and civil actions. Deterrence 
approaches are mostly about establishing a culture and environment that does not accept or 
tolerate fraudulent behaviour and proactively training employees about the established 
mechanisms to detect fraud and how fraud can be reported (Wells, 2017, pp. 370–371). 
Fraud deterrence mechanisms, such as releasing a code of conduct, establishing an internal 
audit department, installing a whistle-blowing hotline, or relying on the four-eyes principle 
for crucial processes can be seen as a matter of discouragement to potential perpetrators. 
With SOX, regulators have reacted to increasingly severe accounting scandals by devoting 
greater energy to fraud prevention and detection as well as deterrence (Wells, 2017, pp. 309–
310). Indeed, with SOX Section 807: Criminal Penalties for Fraud, the factor severity of 
punishment has been addressed and increased significantly. The efficiency of deterrence is 
mainly influenced by the interaction of the three factors in the occupational fraud context 
(Wells, 2004, p. 2). Wells (2004) argues that swift and certain punishment does not need to 
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be severe. In contrast, Friesen (2012) provides evidence of an increase in the severity of 
punishment constituting a more effective fraud deterrence factor than an increase in certainty 
of being caught. Conflicting evidence, especially with regard to the experimental student 
design of Friesen (2012), was previously found by Block and Gerety (1995). Given that most 
empirical evidence comes from various fields of criminological studies, it is rather difficult 
to say how efficiently the three factors actually deter fraud and what represents a good 
method of deterring financial statement fraud in particular. This study is mainly concerned 
with the detection of fraud, where deterrence plays a minor role and is only touched upon 
with regard to the identification and creation of a comprehensive detection model based on 
publicly available information. 
Fraud prevention and deterrence are often used synonymously (Wilhelm, 2004). The 
difference between the two lies in their order of influence on the fraudulent action, although 
a strict separation is not possible and is potentially unwanted due to the interaction between 
fraud deterrence, prevention and detection mechanisms (Jans, Lybaert, & Vanhoof, 2009). 
Figure 8 depicts the basic order of the three concepts. In contrast to deterrence, which is 
based on discouragement, prevention is related to hindering or stopping individuals from 
committing fraudulent behaviour (Wilhelm, 2004, p. 10). Therefore, prevention occurs when 
deterrence fails. Prevention mechanisms are designed to create barriers to make it more 
difficult to successfully commit a fraudulent act and furthermore to increase the likelihood 
of being caught afterwards. For example, verification and authentication procedures 
represent an important means of fraud prevention. The literature suggests to use a wide 
variety of prevention mechanisms, as preventing the fraud before its occurrence is usually 
less costly than the consequential damages (e.g. Wells, 2004; Bierstaker, Brody, & Pacini, 
2006; Ogoun & Obara, 2013). However, determining and balancing the optimal amount of 
deterrence and prevention is difficult. The costs associated with implementing and 
maintaining mechanisms on the business side and also on the regulator’s or lawmaker’s side 
have to be justified against savings from deterrence and prevention (Rose, 2010). 
While fraud prevention is based upon the goal of not letting fraud happen in the first 
place, fraud detection assumes that an unknown number of fraudulent actions have already 
happened and need to be uncovered (Wilhelm, 2004, pp. 10–11). Detection is about the 
identification of fraudulent behaviour. In the case of financial statement fraud, this refers to 
the intentionally misstated nature of financial statements, with examples including whistle-
blower hotlines or regular and surprise internal and external audits. According to Bishop 
(2004, p. 123), the balance between prevention/deterrence and detection with regard to the 
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effort companies usually devote to the respective mechanisms is 20% to 80%. He argues that 
although detection is a vital part of fighting fraud, more evenly balancing the two (as he 
barely distinguishes between deterrence and prevention) would help to reduce fraud. 
Bierstaker et al. (2006) have emphasized the more frequent and excessive application of 
modern data analytic approaches, which are seldom deployed according to their survey of 
accountants and auditors regarding the detection and prevention of fraudulent behaviour. 
Figure 8 presents an overview of different fraud detection stages after the emergence of 
a fraudulent financial report.70 This will serve as the foundation for the upcoming sections, 
which focus on fraud detection possibilities and responsibilities and how this study may help 
to improve the fraud detection process. Given that this study seeks to develop a 
comprehensive fraud detection approach, the fraud detection stages in the context of a 
fraudulent event will be highlighted, rather than an in-depth discussion of deterrence and 
prevention mechanisms.  
According to Figure 8, once deterrence and prevention have failed, a fraudulent 
manipulation of financial reports occurs and sets the starting point for the five stages of 
detection. In the second stage, effective corporate governance (for example through a 
vigilant board of directors or an adequate internal audit function) may uncover the fraudulent 
action, if it has not already prevented it. In stage three, an independent external auditor 
provides reasonable assurance through control and substantial tests to provide assurance that 
financial statements are free of material misstatements. At this point, if undiscovered, a 
misstated financial report will be publicly released. It is then possible that misstatements are 
uncovered by other sources, like users or formal investigations by regulators. At stages four 
and five, the discovery of a misstatement will result in an SEC enforcement action. If the 
misstatement is discovered at stages two or three, it can be corrected and the truthful financial 
report issued in its place.  
The following section will go through the stages and discuss the individuals who are 
involved in fraud detection. The section closes with a summary and an assessment of the 
need for fraud detection that relies on publicly available information
                                                 
70 Combining the view of Wilhelm (2004, p. 15) and Rezaee and Riley (2009, p. 23) to reflect the three stages 
of deterrence, prevention and detection while emphasizing on the latter. 
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2.4.3 Corporate Governance 
Providing a general definition of corporate governance is difficult, even though it has 
constituted an omnipresent concept since the 1990s (Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 2005, 
pp. 1–7). Owing to the universality of the term and the almost countless perspectives and 
interpretations available from different fields, including but not limited to accounting, 
finance, the regulatory field and economics, narrow and broad definitions have been 
formulated (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, pp. 4–5). 
From a broader angle, corporate governance reflects “the combination of applicable laws, 
regulations, and listing rules that facilitate, direct, and monitor corporations’ affairs in 
attracting capital, performing effectively and efficiently, increasing shareholder values, and 
meeting both legal requirements and general social expectations” (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, 
p. 122). Within the fraud detection context and with origins in principal-agent theory, 
corporate governance can more easily be addressed as mechanisms that shareholders and 
stakeholders “require to protect their interest in a world of imperfectly verifiable actions” 
(Keasey et al., 2005, p. 2). 
Corporate governance approaches differ around the world, albeit mostly between the 
USA and other Anglo-Saxon countries on the one hand and most of mainland Europe and 
Japan on the other (Gilson, 2001, p. 329).71 The three main institutional factors that drive 
corporate governance in general and to a certain extent, the differences between those two 
groups are ownership structure, legal systems and capital markets (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, 
p. 125). The ownership structure can either be dispersed or concentrated. Dispersed 
ownership structure pertains to the situation in the USA or UK, where ownership is spread 
across institutional investors, as is typical for cross-border investments, whereas 
concentrated ownership can be found in countries such as Germany and revolves around 
family-owned companies, for example. The ownership structure determines the relevance 
and organization of internal (board composition) and external (rules, laws and regulation) 
control mechanisms.  
Regarding the legal system, corporate governance can also be separated into two major 
categories: one-tier and two-tier systems. This divide is associated with the two traditional 
                                                 
71 Although the differences seem to be of basic nature, a trend towards convergence of corporate governance 
approaches (usually in terms of their constitution of standards) has emerged in recent years (Gilson, 2001). 
However, an observable effect cannot easily be measured as Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) have stated. 
As these authors suggest, convergence seems to be more focused on formality than on actual substance. An 
extensive literature review can be found in Thomsen (2003) and Thomsen and Conyon (2012, pp. 78–82). 
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legal systems of common and civil law (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, p. 126). Civil law has its 
origins in Roman law and is today practised in countries such as Germany, France, Italy, and 
Spain; in contrast, common law came from the UK and is practised today in the USA and 
Australia. The two-tier system has two bodies that operate side by side, namely the board of 
directors and the supervisory board, whereas the one-tier system combines the duties of both 
bodies in one board. Given that this study relies on cases regulated by the SEC (which are 
typically US companies), the corporate governance structures discussed in the following 
refer to the one-tier system. The US corporate governance approach is widely regarded as 
being regulatory-led through policy-makers (Congress, SOX), regulators (SEC) as well as 
stock exchange listing standards and specific state laws (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, p. 126). 
The third factor revolves around the importance of corporate governance for capital 
markets and their participants and vice versa. Capital markets’ purpose to efficiently allocate 
scarce financial resources can be facilitated through suitable corporate governance 
mechanisms (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, pp. 46–61). Corporate governance can lead to the 
positive development of capital markets by enhancing investor protection and lowering the 
cost of capital by reducing the barriers that constrain access to capital (Haque, Arun, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2008, p. 266).72 Moreover, it may strengthen a firm’s information environment 
and enhance stock valuation (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 126–127). Different capital market 
characteristics like the US stock market-centred capital market or Germany’s and Japan’s 
bank-centred capital market have also led to different developments regarding corporate 
governance.73 
Corporate governance is a high-dimensional construct that differs by country through 
legal requirements and is subject to constant change. In the following section, the relevant 
mechanisms and participants of corporate governance in general and their influence and 
function in fraud prevention will be outlined in the detection and deterrence context. 
2.4.4 Participants of Corporate Governance 
The participants of corporate governance are derived from its mechanisms and principles 
and vice versa. Three have already been covered when discussing the factors that drive the 
                                                 
72  A summary of the literature on the consequences of characteristics of corporate governance can be found 
in Haque et al. (2008). 
73 An extensive overview of differences in corporate governance approaches can be found in Gilson (2001). 
This study will not go into further detail as the sample is based on SEC regulated companies, hence the US 
approach is the primary focus. 
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approaches of corporate governance in different countries. In addition to legal and 
regulatory, market-based and ownership mechanisms, informal governance through social 
norms, reputation and trust or other codes build the foundation of corporate governance on 
a very basic level (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, pp. 47–48). The combined set of mechanisms 
constitutes the participants of corporate governance. Each participant successfully fulfils his 
or her responsibility and particular role if their participation results in an added value that is 
often associated with shareholder (investors) interests (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 122–123). 
Therefore, defining an optimal set of mechanisms is important because every mechanism is 
associated with costs and benefits (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, pp. 60–61). Regulatory 
standards like SOX considerably influenced the costs of corporate governance compliance 
through defining a higher quality framework for corporate governance (Coates, 2007, 
pp. 107–108).74 Figure 9 depicts corporate governance participants, especially focusing on 
participants who are directly concerned with financial statement fraud and its detection. 
 
Figure 9 – Corporate governance participants75 
                                                 
74  According to Coates (2007, p. 107), the audit fees and internal audit costs increased by approximately $1 
million per $1 billion of revenue, leading to a modest trend of going private to avoid compliance costs, 
especially for smaller firms. 
75 In reference to Rezaee (2003) and Rezaee and Riley (2009, p. 123). 
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The participants can be divided into internal and external participants depending on their 
sphere of influence on the company. External participants are foremost governing bodies, 
like the SEC, PCAOB, FASB or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and external 
financial statement auditors. 
In the financial statement fraud context, the governing bodies have different purposes, 
based upon their general goals (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 138–279). Thus, the participants 
share complementary and interrelated roles and substitute for each other to a certain extent 
(Ogoun & Obara, 2013, pp. 126–127). Their common goal is to provide and ensure capital 
market efficiency, integrity, and safety while remaining globally competitive. Governing 
bodies lay the cornerstone for external financial statement auditors. Besides issuing 
accounting and auditing standards, they also oversee auditors.76 External financial auditors 
are responsible for assessing the conformity of a company’s financial statements with 
GAAP.77 The conformity of the statements is essentially important for functioning capital 
markets, as market participants trust and rely on them. Overall, external governance bodies 
build the framework in which companies operate and serve as supervisors. In the aftermath 
of the recent major accounting scandals, governing bodies have reacted with a multitude of 
programmes to counter fraudulent behaviour and strengthen market participants’ trust 
(Coates, 2007, pp. 91–92). Although governing bodies are not usually directly concerned 
with the detection of financial statement fraud, the programmes were created to strengthen 
the fraud deterrence, prevention, and detection environment, for example through the 
creation of the PCAOB to oversee auditors. 
Internal participants, as depicted in Figure 9, comprise the board of directors, the audit 
committee, the top management team, and internal auditors. The board of directors’ function 
is to create a system of checks and balances for the management team, which is necessary 
due to the separation of control and ownership (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012, pp. 142–143). In 
practice, the overarching function of the board of directors is the “overseeing, monitoring 
and controlling of management activities” (Rezaee, 2003, p. 27). The board of directors can 
consist of external and internal executive and non-executive members. The effectiveness of 
the board of directors in fulfilling its functions is highly dependent on the quality, reputation, 
and independence of the members. As the (top) management is typically involved in 
fraudulent actions like financial statement fraud, the board of directors has significant scope 
                                                 
76 In the case of the PCAOB after the release of SOX. 
77 More on the role of external financial statement audits in fraud detection can be found in sections 2.4.6 and 
2.4.7. 
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to counter fraud (Wells, 2017, p. 360). Empirical evidence has suggested that weaker 
corporate governance, for example in the form of a board of directors with the chairman also 
acting as the CEO, or boards that have fewer outside members, are more likely to bear fraud 
(e.g. Farber, 2005). The embodiment of corporate governance in general and the board of 
directors in particular has often proved to be significantly related to fraudulent activity (e.g. 
Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 2019). Grove and Cook (2007) have developed a comprehensive 
list of red flags associated with corporate governance weaknesses derived from the cases of 
financial statement fraud around the early 2000s. They suggest that the focus on short-term 
performance and weak internal controls amongst others primarily have negatively influenced 
the occurrence of the scandalous cases and assume that the reactions from external corporate 
governance bodies like SOX to provide the required remedy. 
The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting issued a report in 1987 that 
recommended that public companies implement and configure an effective audit 
committee.78 The audit committee is an operating committee formed through the board of 
directors. The audit committee, as the name suggests, oversees internal and external audits 
and is responsible for maintaining an effective audit environment (Rezaee, 2003, p. 27). In 
this context, it must also ensure the integrity of the financial reporting process. Despite 
having the knowledge to understand the financial statements, the financial reporting process 
and being familiar with applicable laws, standards and regulations, members also have to be 
independent of the management to be able to fulfil their function. The audit committee 
arguably plays one of the most important roles in the context of fraud prevention, detection 
and deterrence through its centrality between other participants of corporate governance 
(Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 157–159). The Treadway Commission regards the audit 
committee as an effective part of corporate governance, especially to combat fraud.79 
Therefore, audit committees’ responsibilities and powers have been revised extensively 
through governing bodies in the aftermath of SOX to improve the quality of their financial 
statements and to ensure truthfulness (Coates, 2007, pp. 104–105). Empirical evidence on 
the role of audit committees regarding the occurrence of fraudulent manipulations is rather 
mixed. Whereas Beasley (1996) finds that firms that do not engage in fraudulent schemes 
have a higher proportion of outside members, the mere existence of an audit committee does 
not affect the likelihood of fraud in his sample of 75 fraud and 75 non-fraud companies. The 
                                                 
78 The report is available at https://www.coso.org/Documents/NCFFR.pdf. 
79  SEC (1989), The Treadway Commission Report: Two years later. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/ 
 news/speech/1989/012689grundfest.pdf. 
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findings of Abbott, Park, and Parker (2000) suggest that audit committee independence and 
regular meetings can reduce the likelihood of fraudulent manipulations. The integrity of the 
audit committee is another factor that negatively affects the risk of fraud. Personal ties to top 
management compromise the audit committee’s effectiveness (Wilbanks, Hermanson, & 
Sharma, 2017). 
Management, which is installed through the board of directors, is responsible for 
executing the corporate strategy and managing the resources of the company. In this regard, 
it is also responsible for the financial reporting process and the conformity of statements 
with GAAP as well as the quality, integrity and reliability of the financial reporting process 
as a whole (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 184–185). This additionally implies that financial 
statements have to be free of irregularities, material errors, or misleading information. In the 
post-SOX era, for example, management has become responsible for implementing effective 
internal control over financial reporting (SOX 302.4 and SOX 404.b). These and other 
internal control mechanisms should be able to reduce the risk of fraudulent and similar 
unwanted behaviour if they are effectively and efficiently implemented (Walsh & Seward, 
1990). Therefore, adequate implementation is crucial, as fraud risks remain if internal control 
systems are not adapted to company peculiarities and evaluated correctly, as one of the 
primary threats to internal control systems is management override (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, 
pp. 192–194). In general, management characteristics, board structure and control of 
management have often been shown to be associated with fraudulent actions and should be 
considered as a fundamental source when assessing fraud risk (e.g. Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1996; Sharma, 2004). 
The management is supported and controlled by a number of corporate governance 
participants. Internal auditors assist the management, the audit committee and other 
participants of corporate governance in assuring that control systems are properly designed 
and maintained (Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, & Bardhan, 2011, pp. 288–290). Internal auditors have 
received increased attention in the aftermath of the WorldCom accounting scandal, in which 
internal auditor Cynthia Cooper discovered and reported fraudulent actions (Scharff, 2005). 
Internal auditors have also become an integral part of corporate governance through 
regulatory requirements and standards. For example, the NYSE required the installation of 
internal audit functions in 2004.80 The impact of internal auditors on the financial reporting 
                                                 
80  NYSE (2014), Corporate Governance Guide. Retrieved from https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/ 
 listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Guide.pdf. 
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system, especially on the outcome, has been empirically examined in detail. Prawitt, Smith, 
and Wood (2009) among others have noted that a higher quality of internal control function, 
especially internal audits, leads to better financial reporting in general in their examination 
of the probability of meeting analysts’ perceptions and the quality of external financial 
reporting as a whole. Coram, Ferguson, and Moroney (2008) provide evidence of internal 
audits contributing extensively to fraud detection, especially to the self-reporting of fraud. 
They furthermore suggest that outsourcing the internal audit function is jeopardizing this 
effect. 
Besides the positive effects of corporate governance mechanisms, there exist a number of 
downsides associated with the increasingly powerful presence of the related mechanisms. 
Shi, Connelly, and Hoskisson (2017) suggest that the powerful expectations of external 
governance participants can limit the autonomy and intrinsic motivation of managers, 
potentially even increasing the likelihood of fraudulent actions. Weir, Laing, and McKnight 
(2002) offer evidence of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance in the UK. Although most of the mechanisms seemed to have little to no effect 
on company performance, the mixed results could be discussed with reference to similar 
studies, raising a question about the necessity of imposed governance mechanisms without 
evidence of positive effects. However, the authors also state that the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms as a whole is difficult to ascertain, given that most 
companies comply with the code of best practice and thus leave little room for comparison. 
Jain and Jamali (2016) also present mixed results in their comprehensive literature review 
of the effects of corporate governance. 
Among corporate governance participants, internal and external auditors are a major 
source of fraud detection (Gottschalk, 2018, p. 32). In the brief discussion of corporate 
governance participants, the positive effects of both have already been suggested. In the 
following sections, internal and external audits will be discussed and their contributions to 
the prevention, detection, and deterrence of financial statement fraud presented. 
2.4.5 Internal Audits 
Internal auditors are positioned as an internal participant of corporate governance and thus 
have considerable potential to assist in detecting fraudulent actions.81 Internal auditors 
                                                 
81  Although the internal audit function can be outsourced rather than being provided by in-house sources 
(Coram et al., 2008, p. 544). 
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provide the internal control structure and are involved with operational and financial 
reporting systems (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 208–211). The internal audit function (IAF) 
has evolved and grown in recent years in many countries, mainly through regulatory 
novelties like SOX in 2002 (Soh & Martinov‐Bennie, 2011, p. 605). For example, internal 
auditors may provide consulting and assurance services to comply with the provisions of 
SOX, like those regarding internal control systems, risk assessment and financial reporting. 
Internal auditors and their role in corporate governance have been addressed extensively 
in authoritative reports and professional standards. The integration of internal control 
systems is attributable to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, a US federal law 
addressing the bribery of foreign officials as well as accounting transparency. In this 
concern, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
was established by five private organizations in 1985 as a platform for the Treadway 
Commission, which was formed to inspect, analyse and formulate recommendations on 
corporate financial reporting (Vanasco, 1998, p. 24).82 COSO adopted a framework in 1992 
to design and test the effectiveness of internal control. This framework with the name 
“Internal Control – Integrated Framework” has been developed to become the predominant 
framework, which is globally applied and was updated in 2013 to incorporate changes to 
business and the operating environment (Janvrin, Payne, Byrnes, Schneider, & Curtis, 2012). 
The mission of COSO and its funders is “to provide thought leadership through the 
development of comprehensive frameworks and guidance on enterprise risk management, 
internal control and fraud deterrence designed to improve organizational performance and 
governance and to reduce the extent of fraud in organizations” (COSO mission statement).83 
The general framework provided by COSO has influenced regulators and standard setters 
and has been incorporated into auditing standards. The PCAOB has released the AS2 – An 
Audit on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit 
of Financial Statements and the AICPA the SAS 55 and 78 – Consideration of Internal 
Control in a Financial Statement Audit, suggesting the COSO framework as a basis for 
auditors.84 In addition, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), which was founded in 1941 
as a non-governmental organization, has issued a Statement on Internal Auditing Standards 
                                                 
82 The funders of the Committee were professional accounting and auditing institutions based in the USA, 
namely: the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting 
Association (AAA), the Financial Executives International (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
and the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). 
83 The COSO mission statement as of 2019 is available at https://www.coso.org/Pages/aboutus.aspx. 
84 AS2 was superseded by AS5 in 2007. 
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3 (SIAS3) – Deterrence, Detection, Investigation and Reporting of Fraud in 1985 to counter 
specific types of fraud and to ensure that internal auditors prioritize engaging and assisting 
in fraud detection (Vanasco, 1998, pp. 22–23).85 Although it is the most prominent 
framework, COSO is not the only one, especially with regard to the risk of fraud. Certainly, 
an alternative framework for internal auditing with the objective to deter, prevent and detect 
fraud is the so-called IFR² (Jans et al., 2009). The IFR² framework heavily relies on data 
mining techniques coupled with domain knowledge to fulfil its task. The frameworks in 
general hint at the importance of a structured detection approach, which is dependent on a 
foundation in fraud theory and the exploitation of technological advances. 
Similar elaborations can also be found in the respective standards. The responsibilities of 
internal auditing departments regarding fraud based on the SIAS3 are the identification of 
red flags signalling the possibility of fraud, investigating symptoms of fraud and reporting 
findings to an audit committee (or another appropriate level of management or the board). 
Therefore, the internal auditor should possess sufficient knowledge regard fraud factors, 
think critically about control weaknesses, determine whether the corporate culture and 
environment fosters related behaviour, determine and assess corporate policies describing 
violations and how they should be tackled and assess and determine potential improvements 
(Vanasco, 1998, pp. 42–43). The SIAS3 also states that through the tradeoff of benefits and 
costs, not all fraud can be deterred and prevented and therefore detection mechanisms and 
investigative approaches need to be established. Consequently, standard setters, regulators 
and the literature suggest that internal auditors are more successful when they play a 
proactive role (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 214–218). 
The internal audit function is viewed as the first-line defence against fraud. It can prevent 
and deter fraud through its bare existence but unfolds its true potential through thorough 
implementation and compliance with standards (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, pp. 212–214), 
especially when creating an environment in which potential perpetrators are unable to find 
the ground for fraudulent actions due to an anti-fraud culture and effective controls (Coram 
et al., 2008, p. 546). With regard to fraud detection, internal auditors might have an 
advantage over external auditors because they have a broader scope of insight into the 
company and are less constrained through the factors of time and associated costs (Rezaee 
& Riley, 2009). However, internal auditors do not act as additional or surrogate external 
                                                 
85 The IIA sees itself as standard setter, educator and global voice of the internal audit profession. The 
information on the self-perception have been gathered from the official website: https://na.theiia.org/about-
us/Pages/About-The-Institute-of-Internal-Auditors.aspx 
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auditors and thus do not ensure the fair presentation of financial statements (Rezaee & Riley, 
2009, p. 215). Regarding this concern, the interrelated nature of corporate governance 
participants is significant, as the audit committee should ensure that the internal and external 
auditors’ functions are complementary and coordinate them accordingly (Rezaee, 2003, 
p. 27). The positive influence of the audit function on fraud detection has also been found 
empirically. Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000), as well as Coram et al. 
(2008), have found that the existence of an IAF and the support of internal auditors are 
associated with non-fraudulent firms, whereas fraudulent firms exhibit a less pronounced 
IAF. The audit committee should ensure the objectivity and independence of internal 
auditors (Christopher, Sarens, & Leung, 2009). For example, internal auditors may run into 
conflicts of interest, as they are hired, promoted, and evaluated through top managements, 
for whom they operate. After SOX, the task to hire and compensate the director of internal 
audit has therefore moved to the audit committee. 
Overall, the internal audit function plays an important role in itself and provides 
supportive services for other participants of corporate governance. Standard setters and 
regulators have also engaged in strengthening the IAF by improving its effectiveness through 
requirements regarding the function’s structure and the persons acting within it, building a 
fundamental basis for the detection of fraud in general and financial statement fraud in 
particular. The different frameworks imply the use of state-of-the-art data mining techniques 
for fraud deterrence, prevention, and detection, supporting the goal of this study in 
developing a comprehensive fraud detection approach that utilizes different data sources and 
modern detection models. 
2.4.6 External Audits and the Expectation Gap 
The auditing profession has a vital task to ensure market efficiency and has developed 
alongside companies over time. Nevertheless, the most noticeable changes to the profession 
have been based on uncovered cases of fraud. Following the stock market crash of 1929 and 
the issuance of the Securities and Exchange Act in 1934, it became obligatory for public 
companies to be independently audited for the first time in the USA (Singleton & Singleton, 
2010, p. 284). An increasing number of companies wanted to be listed on the stock market 
and sell shares. Potential investors’ need for reliable information about a company’s situation 
led to an increase in demand for audited reports. Soon, private accounting firms emerged 
and took care of testing the adherence to GAAP. In this regard, a call for auditing rules could 
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soon be heard after fraudulent activities at McKesson & Robbins 1939 went undiscovered 
(Byrnes et al., 2018, pp. 286–289). Most of the tasks were optional, like the physical 
inspection of inventories or the confirmation of receivables. The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued the Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) 
No. 1 in the subsequent year and significantly increased auditors’ responsibilities. The next 
step was influenced by the integration of computers into the business sphere. In 1973, the 
Equity Funding Corp. scandal revealed a need for electronic auditing. Indeed, this company 
boosted profits via falsely reported commission income, which was not uncovered by the 
audits due to a lack of electronic auditing tools. This and technological advances induced by 
the access to computer-processed data led to the continuous increase in computer-guided 
audit routines on the one side and the obligatory introduction of the internal control system 
on the side of the companies. 
Alongside changes to auditing tasks and tools, the expectations of auditors have changed 
considerably, especially concerning fraud detection (e.g. Epstein & Geiger, 1994; Kinney & 
Nelson, 1996). Initially, auditors were expected to provide (almost) absolute assurance 
against fraudulent manipulations. However, with increased business activity, auditors were 
somewhat constrained in determining the fairness of financial statements and in verifying 
every transaction (Byrnes et al., 2018, pp. 286–287). Absolute assurance has hence changed 
to a reasonable level of assurance. Although efforts have been made to communicate the 
(self-perceived) responsibilities of auditors, there was and still is a different perception 
between the public, regulators, jurors of what auditors are intended to do and what is required 
for them to do (Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014). This discrepancy is called the “expectation gap” 
and describes a fundamental issue of the audit profession.86 The term was introduced by 
Liggio (1974). Since then, the literature has argued whether and to what extent it actually 
exists, with cumulative evidence proffered over time. Focusing on audit report references 
for loss contingencies, Kinney and Nelson (1996) have found that SEC, GAO and financial 
analysts (among others) hold auditors more responsible for audit effectiveness and expect a 
higher level of disclosure than auditors think is reasonable.87 In 1988, a number of SAS were 
released in the course of public criticism to partly address the expectation gap issue. In 
particular, SAS No. 58 – Reports on Audited Financial Statements introduced an explanation 
stating that an audit (only) provides reasonable assurance regarding whether the financial 
                                                 
86  See Chye Koh and Woo (1998) for a review of the literature. 
87 GAO stands for the US Government Accountability Office, providing services like auditing and evaluations 
for the US Congress. 
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statements are free of material misstatements.88 SAS No. 53 – The Auditor’s Responsibility 
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities89 addresses fraudulent manipulations of 
financial statements and requires that an audit in accordance with GAAS (generally accepted 
auditing standards) be designed to detect errors and irregularities, albeit under the concept 
of reasonable assurance and not guaranteed.90 However, a survey among investors by 
Epstein and Geiger (1994) subsequently concluded that around 70% of participants demand 
absolute assurance against fraudulent misstated financial statements. 
The expectation gap is difficult to bridge (Porter, 1993). The accounting and auditing 
literature demands the design, implementation and maintenance of internal control 
mechanisms that are able to reasonably assure that reliable financial statements are crafted 
(Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014, p. 16). Auditors then have the responsibility to reasonably assure 
that those statements are prepared fairly in accordance with GAAP. Despite the public 
perception, it is mostly understood in the literature that auditors have the duty to ensure that 
financial statements are accurately represented and that CPAs do not need to act as crime or 
police detectives (Farrell & Healy, 2000, p. 25), despite the fact that the literature attributes 
a greater potential for fraud detection to auditors (Gottschalk, 2018, pp. 35–38, for a 
comprehensive literature review). AU section 316.12 Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit even reads, “a properly planned and performed audit may not detect a 
material misstatement resulting from fraud”. 
With the aforementioned discussion in mind, it may be unsurprising that external auditors 
are not among the top sources of fraud detection. Gottschalk (2018) has examined 369 cases 
of white-collar crime between 2009 and 2015, finding that 287 of these were attributable to 
fraud or manipulation. The best source of detection for both categories were journalists, with 
about 28% of the detected cases. Of other typical mechanisms to detect fraud, internal control 
systems and audits of official authorities (e.g. tax controls) appear to be slightly better than 
external auditors in the overall comparison. Similar results have been attained by Albrecht, 
Albrecht, and Dunn (2001), who found around 18-20% of fraudulent cases are revealed by 
external or internal audits. Pedneault, Rudewicz, Silverstone, and Sheetz (2012) has 
estimated that around 12% of initial hints of fraud cases are discovered by external audits 
                                                 
88 The effective date was 1 January 1989. SAS No. 58 is still in effect today. 
89 Errors are regarded as honest (unintentional) mistakes, whereas irregularities are deemed intentional 
misstatements. 
90 SAS No. 82 – The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Error and Irregularities superseded the 
old version. The effective date was 15 December 1997. In 2002, SAS 99 – Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit superseded SAS 82 and placed greater emphasis on fraud detection in the 
aftermath of the major accounting scandals (Moyes & Baker, 2003). 
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and an additional 19% through internal audits. Other studies dealing with the ability of 
auditors to detect fraud have also yielded rather negative results. According to Beasley 
(2003), the ability of financial statement audits to detect fraud after the numerous auditing 
standard revisions has not improved. Albrecht and Hoopes (2014) have inspected cases in 
which external auditors were unable to detect fraud and have analysed the factors that most 
likely lead to failure. In 10 of the 19 cases, the auditors were conducting the audits in 
accordance with applicable auditing standards but were unable to detect the fraudulent 
manipulation. In five cases, the auditors were negligent in performing the audit, whereas in 
four an early settlement was reached. The reasons were manifold in both groups. In the case 
of negligent audit practices, the reasons ranged from inadequate training and poor audit 
execution to a failure to exercise due care and a lack of independence, for example through 
bribes. In the 10 cases where the auditors were unable to detect the fraudulent manipulation 
but were not negligent, the reasons were either attributable to the fraudster or to participating 
(colluding) parties. Reasons can be plentiful, for example through lying or people being 
reluctant to disclose what they know, or alternatively through the nature of accounting and 
auditing, which mainly focuses on the inability to detect fraudulent records in a sample-
based audit in the voluminous accounting records. 
To summarize, external financial statement audits are, in spite of public opinion to the 
contrary, unable or unintended to detect every instance of financial statement fraud. 
However, detection results by external auditors seem to be rather disappointing, as they most 
likely have considerable potential to detect manipulations, leading to a need for additional 
mechanisms and tools as standard setters and the literature have already demanded. 
Therefore, in the following section, the audits specifically designed to detect and investigate 
fraud will be discussed. 
2.4.7 Fraud Audits 
Despite the existence of regular financial statements and internal audits, an additional type, 
the so-called fraud audit, has emerged. Where suspicion is raised at the conclusion of an 
aforementioned audit, a fraud audit may be undertaken to examine the case in greater detail 
and with respect to fraudulent actions (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 12). Fraud audits 
require experts from the field of accounting and auditing. In this regard, the term forensic or 
investigative accounting has appeared (Vanasco, 1998, p. 23). The difference between fraud 
auditing and forensic accounting is not clearly defined but according to Singleton and 
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Singleton (2010, pp. 12–15), fraud auditing is related to the specialized approaches and 
methodologies necessary to discern fraud in an audit, whereas forensic accounting is the 
general term concerned with investigative work in the domain of accounting with a broader 
scope. Forensic accounting may also involve court-related work like gathering evidence and 
translating complex financial transactions to laypersons. 
Regular financial statement audits and fraud audits differ. A fraud audit is neither a 
defined term nor a defined professional service and may also be called a fraud examination 
or fraud investigation (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 12–14). Fraud audits are usually 
performed in the aftermath of financial statement audits and/or if suspicion of potential or 
actual fraud is raised by any source. As mentioned in section 2.4.6, fraudulent manipulations 
are not only detected by auditors but often other sources that provide the relevant clues 
leading to suspicion (Gottschalk, 2018, p. 32). One example of a fraud audit would be the 
case of an auditor being sued by shareholders after fraudulent manipulations were discovered 
in audited financial statements. The fraud audits may reveal whether the manipulation could 
have potentially been uncovered by the regular audit.  
Fraud audits are much more in-depth, time-consuming and therefore costly than regular 
financial statement audits. They are closer to the concept of absolute assurance and thus the 
inspection of every transaction. Moreover, fraud audits also involve investigations of the 
accounting and controls system in general, to identify potential weak spots and ways in 
which safety procedures might be circumvented (Vanasco, 1998, pp. 42–43). Cases have 
shown that fraud audits to consume more than 50 times the amount of hours spent on regular 
audits (Albrecht & Hoopes, 2014, p. 15). Albrecht and Hoopes (2014, p. 14) have argued 
that fraud audits represent “the only way to satisfy the expectation that financial statement 
auditors always detect material financial statement fraud”. The procedures of these audits 
are not considered by GAAS or PCAOB auditing standards. Moreover, Albrecht and Hoopes 
(2014, p. 15) claim that these standards would also not be feasible to fulfil the task. 
Besides the already mentioned differences in the timing and the scope of the audits, 
additional peculiarities are important. Whereas regular financial statement audits are 
performed by CPAs, fraud audits are more likely to be executed by Certified Fraud 
Examiners (CFEs) or forensic accountants (FA) (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 14–15). 
CFEs and FAs usually share knowledge of accounting and auditing but are additionally 
trained in fraud investigation. Moreover, their tooling may involve data mining and analysis 
techniques, which are usually not part of a regular financial statement audit (Bierstaker et 
 
83 
 
al., 2006, p. 530).91 The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) offers 
programmes to accredit CFEs and may help to establish fraud policies in companies 
(Bierstaker et al., 2006, p. 523).92 Among the big accounting firms (at least for the big four), 
fraud examinations have become typical services that are offered to clients. In spite of their 
differences and similarities, their most obvious divergence is their purpose. Indeed, whereas 
a regular financial statement audit provides reasonable assurance of the financial statements 
being prepared in accordance with applicable accounting standards and in its course 
uncovers misstatements and potential fraud, a fraud audit is solely used to uncover the latter. 
2.4.8 Publicly Available Information and Fraud Detection 
The availability of useful data is essential in designing a reliable and well-performing 
detection model. The different types of audits that have been discussed so far can rely on 
access to internal and publicly available data alike. In terms of financial records, internal 
data can be accessed at the transaction or journal level, yielding a higher level of insight than 
aggregated financial statements (Gee, 2015, p. 320).93 In addition, gathering non-financial 
data inside the company may help to improve the detection results, especially when red-flags 
can be utilized (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, pp. 110–111). Examples cover clues related to 
characteristics of corporate governance or top executives. Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 
(1997, p. 10) present a list of red-flags in their assessment of decision aids for auditors with 
entries like: “the company has a weak control environment” or “the chief executive officer 
and the chief financial officer both have an aggressive attitude toward financial reporting”. 
These data may be associated with factors from fraud models that could not be incorporated 
using only publicly available data, or at least not to a satisfactory extent.94 
However, this barely limits the usefulness of the results of this study. It is important to 
note that detection performance could most likely only be improved further with clues 
extracted from additional, preferably company internal data sources. If the detection models 
in this study can potentially distinguish annual reports into truthful and fraudulent categories, 
                                                 
91  Although the technological tools of external auditors are also improving, their focus may differ and be 
designed to assist in the audit process rather than to detect fraud. 
92 The ACFE was founded in the USA in 1988 to counter white-collar crime. It has developed to become the 
world’s largest anti-fraud organization, with 85,000 members in 125 countries as of 2019, offering training, 
education, and anti-fraud policies. Retrieved from https://www.acfe.com/about-the-acfe.aspx. 
93  Although, Gee (2015, p. 320) states that one should start an audit or an investigation with the financial 
statements and intensify in certain areas using additional data from journal entries, transactions and also 
outside of normal business transactions when necessary. 
94 See the explanations on fraud models and their translation into detection models in section 2.2. 
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this process would be even easier with more predictors extracted from additional data 
sources or from complementary decision aids (Eining et al., 1997, pp. 16–17). Moreover, 
such a detection model is not only relevant for auditors and their contributions to functioning 
capital markets but to all stakeholders and shareholders alike. It may be especially relevant 
in cases where auditors support the fraudulent scheme or are involved in some way. 
Additionally, auditors have shown not to be the most reliable source of fraud detection. 
Therefore, when having stakes in a company, further determining the truthfulness of the 
audited publicly available financial statements like the annual or quarterly reports may be 
helpful. From an investor or analyst standpoint, for example, such detection models could 
be exploited to evaluate truthfulness on an additional basis before translating the disclosed 
information into decisions. 
Furthermore, the detection models developed and tested in the following chapters could 
easily be extended to incorporate additional data sources if the identification of the company 
and year are provided. In this regard, the models are not limited to a US sample but can be 
employed for all companies reporting in English. The detection performance might suffer if 
the models cannot be trained on foreign data but should still be able to detect cases if the 
annual reports are similar in nature.95  
                                                 
95 See section 5.2.1 for a comparison of qualitative features from this and similar studies. 
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3 Literature Review of Financial Statement Fraud Detection Studies 
The following literature review will focus on relevant studies in the field of textual analysis 
in accounting and finance and financial fraud detection. The literature review will be used 
to identify the shortcomings and research gaps of contemporary work in the field of financial 
statement fraud detection and prepare the research goals for this study. After identifying the 
research gap and formulating the detailed tasks for this study, the methodology will be 
outlined, before presenting the results. 
3.1 Textual Analysis in Finance and Accounting 
Textual analysis in the accounting, finance and auditing literature has become increasingly 
popular over the past 20 years (Fisher, Garnsey, & Hughes, 2016, p. 160).96 Especially the 
accounting domain, by definition being concerned with communicating corporate 
information, offers extensive possibilities in applying textual analysis. Narratives in 
corporate disclosure can be studied from various perspectives. On the one hand, the focus 
might be on the recipients’ side, i.e. by focusing on perceived information. This literature 
often explores economic implications like changes in equity evaluation, the cost of capital, 
changes in analysts’ forecasts and so on. On the other hand, disclosure might be examined 
from the perspective of creators. Textual analysis facilitates consideration of how textual 
information is crafted by management and opens the door to analyzing the interaction of 
attributes of corporate disclosure and the underlying management and firm characteristics. 
In order to predict fraud, this perspective on the management’s decision-making process is 
vital. It is plausible that managers are the ones committing or instructing the fraudulent 
actions and therefore the focus should be on the textual documents in their present condition. 
Li (2010a) has found empirical evidence for self-serving attribution bias in the MD&A 
section of annual reports. Communication patterns reveal an association between superior 
firm performance and managers’ self-expression in the MD&A section. Moreover, self-
serving attribution bias is associated with overconfident behaviour, resulting in more 
optimistic forecasts. Overall, the findings have revealed that management characteristics that 
result in corporate policy-making can be captured by textual patterns. Narrative peculiarities 
and management intentions have also been the focus of Abrahamson and Park (1994) and Li 
                                                 
96  Fisher et al. (2016) compiled an extensive overview of natural language processing in the accounting, 
auditing and finance literature. Also see Lewis and Young (2019) for an explanation of commonly used 
methods for automated analysis of financial texts and their implications on corporate reporting. 
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(2008), who examined concealment based on the obfuscation theory, which focuses on 
management’s intention either to hide information completely or to obfuscate readers using 
largely incomprehensible language, increasing ambiguities and information asymmetry as a 
result. 
Li (2008) applied readability scoring to measure the relationship between reading ease 
and firm performance as well as earnings persistence. He found empirical evidence 
indicating a negative relationship between firm performance and readability. The results of 
Abrahamson and Park (1994) support the potential opportunistic behaviour of managers 
when crafting corporate disclosure narratives. They find evidence of managers concealing 
or obfuscating negative outcomes if the institutional environment provides greater 
opportunities to do so. Othman et al. (2012) have also shown that the readability of a 
company’s annual report reduces in the two years prior to fraudulent manipulation, revealing 
potential evidence of management obfuscation theory in the financial statement fraud 
context. Social psychology suggests that lying and deception can be identified through 
linguistic peculiarities for example differences in narrative complexity, tone, or the existence 
of less self-relevant and self-referencing language (e.g. Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & 
Richards, 2003). Similarly, Buller and Burgoon (1996) discussed and examined the 
interpersonal deception theory, which deals with deceit in interpersonal communication and 
found evidence for a variety of linguistic features both in written and spoken language that 
indicate deceptive intentions. In this regard, Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, and Twitchell 
(2004) however, appeal that although it has been shown that clues in communication exist 
that hint at certain states of the sender, these clues may vary considerably across different 
types of communication mediums and for different types of states that are studied (e.g. 
deceit) and require a specific assessment to be successful. 
In the context of negative financial situations, a number of studies have focused on 
companies in peril. Narrative peculiarities in the narratives of affected companies are 
examined around related events, such as bankruptcy or financial distress (e.g. Tennyson, 
Ingram, & Dugan, 1990; Smith & Taffler, 2000; Boo & Simnett, 2002). Mayew, 
Sethuraman, and Venkatachalam (2015) examined the language of MD&A reports to find 
evidence of linguistic characteristics being associated with subsequent bankruptcy events. 
More specifically, they revealed tone and the management’s opinion of going concern to 
have predictive power for future bankruptcy. Boo and Simnett (2002) provided similar 
results for companies in financial distress, finding that companies that do not comment on 
future prospects are more likely to fail in the future than are firms from the comparison 
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group. Non-disclosure, i.e. an absence of narratives about a certain topic, may also be 
associated with the subsequent economic condition of firms. This has complemented the 
findings of Abrahamson and Park (1994) and provides additional useful guidance in 
establishing forecasting models based on linguistic characteristics. Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) developed wordlists to measure tone in corporate disclosure and linked them to firm 
characteristics of their sample including trading volume, unexpected earnings and material 
weaknesses amongst others, providing evidence of tone in corporate disclosure hinting at 
corporate peculiarities for a large sample of 10-Ks between 1994 and 2008. 
Other studies have focussed on the influence of management and corporate governance 
characteristics on different types of corporate disclosure. Bamber, Jiang, and Wang (2010) 
have examined the influence of demographic characteristics like age cohort, career track, 
military experience and qualification of managers on corporate disclosure. They find that 
manager specific fixed-effects exist. For example are managers from the accounting, finance 
and legal career track and those with military experience associated with rather precise 
disclosure styles. Rouf (2011) has studied voluntary disclosure and finds empirical evidence 
for corporate governance and management characteristics being associated with the amount 
of voluntarily disclosed information. Especially board size and independence, as well as the 
existence of an audit committee, influence voluntary disclosure positively. Similar results 
have been found Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and Stratling (2014) for corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) disclosure. For their study in the banking industry, besides common corporate 
governance characteristics like frequency of board meetings and size of boards being 
positively related to CSR disclosure, they suggest powerful CEOs (as of the existence board 
duality) counterintuitively to increase transparency for personal interests like reputation. 
Trotman and Bradley (1981) studied voluntary corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
found that the managements’ decision horizon influences the existence and amount of 
voluntary disclosure. Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2019) have examined the impact of CEO 
materialism on CSR and the underlying disclosure and find that materialists are negatively 
associated with their company’s CSR score. Their results depict how a character trait of the 
management directly influences disclosure and hence may be captured by textual analysis. 
On the other hand, a vast amount of studies have focused on the recipient side, revealing 
the impact of linguistic peculiarities on recipient behaviour. For example, Lawrence (2013) 
have presented evidence that suggests that the readability and complexity of financial 
disclosure are vital for private investors’ decision-making. Private investors are more likely 
to invest in firms that provide disclosures with higher readability. In contrast, he has found 
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no evidence of institutional investors’ decision-making being affected by the readability of 
narratives. Additional evidence on the influence of readability of corporate disclosure on 
investors was presented by Lee (2012), who showed that longer and harder to read 10-Qs 
reports result in delayed stock price reactions for the three-day post-filing drift window. The 
results from Lee (2012) imply that management can affect information efficiency by 
influencing textual characteristics in their communication instruments. Lehavy, Li, and 
Merkley (2011) focused on financial intermediaries and corporate narratives. They 
recognized greater analyst dispersion for companies providing MD&As with lower 
readability. Moreover, Li (2010b) and Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) have provided 
empirical evidence of sentiment in corporate disclosure being associated with future firm 
performance, with the market responding to sentiment signals. This finding has further 
implications for the credibility of textual information and their value-relevance for investors. 
Given that investors react according to the positive signal given by management, they value 
the credibility of information over management’s opportunistic behaviour. 
From a wider perspective, the results suggest that textual components of corporate 
disclosure can reveal subtle details of a firm and its management. Moreover, managers can 
and (probably) actively do influence recipients’ ease of absorbing the information provided 
by manipulating its textual components. For the purpose of financial statement fraud 
detection, where subtle details beyond the raw financials and from the inside of the firm and 
the management could potentially be important, textual analysis offers considerable 
potential. 
3.2 Financial Statement Fraud Detection 
Fraud detection is a complex topic that necessitates a multidisciplinary approach 
(Ramamoorti et al., 2013, pp. 6–7). Indeed, it is unlikely that fraud can be countered using 
isolated and narrow approaches (Singleton & Singleton, 2010, p. 145). The fraud detection 
literature has examined manifold issues regarding financial statement fraud and its detection. 
Over the past years, two streams have emerged in the financial statement fraud detection 
literature. Early research focused on quantitative information in annual reports or other 
external communication instruments, supplemented by capital market data (e.g. Persons, 
1995; Beneish, 1999; Kaminski et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 2011; Abbasi et al., 2012). The 
typical design extracts financial and non-financial metrics for companies or firm years where 
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their disclosures are known to be truthful and fraudulent.97 A comprehensive set of potential 
predictors exists, although these indicators vary considerably between studies.98 Over time, 
additional and more sophisticated metrics, as well as more advanced classification 
approaches, have been developed and applied to detect fraudulent cases (e.g. Alden, Bryan, 
Lessley, & Tripathy, 2012). The potential disadvantage of financial metrics is the fact that 
they are the subject of manipulations and may hide more than they actually reveal, moreover 
contain texts more diverse and denser information than the plain numbers (Goel & Gangolly, 
2012, p. 81). Therefore, besides the commonly used financial metrics, some research has 
also started to incorporate non-financial measures. Identifying non-financial measures and 
creating a detection model by building upon the relationship of non-financial and financial 
metrics (for example, facilities’ growth versus revenue growth) may help to identify 
manipulations to the raw financials (Brazel, Jones, & Zimbelman, 2009). 
Besides constructing predictors from company financials, a number of studies have 
focused on exploiting the distributional characteristics of the underlying business-related 
numerical data (e.g. Nigrini, 1996; Durtschi, Hillison, & Pacini, 2004; Saville, 2006; Watrin, 
Struffert, & Ullmann, 2008). Thereby, the data has been examined on different levels like 
journal entries or the aggregated results as disclosed in the financial statements to detect 
anomalies that deviate from the expected frequency distributions, hinting at potential 
manipulations. The most common methods that have been utilized for fraud detection relied 
on Benford’s Law.99 Benford (1938) noted that lower digits occur more often than higher 
digits, based on his impression of the condition of pages in books covering common 
logarithmic tables, which he later confirmed by 20 different lists of numbers from different 
sources. Fraud detection utilizing Benford’s Law is conducted by calculating deviations of 
occurrences of digits at certain places in numbers from the expected occurrence provided by 
the Benford distribution (e.g. in ~30% of the time the first digit is a 1) (Nigrini, 1996). At 
this point, it is important to note that the basic assumption of this type of investigation is that 
the unmanipulated cases actually follow the Benford distribution (Watrin et al., 2008, 
pp. 235–236). Therefore, it has to be assessed beforehand, if the underlying data like journal 
                                                 
97  Although there might still exist a number of fraudulent observations in the group of truthful observations 
due to the fact that fraud is determined based on external data sources like AAERs, which are assumed to 
be unable to detect every case. See 4.1.1 for a discussion of fraud proxies. 
98  A detailed summary of quantitative predictors will be given in 4.1.4, where the selection for this study will 
be discussed. 
99  Sugiarto, Noorzaman, Madu, Subagyo, and Amiri (2017) showed that for first digit tests of fraud, frequency 
distributions resulting from Fibonacci sequences and Lucas sequences are equally well suited as they obey 
Benford’s Law. 
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entries or numerical data in financial reports do even obey Benford’s Law to make this type 
of fraud detection approach applicable at all.100 Benford’s Law requires the underlying data 
to satisfy a number of assumptions, which may not be met by all types of numerical data 
from finance and accounting (for example a built-in minimum or maximum like transaction 
costs of investments or a threshold value to be met to record an asset, rounded data, etc.).101 
Moreover, some fraudulent schemes cannot be captured by using Benford’s Law at all. These 
schemes involve manipulation to data that is not suitable for examination of Benford due to 
the fact that it does not suffice the relevant assumptions, does not have the required sample 
size or is perpetrated through the absence of transactions (Durtschi et al., 2004, p. 27). In the 
above-mentioned examples, deviations from Benford’s Law are seen as anomalies, which 
need to be investigated further. In those cases, each observation is tested against the 
distribution. However, there have been efforts to utilize Benford’s law further. Saville (2006) 
tested the potential of distinguishing fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies using 
Benford’s Law on numbers from the income statements of a pair-matched sample of 34 
companies from South Africa by using a regression model to assess the level of conformity 
of each company’s financial information to Benford’s Law. According to his results, all 
fraudulent observations occur to be conspicuous, whilst only three of the non-fraudulent 
observations appear to have manipulated. Under the above mentioned difficulties, especially 
the questionable assumption that data from financial statements (which are the primary 
source of quantitative predictors in this study) differs in its distributional characteristics with 
regard to the Benford distribution between manipulated and non-manipulated observations, 
this study desists from utilizing a similar approach and rather relies on the more common 
and approved predictor variables. 
Regardless of the nature of the detection model, most studies concerned with financial 
statement fraud detection rely on samples from the USA, but there is also plenty of empirical 
evidence available from other countries using similar models. For example, Spathis (2002) 
and Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis (2002) have constructed a sample based on Greek 
companies, Dikmen and Küçükkocaoğlu (2010) have relied on a Turkish sample and Liu, 
Chan, Alam Kazmi, and Fu (2015) and Ravisankar, Ravi, Raghava Rao, and Bose (2011) 
                                                 
100  Henselmann, Scherr, and Ditter (2013) have examined all monetary line items in 10-K XBRL (eXtensible 
Business Reporting Language) filings in 2012, suggesting that those are obeying to Benford’s Law. Similar 
results have been found by Quick and Wolz (2003) for annual report data of large listed German companies 
between 1994-1998. However, this does not necessarily imply that Benford’s Law is able to distinguish 
between manipulated and non-manipulated observations. 
101  See Drank and Nigrini (2000, p. 132) and Watrin et al. (2008, p. 222) for further effectuations on the 
assumptions. 
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have examined Chinese companies. The results suggest that regardless of country and 
regulatory sphere, detection models created from similar predictors seem to be able to detect 
fraud regardless of the origin of the company. 
Perols, Bowen, Zimmermann, and Samba (2017) have produced one of the most 
comprehensive studies and rely on prior quantitative predictors from Cecchini, Aytug, 
Koehler, and Pathak (2010b), Dechow et al. (2011) and Perols (2011). Their findings have 
a broad scope of implications for the financial statement fraud detection literature. First, they 
reveal how different sampling methodologies can be adopted to address the problem of 
imbalanced data sets in the fraud detection context, where the cases of interest represent rare 
events compared to the overall population. Moreover, they boost existing models by 
complementing them with additional predictors. Finally, they show that addressing different 
types of schemes of financial statement fraud rather than fraud as a whole may lead to a 
better understanding of the subject overall. 
Abbasi et al. (2012) have set their goal in enhancing the performance of fraud detection 
approaches relying on quantitative predictors. Before introducing their MetaFraud 
framework to increase the detection results, they highlight the poor detection performance 
of baseline quantitative predictors from annual reports. By using additional contextual 
information like industry comparisons and enriching the vector with data from previous 
years as well as introducing an adaptive learning algorithm (learning from year to year), the 
results could be improved considerably, scoring extraordinarily well (area under the receiver 
operating characteristic, AUC of 0.931) for their final results, which is outstanding compared 
to other approaches.102 However, the results might be somewhat skewed owing to sampling 
issues, as every fraudulent report is regarded as a single instance of fraud, resulting in the 
same company being detected over and over again in longer-lasting schemes. Regardless of 
this potential issue, they demonstrate how far the results can be improved by enriching the 
set of predictors with additional information. 
The second stream complements the indicators from quantitative data by exploiting 
additional sources to extract qualitative data (textual information) from corporate reports 
(e.g. Goel et al., 2010; Humpherys, Moffitt, Burns, Burgoon, & Felix, 2011; Purda 
& Skillicorn, 2015; Hoberg & Lewis, 2017). In addition to these studies, Cecchini et al. 
(2010a), Dong, Liao, and Liang (2016) and Brown, Crowely, and Elliott (2018) have 
combined predictors from both qualitative and quantitative data to significantly improve 
                                                 
102  Common metrics for evaluating detection outcomes are discussed in section 4.2.5. 
 
92 
 
their prediction results compared to single data-type detection models. The most relevant 
studies will be discussed in the following to highlight the state of the art, present the results 
attained and hint at the contribution of this work. However, comparing the raw prediction 
results across studies is rather difficult as methodology and sample composition vary 
considerably.103 Moreover, a best practice solution for reporting the results has yet to be 
found. Nevertheless, the individual results of each study will be presented to raise general 
awareness of the possibility of detecting fraud in the respective studies, while keeping the 
differences between them in mind. 
Cecchini et al. (2010a) extracted textual predictors from the MD&A section of annual 
reports of a matched sample consisting of 61 truthful and 61 fraudulent observations. To 
discriminate between the groups, they selected words and multi-word phrases of up to three 
words with a different frequency of occurrence in both groups. The qualitative predictors 
were preprocessed by removing stop words, stemming and part-of-speech tagging. They 
complemented their qualitative predictor list with financial variables based on Beneish 
(1999). Their results revealed a significant increase in accuracy from 75% to 82% when 
enriching the list of predictors based on qualitative information with quantitative financial 
information. 
Goel et al. (2010) noted that textual analysis yields the best prediction results when the 
texts are preprocessed by removing stop words and pruning the textual elements. With the 
resulting bag-of-words, they achieved better classification results than with the original 
version of textual elements. Furthermore, they divided the sample into several stages of 
fraud, thus capturing changes in language before and after the actual fraud period. With their 
best attempt, they were able to classify almost 90% of the 405 fraudulently observations in 
their mildly balanced sample correctly. 
Humpherys et al. (2011) examined the linguistic peculiarities of 202 publicly available 
financial disclosures. In contrast to most other studies, they used metrics to measure the 
attributes of the language in deceptive and truthful texts. The 24 metrics captured affect, 
complexity, diversity, expressivity, non-immediacy, quantity, specificity, and uncertainty of 
the textual information. They found that fraudulent disclosures consist of a greater portion 
of active language words, imagery, pleasantness, and group references and have less lexical 
diversity than truthful ones. They assumed that the managers of fraudulently manipulated 
financial statements try to make their reports appear credible while avoiding actual content 
                                                 
103  See West and Bhattacharya (2016) for a comparison of methodologies of fraud studies. 
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in the texts with the change in language. In their best approach, the indicators were able to 
classify 67% of the 202 pair-matched observations correctly. 
Goel and Gangolly (2012) examined indicators of fraud in the language of annual report 
narratives and beyond by capturing document presentation style. They found significant 
evidence that six categories of linguistic clues were associated with fraudulent financial 
reports. The use of complex sentinel structures, readability, positive tone, passive voice, 
uncertainty markers, and adverbs proved to be decisive markers in fraudulent reports. In 
contrast, presentation like the formatting or the punctuation of the annual report seemed to 
lack indicators of fraudulent behaviour. 
Purda and Skillicorn (2015) relied on a similar approach as Cecchini et al. (2010a). They 
utilized a bag-of-words with textual predictors that discriminated well between fraudulent 
and truthful reports. They incorporated 4,895 interim 10-Q reports of which 23% were 
fraudulent and designed their sample to examine fraud detection in a cross-sectional and 
time-series setting. The results reveal considerable changes in their underlying detection 
metric prior to a fraudulent event. They compared their results to eight alternative language-
based and financial-based fraud detection models and indicated that their language-based 
approach worked best with an accuracy of 82% of correct classifications. Furthermore, they 
revealed that language-based models and financial-based models are best used together 
because they detect different cases. 
Dong et al. (2016) extracted predictors from the MD&A sections of 805 fraudulent 
observations using systemic functional linguistics theory. They relied on seven information 
types based on the following three metafunctions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual. Each 
of the metafunctions was deemed to capture different concepts. Under the ideational 
metafunctions, they utilized topics (generated via latent Dirichlet allocation), opinions, and 
emotions (studied by sentiment analysis). The interpersonal metafunction covered modality 
(for example, the number of modal words relative to the number of verbs) and personal 
pronouns (for instance, the number of pronouns relative to the number of verbs). The textual 
metafunction covered writing style (for example, predictors associated with readability 
measurement) and genre (word frequencies based on n-grams). They also combined the three 
metafunctions with metrics from quantitative data, scoring higher results than only 
qualitative or quantitative data on 10-fold cross-validation. For their matched sampling 
approach with 805 fraudulent and 805 truthful observations, they revealed that quantitative 
predictors scored an accuracy of 65.97%, while the combined model achieved 82.49%. 
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Chen, Wu, Chen, Li, and Chen (2017) extracted fraudulent feature terms of up to three-
word length while using text preprocessing, removing punctuation and stop words. Using a 
static feature vector size of 240, they distinguished between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
Chinese/Taiwanese shareholder reports between 1995 and 2012, covering a sample size of 
45 fraudulent and 135 matched non-fraudulent observations.104 They used decisions trees 
and support vector machines as classifiers and achieved an accuracy of 85.25%. 
Hoberg and Lewis (2017) examined abnormal disclosure in the MD&A sections of annual 
reports between 1997 and 2008. In their study, they utilized latent Dirichlet allocation to 
match the content of each document to 75 different topics. By comparing the differences in 
topics found in fraudulent and truthful reports, they were able to distinguish between the two 
groups. They revealed verbal clues in fraudulent reports, which were associated with 
grandstanding the company performance without further mentioning the source of it. 
Furthermore, their results suggested a tendency among management to self-disassociate in 
the case of fraudulent behaviour, in line with evidence found by Li (2010a). 
Similarly to Hoberg and Lewis (2017), Brown et al. (2018) applied latent Dirichlet 
allocation to analyse narratives from 10-Ks from 1994-2012 and manually coded 64 topics 
in their attempt to reveal what is disclosed in contrast to how it is disclosed. In addition to 
qualitative predictors, they utilized the F-Score from Dechow et al. (2011) to compare their 
detection results to a set of quantitative predictors, while also combining qualitative and 
quantitative ones to improve their results further. Robustness was tested by examining 
alternative topics, model specifications and texts from the MD&A section in contrast to the 
entire 10-K narratives. Their overall results, as reported by the pooled AUC values, indicated 
that quantitative predictors were inferior to qualitative counterparts, with a combined 
approach yielding the best detection quality. 
3.3 Research Goals and Hypothesis Development 
This study builds upon relevant previous literature by extracting textual predictors with high 
discriminatory power from fraudulent and truthful reports. In contrast to the existing 
approaches, the features are extended to a length of up to five subsequent words.105 In this 
way, the investigation is more likely to capture complex textual patterns that are related to 
                                                 
104 The feature vector comprises all predictors (features) utilized in the model. For further explanations, see 
section 4.1 and the related subsections. Given that this study builds upon a machine learning methodology, 
the term “feature” will mostly be used instead of “predictor” from here on. 
105  See section 4.1.3 for the generation of qualitative features. 
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the red flags associated with fraud, such as obfuscation theory, the self-serving attribution 
bias, or other clues in textual parts. To date, few studies have exploited multi-word phrases 
to detect fraudulent observations (e.g. Cecchini et al., 2010a). In addition, extensive 
preprocessing of the texts will be exercised by generating normalized terms, creating more 
comparable textual features between the reports, which according to Goel et al. (2010) leads 
to better detection results. To incorporate the results from the stream of literature relying on 
quantitative predictors and enriching the feature vector with additional financial information, 
this study additionally utilizes common metrics from financial statements. 
When developing a comprehensive detection model, it is necessary to adopt a well-
structured approach, going systematically through the process and relying on previous 
findings from the literature (Geerts, 2011). Thus, this study focuses on the shortcomings of 
previous work to overcome the sometimes seemingly arbitrary research design choices that 
may have hindered an understanding of fraud and fraud detection while scoring suboptimal 
detection performances. In taking different perspectives, this study does not seek to criticize 
other studies but rather to provide a new overall approach with additional insight. The 
general structure is divided into design questions and enhancing questions, with the goal of 
developing a sound detection model for future accounting fraud. Figure 10 presents the 
overview of questions and tasks that this study seeks to tackle.  
Under the general research question focusing on the detection of future financial 
statement fraud through attaining qualitative and quantitative information from annual 
reports, the related research tasks are formulated as design and enhancing questions. The 
design questions, which can also be seen as problems that need to be addressed and 
answered, are based on the literature review and theoretical constructs of fraud with regard 
to a possible impact on fraud detection. In the following, the idea behind each question and 
the expected result will be laid out briefly. 
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Goal: Detection of future financial statement fraud 
exploiting qualitative and quantitative information from 
annual reports. 
Design questions 
1. Size of qualitative feature vector 
2. Stability of qualitative features over time 
3. Varying time gaps between training and holdout sample 
4. Varying training and holdout set sizes 
5. Detection rates over time 
6. Feature vector performance 
7. Matched and realistic sampling 
8. Classifier performance 
Enhancing questions 
1. First instance of fraud detection 
2. Quantitative feature vector enhancements 
3. Cost-sensitive results 
Figure 10 – Research goals 
The first question deals with the rather static design upon which most studies have relied 
when constructing their qualitative feature vector. Given that the size of the vector reflects 
the number of textual clues used to distinguish between fraudulent and truthful reports, more 
features should result in better detection performance. Crime detection signal theory, as 
presented in section 2.4.1, suggests that the detector needs to be able to absorb a large amount 
of the signal, which can be very weak while maintaining its ability to distinguish between 
signal and noise. Therefore, although it is likely that feature vector size will not be arbitrarily 
big, because not every feature possesses the same discriminatory power and a larger number 
of features might result in a decrease of detection performance if conflicting features blur 
the distributional decisiveness of the vector, an optimal feature vector size for the problem 
has yet to be assessed (Goel et al., 2010, p. 40). The majority of studies have utilized a bag-
of-word or similar approach to explain or examine the effect of different sizes on detection 
quality. For instance, Purda and Skillicorn (2015) used a fixed vector size of 200 features, 
Chen et al. (2017) relied on 240 different qualitative features and Goel et al. (2010) devised 
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a total of 261,110 features. Cecchini et al. (2010a) have provided the only study to date to 
report detection performance changes for vectors between 100 and 1,200 features in different 
increments, showing that larger vectors actually result in better performance, marked by 
hypothesized saturation for large vectors and even a small drop in performance between the 
two biggest vectors (containing 500 and 1,200 features). In contrast to Cecchini et al. 
(2010a), this study utilizes larger textual patterns as well as a realistic probability of fraud 
approach in addition to the conventional matched sampling, which might influence the 
results to a certain extent. It can be hypothesized that similar results regarding the vector size 
and the aforementioned saturation effect will be observed. 
H1: Larger qualitative feature vectors result in better detection performance. 
The second design question also builds upon the bag-of-words-like design of most studies 
and the intertemporal stability of the underlying feature vectors. The predictors are based on 
qualitative features, which have usually been extracted for a single point in time or for a 
static timeframe. However, a potential problem may occur when utilizing predictors from 
narratives of corporate communication instruments like annual reports due to the constant 
change of content and language (Dyer, Lang, & Stice-Lawrence, 2017). Moreover, 
fraudulent behaviour may also change over time, resulting in different types of clues 
available and extractable from the reports (Zhou & Kapoor, 2011, p. 570).106 To demonstrate 
the impact of altering disclosure on bag-of-words-like approaches, this study uses an initial 
sample of five rolling subsamples to demonstrate the changes to the bag-of-words covering 
different timeframes. The idea behind the rolling subsamples lies in the very general research 
goal, namely the detection of future fraud cases. An artificial future is generated by limiting 
the observations from which the patterns are extracted and models are trained to a specified 
date for each subsample while using future observations that are unknown to the models to 
assess the final performance of the models thereafter.107 The separation in non-overlapping 
timeframes is necessary because the model set-up, which involves feature extraction and 
training, should not be carried out on data that is intended for testing purposes. The procedure 
should ensure the potential real-world application of the detection models, something that 
has rarely been the case in previous studies (e.g. Brown et al., 2018). The indicator “future” 
in Table 2 hints at the design philosophy of the study.  
                                                 
106  See section 2.1.3 and the discussion about the evolution of fraud. Changing fraud scheme patterns over the 
course of time may influence the possibility of finding decisive clues in the reports. 
107 See Figure 11 for clarification of the sampling design. 
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The extent to which the bag-of-words actually differs is difficult to estimate beforehand. 
However, when utilizing design question 1 and assuming that smaller vectors result in worse 
performance, a considerable change in relevant clues over time may also cause the detection 
models to achieve unsatisfactory results. Hence, the detection models would need to be 
updated and tested regularly to deliver reliable results over time. 
H2: Qualitative features are time-dependent. 
Question 3 builds upon the first two questions by advancing the scope of the intertemporal 
stability of feature vectors. To shed light on the actual influence of composition changes in 
the qualitative feature vectors on the detection results, the initial five subsamples are used to 
detect future fraudulent observations with varying time gaps between the model set-up and 
the testing bed.  
This is also tied to question 4, in which the results of questions 2 and 3 are briefly used 
to examine the influence of different-sized timeframes for model set-up and testing. As 
stated earlier, the model building process involves feature extraction and training, which is 
greatly influenced by the number of observations reserved to carry out this task, hence the 
number of years from which the observations are derived. The basic idea behind the 
procedure rests in the general bag-of-words approach and the sampling design. Creating an 
artificial future may be problematic when training and testing subsamples cover large 
timeframes, thereby increasing the time gap between the observations in both groups. 
Therefore, question 4 seeks to reveal the impact of time gaps and subsample length on 
detection results. To emphasize the subsequent implication of larger timeframes at a very 
basic analytical level, the following formulation is presented. A fixed bag-of-words of size 
𝐹𝐹 (number of features) captures the patterns of a certain number of cases 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡, with t denoting 
the period to which the cases refer over a timeframe of length 𝑥𝑥, ranging from one to multiple 
periods. Accordingly, formula one depicts the resulting imparity: 
𝐹𝐹
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥+1𝑡𝑡=1
<
𝐹𝐹
∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡=1
 (1) 
When increasing the length of the timeframes, there is less room for particular clues in 
the bag-of-words. Assuming that fraud is not a highly generalizable concept due to the sheer 
number of possible fraudulent schemes and cases, this should be taken into consideration. 
Especially when increasing the timeframe but keeping vector size constant, it is unlikely that 
patterns can be absorbed equally well. As Perols et al. (2017) have stated, different types of 
fraud require different sets of predictors to be successful. A larger timeframe will likely 
 
99 
 
result in feature vectors being dominated by the most prevalent schemes without taking shifts 
towards certain schemes into consideration, which to a certain extent may be possible 
through smaller timeframes.108 
H3: Time gaps between model creation and model application lead to deteriorating 
detection results. 
Question 5 builds on the previous results to develop the final design and test the detection 
performance over the entire timeframe utilized in this study (1996–2010). Therefore, this 
study follows the design of Brown et al. (2018) with rolling subsamples over 15 years to test 
the reliability of the detection models. The indicator time series in the comparison Table 2 
shows that few studies have adopted a similar approach and have examined performance at 
different points in time over a longer timeframe. 
Questions 5 and 6 are answered in conjunction. In question 6, the three different feature 
vectors representing clues from the financials, from the textual parts and a combination of 
both, will be tested upon the final sampling approach developed up until question 5. In line 
with Goel and Gangolly (2012), this study follows the argumentation that linguistic features 
are better suited to detecting fraudulent behaviour, because quantitative features from 
company financials tend to conceal fraud and hence do not sufficiently differ from truthful 
years to yield good results. In general, it can be assumed that a larger feature vector (usually 
qualitative feature vectors are larger than quantitative ones) should score better results as it 
has the potential to cover more clues. Following this principle, it can be suggested that a 
combination of both would score even better results. So far, only few studies (Cecchini et 
al., 2010a; Dong et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2018) have used combined vectors to detect 
fraudulent cases, each supporting the assumption. What distinguishes this study from the 
first two is its design regarding the detection of future cases and the attempt to assess the 
detection performance over a longer timeframe, while also enlarging the textual patterns. 
Moreover, this study provides evidence for a realistic probability sampling approach, in 
addition to the matched sampling approach, which has been used by both studies. Brown et 
al. (2018) have studied fraud detection from a different angle. Their topic modelling 
approach captures potential clues at a more aggregated yet more understandable level. 
Regardless of the research design, all three studies have found similar evidence of qualitative 
                                                 
108  With regard to the first design question, varying the feature vector size in conjunction with the number of 
years from which the observations for model building and application are derived can also lead to similar 
results. This study wants to hint at the influence of such basic design decisions on the outcome. 
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features being superior to quantitative ones and a combination of both outperforms the use 
of a single data type. 
H4a: The qualitative feature vector achieves better detection results than the quantitative 
feature vector. 
H4b: Combining qualitative and quantitative features improves detection results. 
Fraud prediction represents a “needle in the haystack problem”, whereby the minority 
group, here the fraudulent observations, occur considerably less often than the truthful ones 
(~1% of observations are fraudulent).109 There are two general approaches to deal with 
imbalanced data sets.110 For instance, Kirkos et al. (2007) or Cecchini et al. (2010a) have 
generated a balanced sample by matching each fraudulent observation with a truthful one. 
Despite the strict balancing through pair-matching, mildly balancing the sample is also 
possible. Lin, Hwang, and Becker (2003) or Chen et al. (2017) for example have relied on a 
matching approach in which each fraudulent observation is matched with several non-
fraudulent ones, resulting in a mildly balanced sample. Another possibility is presented by 
Perols et al. (2017), who suggest different under- and oversampling approaches, which are 
typically used to adjust the balance between both groups and reveal the impact on detection 
results.  
As an alternative to the aforementioned techniques, realistic probability of fraud sampling 
(in short, realistic sampling, in contrast to matched sampling) captures the actual probability 
of fraud in the sample by utilizing all available observations (e.g. Lee et al., 1999; Dechow 
et al., 2011; Brown et al., 2018). Some problems stemming from the use of a realistic 
probability of sampling approach pertain to the validity and the measurement of the 
results.111 In the realistic sampling approach, detection, which is usually a basic binary 
classification, might be skewed towards specific predictors that discriminate between the 
classes (fraudulent and non-fraudulent) at a very basic level, like industry or size.112 This 
may be caused by the patterns being dominated by size and industry variations; hence, the 
classifier would actually distinguish between different-sized companies in different 
                                                 
109  Perols et al. (2017) suggested the “needle in the haystack” analogy in the context of financial statement 
fraud to emphasize on sampling difficulties and the different approaches to solve sampling issues. 
110  Table 2 reports the sample sizes for different studies. Large imbalances are usually associated with a 
realistic probability of fraud sampling, while equal sizes of both groups suggest a matched sampling design. 
111  Another deficit of realistic sampling approaches pertains to the considerably larger sample sizes involved, 
which hamper model building as feature extraction and model training times increase. However, 
technological advances to a certain extent have already rendered the argument invalid. 
112 Size has been identified as a significant predictor to distinguish between fraud and non-fraud observations 
in several studies (e.g. Persons, 1995; Beneish, 1999). 
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industries than actual fraudulent and truthful observations, while still scoring a satisfying 
result. Matching companies by size and industry is typically carried out to test whether 
predictors are significantly different relative to control firms (Dechow et al., 2011, p. 23). 
Matched sampling is performed by finding similar companies concerning a set of indicators, 
usually size and industry. Hence, the matched sampling approach may counter the 
aforementioned constraint. In this study, both sampling approaches are exploited, as the goal 
to develop a reliable and real-world applicable financial statement fraud detection model 
should include testing on both sampling approaches. Therefore, a robust detection model 
should successfully detect observations in both approaches, with a tendency to exhibit worse 
performance in the matched sampling context due to the fact that potentially decisive 
predictors are missing. This is the first study to rely on a realistic probability and a matched 
sampling approach to assess the performance of the detection models. 
H5: The pair-matched sampling approach scores inferior results than the realistic 
sampling approach. 
The second problem deals with the measurement and the interpretation of the detection 
performance in a realistic probability of fraud sampling compared to a matched sampling 
approach. Basically, not every performance measure is applicable in both scenarios. A 
detailed discussion will follow in 4.2.5. 
The final design question then focuses on the performance of different classifiers. Studies 
so far have used a wide variety of classifiers. The results are varying considerably but it can 
be suggested that more sophisticated versions score better results (West & Bhattacharya, 
2016). What distinguishes this study is the fact that each classifier is used for the detection 
of every feature vector across all subsamples and therefore the entire timeframe in both 
sampling approaches. So far, studies that have applied different classifiers have typically 
only focused on a single type of data (for example, financial ratios) but have scored different 
results across multiple classifiers (e.g. Fanning & Cogger, 1998; Lin et al., 2003; Gaganis, 
2009; Abbasi et al., 2012). However, differences in feature vectors regarding size 
(qualitative feature vectors are usually larger than quantitative ones) and underlying data 
peculiarities resulting from different data types (ranging from traditional financial metrics to 
qualitative features) are considerable. Therefore, different classifiers are likely to score better 
on certain types of feature vectors (Sigletos, Paliouras, Spyropoulos, & Hatzopoulos, 2005). 
A comparison of classifiers across multiple feature vectors and sampling approaches can 
help to improve understanding of fraud detection on a technical level. Overall, the 
comprehensive overview provided by the eight initial design questions can enhance the 
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general understanding of financial statement fraud detection in a time series setting and help 
develop reliable, robust, and efficient detection models. 
H6a: More sophisticated classifiers achieve better detection performance. 
H6b: Classifiers differ in their detection performance across feature vectors. 
In addition to the eight initial design questions, which result in the first essential outcome 
of this study, three enhancements will be implemented to ensure the robustness and validity 
of the results, increase performance, and make the results more relatable from an economic 
point of view. The first enhancement deals with the first instance of fraud test, where 
schemes lasting over several periods are only taken with the first occurring instance into 
consideration (e.g. Brown et al., 2018).113 The problem with schemes lasting over several 
periods is that this might result in the classifier distinguishing companies rather than actual 
fraudulent cases, due to the fact that each observation of a fraudulent scheme is regarded as 
an individual instance of fraud, as often seen in previous literature (e.g. the design of Persons, 
1995; Cecchini et al., 2010b; Dikmen & Küçükkocaoğlu, 2010; Abbasi et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, it should be the goal of a real-world application to always detect the first 
occurrence of fraud. Through ex post examination, fraudulent schemes have often been 
detected several periods after their initial appearance, resulting in lengthy schemes. 
According to Summers and Sweeney (1998), it takes about three years on average before 
fraud is exposed. In this study’s sample, the average scheme length is 2.6 years, with 322 
(40%) of the 805 instances of fraud referring to a single period. Presumably, through the first 
instance of fraud detection variation, the results might be slightly decreasing, as the chances 
of getting a second try through a later instance of the same scheme are reduced.114 
Additionally, it is not possible for a firm with a persistent status (e.g. many subsequent 
fraudulent firm-year observations of the same company) to negatively influence the results 
and bias the learner towards that firm. 
The second enhancement is associated with improvements to the baseline design of fraud 
detection models that rely on quantitative features extracted on an annual basis, as is most 
typical (e.g. Persons, 1995; Kaminski et al., 2004; Cecchini et al., 2010b; Abbasi et al., 
2012). Abbasi et al. (2012) have offered several improvements to the traditional approach, 
especially taking additional contextual information like deviations from industry means or 
data from previous reports into consideration. By enriching the quantitative feature vector 
                                                 
113  Perols et al. (2017) have gone even further by excluding all observations from a fraudulent firm (even the 
years of the firm that were non-fraudulent) but the very first instance of fraud. 
114  Although this is irrelevant for the detection with a single year holdout sample as in this study’s final sample. 
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with additional information from previous years for every observation, this study controls 
for improvements to a certain extent. It can be assumed that the improvement results in better 
detection quality for the quantitative feature vector (Abbasi et al., 2012). Given that this 
study utilizes common quantitative features from previous research, the baseline results from 
the first eight design questions will not contain improvements to the quantitative feature 
vector. The examination of feature vector enhancements on a later stage then allows 
determining the level of improvement possible with the addition of enhanced quantitative 
features. 
H7: Incorporating additional contextual quantitative features results in better detection 
performance. 
While answering the design questions, the study is concerned with assessing the 
performance of the detection models. Similar studies have often relied on the area under the 
receiver operating characteristic (AUC) as the basic detection performance metric owing to 
the universal expressiveness of other characteristics (e.g. Abbasi et al., 2012; Brown et al., 
2018).115 In order to translate the rather abstract and generic performance measure into more 
relatable results, misclassification costs are introduced last, which is a common technique in 
the fraud detection context to evaluate the outcome using estimated cost ratios (e.g. Persons, 
1995; Beneish, 1999; Abbasi et al., 2012). Studies have often only reported a single metric 
or a single set of metrics, limiting the comparability of the results and precluding the 
reporting of their economic benefits when not relying on a cost-sensitive design.  
                                                 
115  A detailed discussion of different performance metrics and an explanation of the AUC is provided in section 
4.2.5. 
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Quantitative features Fraud Non-fraud setting Future Time series 
Loebbecke et al., 1989 77 305 USA   
Persons, 1995 100 100 USA   
Hansen et al., 1996 77 305 USA   
Green & Choi, 1997 46 49 USA   
Fanning & Cogger, 1998 102 102 USA yes  
Summers & Sweeney, 1998 51 51 USA   
Beneish, 1999 74 2,332 USA   
Lee et al., 1999 56 60,453 USA   
Bell & Carcello, 2010 77 305 USA   
Feroz et al., 2000 42 90 USA   
Spathis, 2002 38 38 Greece   
Spathis et al., 2002 38 38 Greece   
Lin et al., 2003 40 160 USA   
Kaminski et al., 2004 79 79 USA   
Kirkos et al., 2007 38 38 USA   
Gaganis, 2009 199 199 USA   
Lou & Wang, 2009 94 467 Taiwan   
Cecchini et al., 2010(b) 132 3,187 USA yes  
Dikmen & Küçükkocaoğlu, 2010 17 109 Turkey yes  
Dechow et al., 2011 293 79,358 USA yes  
Ravisankar et al., 2011 101 101 China   
Alden et al., 2012 229 229 USA   
Abbasi et al., 2012 815 8,191 USA yes (yes) 
Liu et al., 2015 138 160 China   
Perols et al., 2017 51 15,934 USA   
Qualitative features           
Goel et al., 2010 450 622 USA   
Glancy & Yadav, 2011 11 20 USA   
Humpherys et al., 2011 101 101 USA   
Purda & Skillicorn, 2015 1,407 4,708 USA   
Chen et al., 2017 45 135 China/Taiwan   
Qualitative and quantitative features combined 
Cecchini et al., 2010(a) 61 61 USA   
Dong et al., 2016 805 805 USA   
Brown et al., 2018 459 37,806 USA yes yes 
The table reports a selection of relevant studies segmented according to their primary source of 
predictors, with additional information on sample size, setting, and test environment. 
Future: where the design explicitly states that the observations of the holdout set are from future periods 
and feature extraction is limited to previous years 
Time series: the results are assessed at different points in time in order to create a reliable detection model 
over the course of time 
Table 2 – Comparison of similar studies  
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4 Methodology 
In the upcoming sections, the methodology and the results will be presented. This study 
relies on the development of a comprehensive financial statement fraud detection model, 
utilizing techniques related to machine learning and textual analysis in the accounting 
research domain. Therefore, to discuss the relevant topics, the following effectuations start 
with the feature extraction and essentially depict how the narratives of annual reports are 
analysed to identify relevant textual patterns (which are referred to as qualitative features) 
as well as the financial metrics borrowed from the literature (described as quantitative 
features). Following the feature extraction and generation process, the machine learning 
framework utilized in this study is highlighted, focusing on validation techniques and the 
classifiers applied, before the results are presented. Thereafter, the structure of the 
presentation of the results is based on the research goals and the respective hypothesis. 
Lastly, the limitations of the research design are discussed and the results compared to 
similar studies. 
4.1 Sampling and Feature Extraction 
This section on sampling and feature extraction provides explanations regarding the data 
gathering process, especially focusing on the different sources of data, their peculiarities, 
and how they potentially influence the analysis. Afterwards, a detailed exposition of how the 
features of this study are extracted from the final sample is given. 
4.1.1 Sample Composition 
The underlying sampling process of this study is depicted in step 1 of Figure 11. The overall 
process is based on common text mining procedures (Feldman & Sanger, 2007, p. 15). The 
three primary sources are the EDGAR database,116 the AAER archive117 accessible through 
the SEC website and Compustat for supplementary company financials. Fraudulent financial 
statements are identified using the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) 
No 1-3810 issued by the SEC in the case of violations against the financial reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. AAERs have been extensively studied 
in the literature in order to identify fraudulent observations (e.g. Persons, 1995; Green & 
                                                 
116 EDGAR services are available at https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
117 AAERs are available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/friactions.shtml. 
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Choi, 1997; Beasley et al., 2000; Cecchini et al., 2010b; Abbasi et al., 2012; Dong et al., 
2016). The use of AAERs as proxies for fraud has potential downsides, which are rarely 
discussed but should be mentioned before the analysis. Dechow et al. (2011) have used the 
term “misstatement” rather than “fraud” when utilizing AAERs to identify observations of 
interest and has mentioned that although the SEC’s allegations often imply fraud, firms’ 
managers typically do not deny or admit guilt. Another limitation is the fact that the use of 
AAERs means relying on the SEC’s activity in the field of fraud detection and the 
publication of AAERs, which may be hindered for example by budget constraints or agenda 
setting and was in the past limited to publicly traded companies (Rezaee & Riley, 2009, 
pp. 270–272). Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2013) and Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2017) 
have estimated the number of fraudulent cases that go undetected: according to their model, 
13% of US public companies engage in fraudulent actions in general and 7.3% in financial 
fraud in particular. When assessing the probability of fraud in this study’s sample, about 1% 
of observations are described as fraudulent, (from Table 3: 805/(805+84,960)≈0.009), 
potentially with a larger number of cases going undetected in the sample.118 Dyck et al. 
(2017) furthermore suggest that SEC-related fraud proxies are highly biased by the SEC 
activity level. Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2017) have compared four different 
sources and databases of financial statement misconduct research and ranked them based on 
four different features relevant for the purpose of quality research.119 Samples based on 
AAERs are said to have the best scope (% of all enforcement actions by the SEC or the 
Department of Justice relating to financial misrepresentation under Section 13 (b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) while being the worst at timeliness (time lag to event 
date). Moreover, AAERs are suggested to be best suited at capturing most cases of fraud 
(this greatly depends on the definition of fraud) while exhibiting the second least amount of 
omissions. Karpoff et al. (2017) point out that the choice for either database is mostly 
depending on the research goals and should carefully be determined. As timeliness can be 
assumed to be rather unimportant for this type of study but coverage of cases of misconduct 
is important for the comprehensive identification of relevant cases, AAERs seem to be the 
best choice amongst the available, keeping the aforementioned limitations in mind.
                                                 
118  The fraction is similar to other studies relying on a realistic probability of fraud sampling. 
119  Karpoff et al. (2017) refer to the Center for Financial Reporting and Management as the primary source of 
AAERs, which also has been the underlying source for this study. 
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The three initial data sources provide the textual information as in the annual reports on 
Form 10-K, the additional financial information from Compustat and ensure the 
identification of fraudulent observations in the resulting sample through the examination of 
AAERs. In line with similar studies like Cecchini et al. (2010b), Goel et al. (2010) and Purda 
and Skillicorn (2015), a cross-sectional approach is applied. Concerning the financial 
industry, there is no universal way of dealing with firms from this branch. Although a 
number of studies exclude firms from the financial industry because of the SEC’s special 
disclosure guides (e.g. Purda & Skillicorn, 2015) or unique topics discussed in the MD&A 
like market liquidity and capital structure (e.g. Hoberg & Lewis, 2017), this study follows 
Goel and Gangolly (2012) as firms from certain industries are not excluded. Detection 
performance might be negatively affected by this choice. However, the addition of a pair-
matched approach in which observations are grouped by industry (besides size) controls for 
the potential impact. Table 1 shows the industry classification of the fraudulent observations. 
 Fraudulent Non-fraudulent 
Division Abs. Perc. Abs. Perc. 
A 3 0.37% 265 0.31% 
B 9 1.12% 3,298 3.88% 
C 13 1.61% 929 1.09% 
D 344 42.73% 31,607 37.20% 
E 40 4.97% 8928 10.51% 
F 34 4.22% 2929 3.45% 
G 45 5.59% 4876 5.74% 
H 118 14.66% 17,640 20.76% 
I 199 24.72% 14,488 17.05% 
Total 805 100.00% 84,960 100.00% 
Division via standard industry classification 
A Agriculture, forestry, fishing 
B Mining    
C Construction    
D Manufacturing    
E Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services 
F Wholesale trade   
G Retail trade    
H Finance, insurance and real estate 
I Services    
Table 3 – Industry classification 
Years before 1996 are excluded because of the limited availability of annual reports in 
the EDGAR online database. Furthermore, firm years of 2011 onwards are removed, as 
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AAERs are released with a significant delay after the fraudulent action. The average time 
between opening an investigation and commencing an enforcement action was 21 months, 
with various cases lasting for several years.120 This procedure is highly conservative and 
limits sample size considerably but avoids the inclusion of unidentified fraudulent firm-year 
observations in the sample. Reports without textual content are excluded from the 
examination.  
The initial sample comprises 1,269 instances of fraud and 131,296 annual reports, which 
are further reduced to 805 fraudulent and 84,960 non-fraudulent observations after 
disregarding unidentifiable and unprocessable observations and merging with the Compustat 
universe. Unprocessable reports are mainly empty files and files including a header but no 
real content or corrupted files, which could not be processed in the automated approach. The 
terms “fraudulent” and “non-fraudulent” will be used hereafter in order to reflect the 
assignment of the observations based on the AAERs, limited to the scope of SEC 
enforcement actions and therefore not with all certainty resulting in the correct separation of 
truthful and fraudulent reports. Merging the annual reports with data from the Compustat 
universe leads to a considerable loss of observations, which is unfortunate but typical, as 
similar studies have shown (e.g. Griffin, 2003; Li & Ramesh, 2009). 
Fraudulent   
Initial instances of fraud 1,269 
With CIK 1,236 
With processable annual reports from EDGAR 902 
With total assets and SIC in Compustat 818 
Matched* 805 
  
Annual reports   
Initial annual reports from EDGAR 131,296 
Processable annual reports 130,395 
With total assets and SIC in Compustat 85,778 
Non-fraudulent 84,960 
*matched: total assets (95% confidence interval), sic (two digits), year (exact) 
Table 4 – Sample size 
In the next step, the firm-year matching for the alternative matched sampling approach is 
performed. In line with previous studies, pair-matching relies on total assets (95% 
confidence interval), industry (two-digit SIC codes) and year (exact) to assign the cases (e.g. 
                                                 
120 SEC (2014, p. 54), Agency Financial Report – Fiscal Year 2014. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/ 
 about/secpar/secafr2014.pdf. 
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Beasley, 1996; Summers & Sweeney, 1998; Cecchini et al., 2010a). Congruent with Beasley 
(1996), a small number of cases could not be successfully matched and are therefore 
disregarded in the following. 
The fraudulent cases are unevenly distributed over time with a peak in 2001, as can be 
seen in Figure 12. An explanation can be found in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
from 2002 in the aftermath of the major fraud cases in the early 2000s (Goel & Gangolly, 
2012, p. 79). The difference between all fraudulent cases and cases remaining in the 
examination does not seem to follow a time-dependent pattern. 
 
Figure 12 – Distribution of fraudulent cases 
4.1.2 Textual Analysis 
Before explaining how the qualitative features are extracted from the documents, this study’s 
method in the greater scheme of text analytics is categorized. The amount of textual data 
produced and publicly available has increased immensely in recent years (Aggarwal & Zhai, 
2012, pp. 2–4). Textual data must be distinguished from other forms of data like quantitative 
or relational data. It is characterized by its sparsity and high dimensionality (Aggarwal 
& Zhai, 2012, p. 3). When looking at a corpus, a collection of documents that one wants to 
analyse, dimensionality on a word-to-word basis is derived from each unique word in the 
corpus, even the words that only occur once (sparse). As this grows with corpus size, the 
document vector, which spans across all documents in the corpus and words in the document, 
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grows rapidly. When strings of words, as opposed to single words, are taken into 
consideration, it accelerates even faster. Hence, the high dimensionality of its nature and the 
fast increasing amount of textual data, combined with technological advances in both 
hardware and software, have led to an emerging development of text analytic techniques 
(Aggarwal & Zhai, 2012). 
 
Figure 13 – Text mining121 
Figure 13 is based on the text analytics overview of Miner et al. (2012). It depicts 
numerous related fields, which are of considerable importance in themselves but are 
connected through the basic concept of text mining. In their explanation of text mining, 
Aggarwal and Zhai (2012, pp. 4–8) mention the supportive nature of its purposes, like 
helping to digest and consume texts as well as analytical characteristics such as pattern 
recognition and the discovery of outliers. Miner et al. (2012) suggests that text mining can 
                                                 
121 Referring to Miner et al. (2012, p. 40). 
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be seen as the practical application of text analysis techniques, ranging from rather 
descriptive techniques like information or concept extraction to more sophisticated 
approaches such as natural language processing, whereby machines are not only able to 
describe what was said but actually to understand the content and generate textual data like 
humans. 
Machine learning and text mining or textual analytics are often mentioned in the same 
sentence. As illustrated in Figure 13, text mining is a highly interdisciplinary field that lives 
and develops with advances in other fields such as statistics and computer science With 
increasing interest in artificial intelligence and machine learning in recent years, the fields 
have become even more closely intertwined (Fisher et al., 2016, pp. 157–158). The nature 
of many text mining applications builds upon typical machine learning approaches of 
training and testing, for example when patterns from known texts are extracted and used to 
categorize unknown texts. 
This interdisciplinary is also reflected in the text mining setting of this study, where an 
economic problem – the existence of fraudulently altered financial statements – is tackled 
by examining texts from annual reports in order to learn patterns to detect fraudulently 
altered statements of future periods. The detection of fraudulent statements can mostly be 
referred to as a document classification setting, whereby classification patterns are derived 
from the actual texts (Fisher et al., 2016, p. 164). For the purpose of the successful extraction 
of patterns, each document needs to be characterized based upon the results of the 
examination of its textual data. These examinations can be manifold, for example, as 
previously mentioned, focusing on re-occurring topics or word frequencies. The results of 
the examination describe each document, which can now be used to identify patterns based 
on predefined groups of documents, i.e. fraudulent and non-fraudulent ones. In this way, 
differences between the results of the examination of the textual data across groups are 
critical. 
Cavnar and Trenkle (1994) have proposed an n-gram-based text categorization approach, 
where n-gram frequencies are exploited to classify texts to predefined categories. “An n-
gram is an n-character slice of a longer string”, in their example referring to slices of 
characters from words (Cavnar & Trenkle, 1994, p. 162). Their approach is associated with 
supervised machine learning, as they trained a model in order to “learn” patterns of n-grams 
from training data to classify texts from a holdout sample in a setting where text labels are 
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known (Feldman & Sanger, 2007, pp. 8–10).122 The methodology of this study builds upon 
the very basic idea of their work, although here texts are analysed on a word level and longer 
strings are taken into consideration. Furthermore, the texts are preprocessed based on 
common preprocessing approaches for an n-gram text categorization (e.g. Goel & Gangolly, 
2012; Vijayarani, Ilamathi, & Nithya, 2015). 
4.1.3 Qualitative Features 
In the following, the extraction of features from the qualitative and quantitative data of the 
annual reports will be discussed. The process covers steps 2 and 3 of Figure 11. In the 
literature, two basic streams on how linguistic predictors should be generated to detect fraud 
can be identified. A normative stream uses predefined predictors, based on informed 
reasoning and previous findings (e.g. Bell & Carcello, 2000; Humpherys et al., 2011). The 
second stream adopts adaptive and evolutionary techniques to identify discriminative 
patterns directly from the texts (e.g. Goel et al., 2010; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015). In order to 
avoid a normative design, this study follows the latter view that allows the updating of 
linguistic predictors and reacting to variations in the corporate narratives over time, which 
is exceptionally important for the general research design by which this study attempts to 
capture potential changes over the observed timeframe. Qualitative feature extraction is not 
limited to certain sections like MD&A, which is often subject to textual analysis for fraud 
detection (e.g. Dong et al., 2016). Choosing the MD&A as the only source of qualitative 
features comes with several problems as Loughran and McDonald (2016) argue. The first is 
the imperfect labelling of the MD&A section in a 10-K. Loughran and McDonald (2016) 
mention several tripwires in identifying MD&A sections, most obviously wrongfully 
labelled segments or the case of MD&A sections reported under exhibit 13. The second 
problem comes with the content that can be shifted between segments. Relevant content may 
be found in the footnotes or other segments, which would be excluded if only isolated parts 
are examined. For a study relying on an automated approach and a vast sample, manually 
looking for errors, irregularities, or peculiarities in certain documents is not possible. 
Therefore, an isolated examination of certain sections is not performed. 
The following paragraphs will highlight the generation of the textual features, dividing 
the process into preprocessing of texts and feature extraction. 
                                                 
122 The machine learning approach of this study is highlighted in section 4.2. 
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Preprocessing of Texts 
All corporate narratives are consistently preprocessed following Grüning (2011). First, plain 
text is extracted, i.e. all layout features (bold printing, tables, or graphs) are disregarded. 
Words are stemmed using a dictionary-based stemmer (Kowalski & Maybury, 2000, p. 77) 
and the Automatically Generated Inflection Database (AGID) that contains the roots of about 
280,000 inflected forms.123 For example, “organisations” and “organisation’s” are reduced 
to “organisation” (one of two British spelling variants) and “organizations” and 
“organization’s” are reduced to “organization” (the unique American spelling variant); 
“reading” is stemmed to “read”. Subsequently, British, American, and Canadian spelling 
variants are harmonized using the Variant Conversion Info (VarCon), a database that collects 
spelling variants for about 16,000 words.124 All stop words are removed using the list of 319 
stop words from the Information Retrieval Group of the University of Glasgow (Cowans, 
2006, pp. 133–134). 
Feature Extraction 
Feature extraction is based upon the fundamental research goal of this study: the detection 
of future cases of financial statement fraud. The design is meant to train detection models 
based on known information and detect the cases of future periods. Observations for the 
model set-up are allocated to the training sample based on the respective period to which 
they are referring.125 For each pre-treated annual report of the training sample, all unique n-
grams of up to five words in length are collected from the harmonized texts. For instance, in 
a text, each word is considered an n-gram of one-word length. The first two words are an n-
gram of two words length (bigram) and the second and third word from another bigram. The 
first three words are an example of a trigram; words two to four constitute a second trigram; 
and words three to five another one. Altogether, a text of x words contains 5x–10 n-grams of 
up to five words length (x unigrams, x–1 bigrams, x–2 trigrams, x–3 four-grams, and x–4 
five-grams). 
The n-grams are regarded as unique independent of their word order (Grüning, 2011). For 
instance, the pre-treatment of the two original text passages “a financial statement analysis” 
and “the analysis of the financial statements” are harmonized to “financial statement 
analysis” and “analysis financial statement”. They merely differ in their word order and are 
therefore considered identical. Subsequently, the term normalized n-gram is used. Using 
                                                 
123 AGID is available at http://wordlist.aspell.net/other/. 
124 VarCon is available at http://wordlist.aspbell.net/varcon/. 
125  See section 3.3 for the basic research goals and Figure 26 for an explanatory breakdown of the subsamples. 
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normalized n-grams in this ways enables topics and terms to be identified in a text regardless 
of variations in grammar, enabling to identify more generalizable clues, which are not 
differing in slight variations. Without these normalizations, the terms (“the analysis of the 
financial statements” and “a financial statement analysis”) are identified as separate n-grams. 
Assuming that both terms would be regarded as clues with high discriminatory power, both 
had to be considered in the qualitative feature vector, whereas the normalization results in a 
single feature (only “analysis financial statement” instead of the two initial terms). As studies 
so far (this one included) are restricted to limited bag-of-words/bag-of-n-grams sizes 
(number of clues, for example 100), considering both clues would block a spot in the vector 
for another clue. 
The normalized n-grams of all fraudulent and non-fraudulent annual reports in the 
training sets are collected separately. This has been done for the realistic and the matched 
sampling approach individually. In the training sets, n-grams with the highest potential to 
distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations are identified. The highest 
ranked n-grams are collected for each training set (for each subsample) to attain the 
respective features according to the reports in the subsample. The training observations are 
regarded as known cases up until a specific year, with observations from the following years 
representing the artificial future. After determining the top 1,000 qualitative features, their 
occurrence in each of the texts of the training and the holdout set is counted and scaled to 
text length. The result is a vector for each document that can be used to train the detection 
models and test them on the holdout set. For further explanations on feature vector size and 
n-gram collection, see sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.1, where the vector size implications of 
qualitative features, based on the collection of n-grams exploiting their inherent information 
value using an information gain ratio, are discussed. 
4.1.4 Quantitative Features 
The next section reviews the selection and generation of the quantitative predictors, also 
referred to as quantitative features. The variables are based on previous studies by Kinney 
and McDaniel (1989), Persons (1995), Fanning and Cogger (1998), Kaminski et al. (2004), 
Kirkos et al. (2007), Skousen et al. (2009) and Dechow et al. (2011). Thus, this study focuses 
on incorporating a large number of predictors, capturing fraud factors that have been 
identified in section 2.2 (especially 2.2.8) and fraudulent schemes as discussed in section 
2.3, while maintaining a suitable sample size. 
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Persons (1995) has assumed that companies in financial distress are more likely to engage 
in fraudulent manipulations, creating her fraud detection model using 10 variables to 
measure financial leverage, profitability, asset composition, liquidity, capital turnover, size 
and overall financial position. Kaminski et al. (2004) have also measured financial distress, 
reusing eight of the variables from Persons (1995) and adding 13 new ones. They seek to 
capture the same dimensions but add different potential measurements. Fanning and Cogger 
(1998) have broadened the scope by adding measures for corporate governance, personal 
interrelations and auditor choice. They argue that management characteristics might provide 
relevant information for the prediction of fraudulent behaviour. However, they also assume 
that personal characteristics like potential gambling debts or criminal records may be 
discriminatory predictors even though they are hardly observable. In contrast to the previous 
studies, Dechow et al. (2011) have created their own set of predictors, focusing on different 
accrual based approaches, performance variables, nonfinancial measures, off-balance sheet 
activities and market-related incentives. 
This study incorporates 16 of the variables from Kaminski et al. (2004), one from Kirkos 
et al. (2007) and complements the quantitative feature vector by adding two variables from 
Dechow et al. (2011). Some measures with very limited coverage in the Compustat database 
are disregarded. The final set of predictors can be found in Table 5. 
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No. Name Definition Fraud factor 
v1 accr residuals from cross-sectional regressions r 
v2 btm common equity / market value p_ep 
v3 logat natural logarithm of total assets o_os 
v4 arta receivables / total assets o_ic 
v5 invsal inventory / sales o_ic 
v6 invta inventory / total assets o_ic 
v7 nisal net income / sales p_fs 
v8 nita net income / total assets p_ft 
v9 opxsal operating expenses / sales p_fs 
v10 opisal operating income / sales p_fs 
v11 reta retained earnings / total assets p_ft 
v12 salar sales / receivables p_fs 
v13 salta sales / total assets p_fs 
v14 into costs of goods sold / inventory o_ic 
v15 tlta total liabilities / total assets p_ep 
v16 cogssal costs of goods sold / sales o_ic 
v17 de total liabilities / total equity p_ep 
v18 gp gross profit / sales p_fs 
v19 ietl interest expenses / total liabilities p_ep 
Pressure:  financial stability (p_fs) 
 external pressure (p_ep) 
 personal financial need (p_pfn) 
 financial targets (p_ft) 
Opportunity: industry considerations (o_ic) 
 monitoring (o_m) 
 organizational structure (o_os) 
Rationalization rationalization (r) 
Table 5 – Variable definitions 
Financial leverage (tlta and de) is assumed to be an indicator for financial fraud, as higher 
leverage is associated with a higher risk of covenant violations, which may instigate the 
management to engage in fraudulent behaviour in the case of potential debt covenant 
violations (e.g. Persons, 1995, p. 40). A similar argumentation can be brought forward for 
performance indicators (reta and nita). Covering diminishing performances by overstating 
revenues or understating expenses may be in the interest of the management to meet 
expectations. Alternatively, a window-dressing effect can be assumed (Kinney & McDaniel, 
1989, p. 72). Furthermore, management compensation is often tied to stock prices, which 
may result in motivation for manipulations. The stock market performance is measured with 
the book-to-market ratio (btm).  
Asset composition (invta, nisal, opisal, invsal, arta and salar) is of importance for fraud 
prediction purposes as receivables, sales and inventories are typically manipulated balance 
sheet positions, due owing to difficulties in auditing the positions caused by the option of 
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subjective estimations (e.g. Persons, 1995, pp. 40–41; Kirkos et al., 2007, p. 998). In the 
light of manipulated sales numbers, there may also be an untruthful reporting of the 
associated costs of goods sold (cogssal, into and gp) as an overstated gross margin may yield 
incentives for the management (Dechow et al., 2011, p. 34). In this context, operating and 
interest expenses (opxsal and ietl) are also taken into consideration. Capital turnover (salta) 
captures the ability of the management to be competitive and generate sales with the invested 
capital (e.g. Persons, 1995, p. 41). Similar to the argumentation following the performance 
and the asset composition, the management might cover up their lack of competitiveness 
with fraudulently reported sales. From Dechow et al. (2011), the cross-sectional version of 
the modified Jones model (accr) is employed. They assume that the accrual component of 
earnings is the major subject to earnings management and potential manipulation. Accrual-
based predictors have been revealed to yield good results (e.g. Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1995). 
Besides the reliance on previous findings, this study also tries to bridge the gap to fraud 
theory. According to the Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 – Consideration of Fraud 
in a Financial Statement Audit, the three factors of the fraud triangle (pressure, motivation, 
rationalization) can help as a guideline when trying to detect and deter fraud. The 
interdependences between them constitute the basis of the fraud triangle (Cressey, 1953) and 
their interwoven nature has often been proven subsequently (e.g. Skousen et al., 2009; 
Schuchter & Levi, 2016). Breaking down the three factors further into subordinate types in 
reference to the SAS 99 may help to identify proxies (Lou & Wang, 2009; Skousen et al., 
2009). Therefore, capturing each of the factors (and of course as many subtypes as possible) 
by the predictors may help to improve detection performance. According to the findings of 
Huang, Lin, Chiu, and Yen (2017), the factors from the fraud triangle are not equally 
important or suitable in detecting fraud. Their results of a survey of experts suggest that 
pressure is the most important fraud factor, with opportunity coming in second place and 
rationalization depicting the least important factor. 
Pressure can be separated into financial stability, external pressure, manager’s personal 
financial situation, and financial targets. The factor can be mostly referred to predictors 
capturing performance and the financial situation at the company end. The manager’s 
financial situation cannot be incorporated by exploiting the information available. 
Opportunity can be further segregated into industry-specific considerations, (ineffective) 
monitoring, and the organizational structure. Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham (1989) 
already suggested that size as a proxy for organizational complexity represents a solid 
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predictor for financial statement fraud, which may be due to the greater opportunity to 
conduct fraudulent schemes in larger corporations. Rationalization is hard to capture by 
variables from the company characteristics and its financials, but it may be possible to 
consider discretionary accruals as a proxy for management decision-making, which can be 
associated with factors of rationalization, like financial reporting rationalization. This study 
refers to Skousen et al. (2009) to assign the variables to the three factors of the fraud triangle, 
where possible.126 To incorporate an extensive range of possible fraud predictors, variables 
are selected from as many factors and dimensions as possible and combined into the 
quantitative feature vector. The set of variables and the underlying calculations, as well as 
the factors of the fraud triangle they potentially capture, can be found in Table 5. In line with 
Huang et al. (2017) the predictors focus on pressure and opportunity to capture the most 
important factors in great detail. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 6. 
Variables from the company financials have proved able to predict fraudulent behaviour. 
However, when making use of fraud theories like the fraud triangle, these variables are rather 
poor at capturing the relevant factors (especially rationalization, see Skousen et al., 2009), 
which are said to be interwoven to a considerable degree. Going further and applying this to 
enhancements of the fraud triangle – or other fraud theories to a certain extent – the 
assignment would potentially be even more difficult. Therefore, adding predictors from other 
data sources is necessary, especially data on the managers or accountants who are in most 
cases responsible and/or involved in fraud schemes. Factors like capability from the fraud 
diamond, for example, could best be studied with personal information about the fraudster. 
Such personalized data are hard to come by but may significantly improve the detection 
systems (Gottschalk, 2018, pp. 38–41). Hence, enriching the pool of predictors to better 
capture all of the factors may considerably boost fraud detection likelihood. Therefore, this 
study incorporates predictors from the textual components of annual reports to overcome 
this problem to a certain extent.
                                                 
126  The assignment of predictors to certain factors of the fraud triangle is not exclusive. As a matter of 
simplicity, the most apparent factor has been chosen in table 5. 
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4.2 The Machine Learning Methodology 
In the following sections, the machine learning methodology of this study will be presented. 
After a rudimentary introduction to machine learning in general and for an application in the 
fraud detection context in particular, validation approaches and learning methods will be 
presented and the specific techniques relevant to this study explained and discussed. In the 
following, the four different classifiers that are utilized for the detection of financial 
statement fraud will be highlighted in detail. In this regard, for each classifier, the individual 
parameter optimization is carried out and the respective results that serve as the foundation 
of the in-depth analysis thereafter are presented. 
4.2.1 Machine Learning in a Fraud Detection Context 
Machine learning is an interdisciplinary field that combines aspects from statistics, 
information theory, game theory and optimization in a computer science environment 
(Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, pp. 19–21). Its primary goal rests in the training of 
algorithms embedded in computer programmes. Machine learning is a subfield of artificial 
intelligence, fulfilling tasks based on the fundamentals of human intelligence, as the 
recognition of patterns from extracted data. However, as Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David 
(2014, pp. 24–25) note, in contrast to artificial intelligence, the focus of machine learning is 
not meant to imitate human intelligence and behaviour by machines but to utilize its abilities 
to fulfil specific tasks that might not be possible for human intelligence, such as those beyond 
human capabilities due to the amount or complexity of the underlying data (Goodfellow, 
Bengio, & Courville, 2016, pp. 1–8). Tasks that are suited for machine learning applications 
include classifications, regressions, transcriptions, machine translations, and anomaly 
detection, among others. 
The methods are closely connected to statistics, but the purpose differs. Generally 
speaking, statistics are used to test hypotheses and hence check for assumed relationships, 
whereas machine learning provides an unformulated description of data. Some authors refer 
to machine learning as a form of applied math or statistics (Goodfellow et al., 2016, pp. 11–
16). A basic example given by Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David (2014, p. 25) depicts a 
physician who uses inferential statistics to test the influence of a particular indicator on a 
specific disease but then uses machine learning tools to extract patterns and predict diseases 
without predefining relationships and stating assumptions between indicators and diseases. 
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In this regard, machine learning has the character of a black box compared to statistics 
(Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2016, pp. 351–352). Evaluating the outcome of machine 
learning applications also often diverges from statistics. The assessment of the outcome of 
machine learning techniques is usually based on the ability of the learner to absorb the 
provided set of data, for example, it is evaluated based on the achieved accuracy or error rate 
(Goodfellow et al., 2016, pp. 101–102). 
In contrast, in statistics, the asymptotic theory assumes that sample sizes grow indefinitely 
and that the outcomes of tests are evaluated within this framework.127 Another difference is 
based on the assumptions that statistical models require of their data, like distributional 
characteristics, linearity or independency assumptions. In machine learning, on a very 
general level, the learner figures out the representation of the underlying data without 
prescribing distributional and other characteristics beforehand. 
With the multitude of statistical methods exploited for fraud detection tasks, an extensive 
body of literature has been developed, striving for good detection results. The approaches 
range from traditional and commonly applied logistic regressions (e.g. Beasley, 1996), 
discriminant analysis (e.g. Fanning & Cogger, 1998) or k-nearest neighbour classifiers (e.g. 
Liu et al., 2015), to rarely applied approaches in the accounting literature, like support vector 
machines (e.g. Cecchini et al., 2010a) or artificial neural networks (e.g. Green & Choi, 
1997). More recently, machine learning algorithms have seen growing interest as more 
sophisticated approaches tend to yield better results (West & Bhattacharya, 2016).128 
Moreover, most studies do not only focus on one method but test several different tools (e.g. 
Fanning & Cogger, 1998; Humpherys et al., 2011; Abbasi et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2015). As 
discussed in design question 8, this study relies on a similar design and tests detection 
performance through exploiting several classifiers. 
In this study, the term “detection” is commonly used when discussing the differentiation 
(classification) of fraudulent and truthful observations. Some studies alternatively refer to 
the term “prediction” (e.g. Skousen et al., 2009). Figure 14 depicts a fundamental concept in 
the domain of data mining and machine learning. Classification and prediction are related to 
each other and share similarities, although some fundamental differences in their forms of 
application exist (North, 2012, p. 9). Technically, in a classification setting, the outcome is 
a categorical class label, whereas a prediction models a continuous-valued function. 
                                                 
127 This is not true for all models: for example, when using panel data, one dimension would be fixed as the 
others grow infinitely. 
128  For a comprehensive overview, see West and Bhattacharya (2016). 
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Classification is usually associated with supervised learning. Hence, the resulting class label 
can be interpreted as correct or incorrect because the true state of the new observation is 
actually known. The outcome of most studies in financial statement fraud detection is 
measured in accordance with the percentage of correctly classified observations, rather than 
falling into classification. Classification in an unsupervised setting results in a cluster 
analysis or association rules (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 167). Predictions, on the other 
hand, can generate an outcome for a new, unknown, and potentially future observation. For 
example, when using regression analysis to determine the factors that drive household 
income, the resulting regression function can be used to make predictions about the 
household income of an unknown observation, given its input data. The separation between 
both is important for the assessment of the outcome, which will be relevant in the upcoming 
sections and especially highlighted in 4.2.5. 
 
Figure 14 – Classification versus prediction 
4.2.2 Validation 
The need for validation approaches lies in the general procedure of machine learning tasks. 
If the entire data set is used for training, then performance can only be assessed on 
observations that the learner has already seen. The resultant risk is a potential lack of 
generalizability of the extracted patterns, as it is not tested on unseen data. Therefore, when 
comparing results such as error rates, one must differentiate between training error rate and 
classification prediction
 
124 
 
test error rate, as the latter is usually of greater interest but may also be weaker than the one 
scored on already known data (James, Witten, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2017, p. 37).129 
Another problem that arises from the lack of validation in general or proper validation in 
particular, is the risk of undetected overfitting. A model overfits when the learner cannot 
capture the signal without capturing a major portion of the noise surrounding it, which would 
then again lead to a generalizability problem (James et al., 2017, p. 22). Overfitting also 
occurs, for example, when a model can fit almost any functional form due to the number of 
parameters and follows the data without abstracting generalizable rules. Even with validation 
approaches in place, overfitting can occur if the model performance is optimized and 
evaluated iteratively on a single validation set. In this case, the validation set would become 
a part of the training process. Hence, if not properly validated, overfitting cannot be tested 
for and ruled out (Theodoridis, 2015, pp. 91–93). Therefore, to assess the outcome of 
machine learning applications, a number of approaches have been developed to counter this 
and similar problems. 
Original data   Entire available data set (sample)   
                          
Two split   Training set Holdout set   
                          
Three split   Training set Validation set Holdout set   
                          
    split 1 h1 t1 t2 …             
    split 2   h2                 
    split 3     h3               
    split 4       h4             
Nine-fold cross val. split 5         h5           
    split 6           h6         
    split 7             h7       
    split 8               h8     
    split 9                 h9   
     h: Holdout set, t: Training set       
Figure 15 – Comparison of validation methods 
Figure 15 depicts the most commonly used validation approaches, namely two split, three 
split and k-fold cross-validation (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, pp. 146–150). 
Assume a given data set, for this example, called original data. In the two and three splits, 
the entire data set is split into several subsets, called training, validation, and holdout sets. 
                                                 
129 Error rate is the fraction of wrongly classified observations. 
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The observations from the training set are used to obtain the model by training the learner. 
The holdout set is then the portion of observations used to assess the performance on unseen 
data. In the case of further model set-up steps or tuning steps, an additional subset is 
necessary to assess the performance of this iterative procedure before testing the final result 
on unseen data. The reasons have been discussed before. K-fold cross-validation partitions 
the original data into k subsets; in the explanatory split presented in Figure 15, k equals nine. 
The iterative procedure comprises k steps, each with training and validation of the model. 
For every step, the training happens on k-1 subsets and the validation on the remaining subset 
while iterating over the subsets, so that every subset is used for validation once (Theodoridis, 
2015, pp. 92–93). One potential pitfall exists when drawing subsets from the entire dataset. 
The random drawing process may lead to distorted class distributions, no longer reflecting 
the original proportions. This problem can be overcome by stratification, under which the 
class distribution is kept according to the original data (sometimes the method is then called 
stratified k-fold cross-validation) (Witten, Frank, Hall, & Pal, 2017, pp. 167–168). The k-
fold cross-validation has the advantage of reserving little data for validation purposes, which 
is especially important for scenarios where the number of observations is low and where 
holdout sets would distort the data (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, p. 149). It is also 
possible to combine the different approaches, for example by using an initial two split 
validation approach, with model set-up and optimizing the training data using k-fold cross-
validation before testing the final model on the unseen holdout subset. 
In this study, a mixture of approaches is applied that is mainly relatable to the 
aforementioned combined validation, starting with 5-fold cross-validation for the model 
parameter set-up. The achieved parameter set-ups are then used for model building, which 
comprises feature extraction and model training on the training subset representing the 
known observations and assessing the performance on a holdout set, representing the 
unknown future cases, as time relevance is critical in the fraud detection context. This 
procedure is conducted several times on different subsamples in accordance with the 
respective sampling design for each design question, depicting the overall detection 
performance on several subsamples and for several points in time, avoiding the risk of 
overfitting onto a single subsample.130 
                                                 
130  See 5.1.1 for the initial sampling design or 5.1.5 for the final sampling design. 
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4.2.3 Learning Methods 
Two learning approaches form the basis of machine learning tasks, namely supervised and 
unsupervised learning, also referred to as “learning with or without a teacher” (Hastie et al., 
2016, p. 485). The type of learning method that can be applied is primarily determined by 
the structure of the data (James et al., 2017, pp. 373–374). One can distinguish between 
response and predictor variables, which will be called labels and features in the following. 
In the scenario where every observation has a non-missing label, it is possible to utilize a 
supervised learning approach. In this case, the learner can relate the measurement of the 
features to the labels in order to predict the class affiliation for (other) observations. In simple 
terms, the student presents an answer to the teacher, who tells him or her if the answer is 
correct or not. If the data do not support the claim for non-missing labels, or known class 
affiliation is intentionally withheld, one has to fall back on an unsupervised learning 
approach. Without the labelling variable, building upon the relationship between the labels 
and the features is not possible and different evaluation methods are necessary. Some typical 
representatives are cluster analysis, association rules or self-organizing maps (Hastie et al., 
2016, pp. 485–486). 
The key difference between supervised and unsupervised learning lies in its adaptation. 
Supervised learning can be characterized as a density estimation problem, where one is 
interested in the properties of the conditional density of a label and a feature (joint probability 
density) (Hastie et al., 2016, p. 485). The success of the estimation can, for example, be 
measured by expected loss over the joint distribution. In contrast, unsupervised learning 
infers a probability density without the labelling variable, rendering the measurement of 
success less obvious. In other terms, supervised learning relies on the class label, is centred 
on the idea of finding relationships between labels and predictors and predicts the class 
affiliation correctly, whereas unsupervised learning aims to find and describe patterns in the 
features and the relationship between the data points themselves (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, 
p. 167). 
Between the two fundamental learning techniques exists a third option: semi-supervised 
learning. This represents a possible learning technique for tasks where not all examples are 
labelled (Barber, 2012, p. 306). In this environment, one could rely on supervised learning 
by eliminating the observations with missing labels or by falling back into unsupervised 
learning, ignoring the labels or selecting only unlabelled observations. Both possibilities 
would alter the initial sample to a certain extent, which may not be in the interest of the 
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researcher. Semi-supervised learning can fix this problem by combining potentials from 
unsupervised learning like clustering with the ability of supervised learning to rely on 
correctly classified instances.131 Common semi-supervised learning methods include self-
training, generative models or graph-based algorithms (Chapelle et al., 2010, pp. 8–12). 
Unsupervised and semi-supervised learning is closely related to the learning structure of 
humans and animals and therefore may be better suited for machine learning tasks that aim 
to build upon human skills (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015, p. 442). However, it is beyond 
the scope of this study to dive deeper into particular methods. 
In the fraud detection context, the label is binary-coded and distinguishes between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent reports. Observations with missing labels do not exist in the 
sample, as all observations that are not identified as fraudulent by the analysis of AAERs are 
regarded as non-fraudulent. Hence, this study is built upon a supervised learning approach, 
in which the main goal is centred on the classification performance and therefore the 
detection quality of fraudulent reports by features extracted from qualitative and quantitative 
data from annual reports. 
4.2.4 Model Selection and Hyperparameter Optimization 
After discussing the different validation approaches and the learning techniques in the 
previous sections, this section combines the implications for this study’s setting in the final 
model building process. Before training the models and testing their detection performance 
on the holdout sets, as described in Figure 11, the classifiers need to be established. In the 
following sections, the four classifiers will be highlighted and the hyper-parameter set-up 
discussed. 
The goal of hyperparameter tuning or optimization is to adjust the effective capacity of 
the model to match the complexity of the task (Hutter, Kotthoff, & Vanschoren, 2019, pp. 3–
4). Usually, classifiers such as k-nearest neighbours (KNN) require the a priori 
determination of several parameters, also referred to as “hyperparameters” (Witten et al., 
2017, p. 171). In the example of KNN, one would have to decide how to measure the distance 
to the respective neighbours and how many neighbours (k) are taken into consideration when 
classifying an observation (Hassanat, Abbadi, Altarawneh, & Alhasanat, 2014). 
                                                 
131 If it is the intention to treat the sample as if it would not have any missing labels, semi-supervised learning 
is closer to supervised learning, due to the similar goal of correctly predicting labels (Chapelle, Schölkopf, 
& Zien, 2010, pp. 4–11). 
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Classification quality depends on the determination of these parameters. However, to assess 
the performance of different parameter combinations, an additional holdout data set is 
necessary. Choosing one of the data sets this study insists for later usage would cause the 
optimization to be centred on this data set, leading to an optimized detection result for this 
very subsample and potential overfitting onto the underlying observations (Witten et al., 
2017, pp. 171–172). Avoiding overfitting on a single subsample is important in order to 
achieve robust results on other subsamples, which is even more relevant for the research 
design in this study, where changes to the underlying features over 15 years are assumed.132 
To solve this problem, a random data set of observations from the entire timeframe is 
generated.133 This data set is then used to train models using different hyper-parameter 
combinations and is validated with 5-fold cross-validation.134 In detail, the parameter set-up 
is carried out for each of the feature vectors (quantitative only, qualitative only, quantitative, 
and qualitative combined). The three feature vectors are similar by design and thus purpose, 
however fundamentally different in terms of features and requirements for a good classifier. 
Optimizing the parameters using only one of the aforementioned feature vectors and 
exploiting the resulting hyper-parameters for the other feature vectors would very likely 
cause a bias. The feature vector, on which the parameters would have been optimized, would 
most likely outperform the other two feature vectors. Thus, optimizing the hyper-parameters 
for each of the feature vectors in a similar manner is necessary. Given that this implies an 
extensive optimization task, the parameters are only partly optimized. A more in-depth 
optimization approach for each subset lies beyond the scope of this study and will most likely 
not change the overall tendency of the results. 
When dealing with unbalanced data sets, applying resampling methods on the initial data 
can lead to an unintended impact on class distribution. With the 5-fold cross-validation for 
parameter set-up purposes, a random divide of the entire data set into the subsets could lead 
to said bias. To keep the class distribution similar in the subsets, this study relies on a 
                                                 
132  For clarification, the sample represents all observations covering a period of 15 years. Subsamples represent 
a part of the entire sample, in this study typically covering a continuous part of the timeframe. Each 
subsample can furthermore be split into sets, typically training and holdout sets. See Figure 25 for the initial 
sample, for example. 
133 All randomizing processes in this study are based on a local random seed of 1992 to ensure replicability 
and comparability. Seeds are used to initialize pseudo-random number generators (Kotu & Deshpande, 
2014, p. 82). 
134  Witten, Frank, Hall, and Pal (2017, p. 172) mention the computational extensive nature of hyperparameter 
optimization using grids under a cross-validation approach. In these cases, they suggest the common 
procedure of falling back to a lower amount of splits. Under similar constraints, this study desist from using 
the more common 10-fold cross-validation and relies on a 5-fold cross-validation. 
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proportionate random stratified sampling algorithm. Proportionate random stratified 
sampling divides the entire data set into homogeneous subsets based on the class distribution 
of the initial data set (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 81). 
For optimization purposes, traditional, easy-to-understand yet comprehensive 
optimization grids are utilized (Hutter, Lücke, & Schmidt-Thieme, 2015, p. 330). These 
typically two-dimensional grids illustrate the classification results for different combinations 
of parameters. The downside of the grid search rests in its computational effort, as all 
parameter combinations have to be tested and are seen as equally important, even if some 
parameters or their combinations may be of only minor relevance (Bergstra & Bengio, 2012, 
p. 302). This study does not exploit predefined optimization algorithms to ensure the 
replicability and understandability of the upcoming presentation of the results. Recent 
literature advocates the use of tuning algorithms or even random parameter tuning, which 
might outperform the manual extensive grid search but is especially useful for complex 
classifiers with many parameters to tune (Hutter et al., 2015, p. 330). The difference between 
a pair-matched sample with only quantitative features and a realistic probability of fraud 
sample with the combined feature vector regarding size and complexity is very large. The 
test for optimal parameter combinations is extensive, as it must be conducted for each feature 
vector and sampling approach. The upcoming sections deliver a basic understanding of the 
classifiers as well as their peculiarities, which had to be considered in this study’s scenario. 
In this context, the relevant parameters are discussed and the results of the initial parameter 
tuning using the grid approach presented. 
After the optimization process on the random subsample, the classifiers are ready to be 
deployed in the actual detection setting. It is important to mention that classifier optimization 
via hyper-parameter configuration is undertaken entirely beforehand to avoid overfitting and 
skewing the final detection results. Figure 16 depicts the final detection process, with its 
learning and testing phase. 
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Figure 16 – Basic machine learning process 
The observations of the entire sample are assigned to training and holdout sets, 
constructing the subsamples that cover the different timeframes. In the following, the 
qualitative features are extracted from the training set. This step is repeated for each 
subsample. The differentiation between the training and the holdout set is crucial for this 
kind of methodology, as the observations in the training set represent the universe of 
potential qualitative features based on known cases. The class affiliation (fraudulent/non-
fraudulent) of the observations in the holdout set is assumed to be unknown at the time of 
the model training. Hence, the observations of the holdout set are not utilized for feature 
extraction. For example, for the initial sample as presented in Figure 25, the features for i1 
are extracted from the 49,903 observations of the training set from 1996 until 2003. In the 
next step, the training set is used to allow the algorithms to learn patterns based on the 
extracted features. Finally, the trained models classify the observations from the holdout set 
and the quality of the classification can be assessed. In the example for subsample i1, the 
15,375 observations of the corresponding holdout set are from the years 2004–2006. This 
procedure is carried out separately for all subsamples throughout the entire study.  
Training data
(labelled)
Holdout data
(labelled and
unseen)
Learning algorithm Classifier
Classification
results
Training phase
Testing phase
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4.2.5 Measuring Detection Performance 
To measure the detection performance of the models, the area under the receiver operating 
characteristic (AUC) is utilized in this study. The AUC is a commonly applied metric to 
evaluate the performance of fraud detection models, especially in studies with unbalanced 
samples (e.g. Fawcett, 1997; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015; Brown et al., 2018). However, the 
reporting of results, especially in terms of the measurement of detection performance, has 
been carried out in diverse ways and many different performance metrics can be found in 
the literature. In addition to the AUC, studies have typically reported accuracy (fraction of 
correctly classified observations) and/or recall (fraction of correctly classified fraudulent 
observations), which might be sufficient to assess the classification results for balanced 
samples. However, with the severely unbalanced data sets, which are common in the fraud 
detection context (around 1%–2% of observations are fraudulent in this and in similar studies 
relying on a realistic sampling approach), accuracy alone would not be enough, as a high 
level of accuracy can be achieved without correctly classifying the important but 
underrepresented fraud class (Ben-Hur & Weston, 2010, p. 234). Reporting both values may 
solve part of the problem but still has the limitation that observations, which are wrongly 
classified as fraudulent (type 1 error) are not taken into consideration. For example, if one 
suggests that all observations that are classified as fraudulent should be investigated in detail, 
implying examination costs, the number of false positives is of interest as well.135 
The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) was developed during World War II to assess 
the performance of radar-guided signal detection and to find an optimal trade-off between 
hits and false alarms (Pepe, 2000, pp. 308–309). Under the crime signal detection theory, the 
ROC has also been used extensively to evaluate the performance of models in a similar 
fashion and to determine ramifications with the best signal-to-noise ratios (Phillips et al., 
2001, 296-297). In general, the ROC can be seen as the amalgamation of the true positive 
rate (TPR: fraction of correctly classified fraudulent cases, formula 29) and the false positive 
rate (FPR: fraction of non-fraudulent observations classified as fraudulent, formula 30) of 
varying discrimination thresholds. 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 =
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
 (29) 
                                                 
135  See section 5.2.4 for an estimation and utilization of the costs of misclassification. 
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𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 =
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃
𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃
 (30) 
The decision to classify an observation either as positive or negative is based upon the 
outcome 𝑋𝑋 of the classification function obtained through training a classifier upon a set of 
observations. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 represents the decision value of the i-th observation after training the 
classifier and applying the resultant classification vector to the data of the i-th observation. 
The threshold parameter T depicts the decision boundary, for which 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇 is classified to 
the positive group and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇 to the negative group, respectively. 𝑋𝑋 follows a probability 
density function 𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥) for true positives and 𝑓𝑓0(𝑥𝑥) for false positives. Over varying 
thresholds of 𝑇𝑇, the 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 can be plotted against the 𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇, resulting in the receiver-operating 
characteristic. The AUC is then, as the name suggests, the area under the curve of the ROC 
between 0 and 1. 
𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇) = � 𝑓𝑓1(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
∞
𝑇𝑇
 (31) 
𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇(𝑇𝑇) = � 𝑓𝑓0(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
∞
𝑇𝑇
 (32) 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 = � 𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇�𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇−1(𝑥𝑥)�𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
1
𝑥𝑥=0
 (33) 
To clarify, each discriminatory threshold is a possible result with a respective confusion 
matrix and associated metrics like accuracy or recall. This implies that when comparing 
single metrics like recall or accuracy to other studies, the threshold maximizing the 
respective metrics may be selected, rendering the comparison arbitrary. The AUC is 
calculated from all possible thresholds, improving the comparability of the results. 
Graphically, with the true positive rate on the y-axis and the false positive on the x-axis, the 
best prediction results can be found in the upper-left corner, where the true positive rate is 
high and the false positive rate is low. Technically, it ranges between 0 and 1, with higher 
values indicating better detection quality and a value of 0.5 suggesting a random 
classification process. The AUC is also frequently used in other disciplines, such as in 
medicine and pharmacy to evaluate diagnostic tests (e.g. Mandrekar, 2010; Scheff, Almon, 
Dubois, Jusko, & Androulakis, 2011) and in meteorology to assess forecasting quality (e.g. 
Mason & Graham, 2002). Translating the AUC values into generally accessible terms can 
become rather subjective due to the imprecision of language and contrasting perceptions 
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regarding certain quality levels in different fields of application. According to Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, and Sturdivant (2013, pp. 173–181), values larger than 0.8 depict excellent 
detection quality, although quality should always be seen in comparison with similar 
applications. 
However, the AUC is not flawless in its ability to assess classification outcomes. Lobo, 
Jiménez-Valverde, and Real (2008) have examined the disadvantages of using this single 
value performance metric. The AUC is a measure of discriminatory power, not model fit, 
because it does not take predicted probabilities into consideration. Indeed, a well-fitted 
model may have low discriminatory power and vice versa, although this is not a significant 
issue in this study’s application of the AUC because it primarily focuses on the former. 
Another downside lies in the calculation of the AUC across the entire interval of the FPR. 
For most applications, the marginal areas that represent extremely low or high FPRs are 
rather uninteresting. The optimal thresholds usually lie in the upper-left corner, where the 
FPR is low and the TPR is high. However, the AUC is calculated across all thresholds. In 
this regard, the AUC also does not weight the classification errors according to any sort of 
theoretically or empirically derived costs that may be associated with type 1 and type 2 
errors. When searching for a solution that minimizes the associated costs, only one threshold 
is of interest.136 Figure 17 depicts an explanatory AUC of one of the detection models of 
0.861 and references the AUCs of random classifiers (0.5) and an outstandingly well-
performing classifier (0.99). 
                                                 
136 On the other hand, determining the costs of different errors can be subjective or the relationship between 
the costs may change over time, making this process difficult to determine beforehand. 
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Figure 17 – Explanatory AUC 
Despite the aforementioned commonly applied detection performance metrics, some 
studies utilize different or additional measures, like a costs-of-misclassification approach 
(e.g. Perols et al., 2017). Cost-sensitive results weigh the classification results in accordance 
with predefined costs associated with specific outcomes. For example, a fraudulent case that 
is not correctly classified (not detected) would be weighted with the implied costs that might 
arise through its further existence; on the other hand, a non-fraudulent observation that is 
wrongly classified would be weighted with the already mentioned examination costs. 
Determining the costs is vital to the results of the costs of the misclassification approach, 
rendering it a certain degree of freedom (subjectivity). This study strives to use a single 
metric applicable to balanced and unbalanced samples alike and that is free from subjectivity 
and comparable to other studies. However, to shed light on the potential economic benefits 
of the developed detection models of this study, an additional cost-sensitive result will be 
presented lastly. 
4.2.6 Naïve Bayes 
The first classifier is the Naïve Bayes classification, which is one of the oldest and most 
popular techniques in the area of text classification (McCallum & Nigam, 1998, p. 41). The 
Bayes theorem, published in 1763 by Thomas Bayes, represented an important and 
 
135 
 
influential work in statistics and probability theory (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 113).137 
The basic idea behind a classification algorithm is the assignment of a class label to an 
observation with the help of variables describing each observation. Naïve Bayes is rooted in 
probabilistic theory, making use of evidence to predict the most likely outcome. The Naïve 
Bayes classifier assumes that regarding the label (class), the value of a feature (variable) is 
independent to the value of the other features (variables) in the data set (Barber, 2012, pp. 9–
10). Hence, correlations between features are not taken into consideration. This is referred 
to as class conditional independence. 
Let 𝑋𝑋 be a set of variables (features), 𝑋𝑋 = {𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛} and 𝑌𝑌 the outcome, 𝑌𝑌 =
{𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓}. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is an individual feature, for example, the (absolute) frequency 
of a single n-gram. 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌) denotes the probability of the possible outcomes from the 
underlying data, for example, the probability of the observations to be fraudulent; 
analogously 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋) denotes the respective probability of the inputs of 𝑋𝑋. Given a specific 
input for 𝑋𝑋, 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) is the probability that we would observe the input 𝑋𝑋 given the class label 
𝑌𝑌, also known as class conditional probability. 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) is then the probability of an outcome 
𝑌𝑌 (to be fraudulent or non-fraudulent), given an input 𝑋𝑋. Under the Bayes theorem, the 
probability is calculated as follows: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) =
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌)𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌)
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)
=
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌)∏ 𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖|𝑌𝑌)𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋)
 (2) 
The classification boundary is simply determined by the probability of a new vector 
(observation) 𝑋𝑋∗ belonging to either of the classes. For example, 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑 if: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌 = 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑑|𝑋𝑋∗) > 𝑝𝑝(𝑌𝑌 = 𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝐼𝐼ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓|𝑋𝑋∗) (3) 
Translated to the fraud detection problem, at the end of the process depicted by Figure 
11, each observation is labelled according to its class affiliation 𝑌𝑌 as either fraudulent (𝑌𝑌 =
1) or non-fraudulent (𝑌𝑌 = 0). For each observation 𝑗𝑗, a d-dimensional attribute (feature) 
vector 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 is created, with a maximum size of 1,019 features (1,000 features based on textual 
data and 19 based on numeric financial data). Attribute characteristics can either be binary, 
multi-state or continuous (Barber, 2012, p. 241). This study relies on continuous variables 
for the qualitative and quantitative features. For each n-gram, absolute and relative 
                                                 
137 It was published posthumously as “Essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances” in the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Bayes & Price, 1763). 
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frequencies of occurrence for the respective report (feature vector) are computed.138 
However, continuous variables require further transformation. There exist two possibilities 
for the transformation purpose: either by binning, which translates the variables into 
categorical variables or by using distributional functions (kernel functions) (John & Langley, 
1995, p. 339). The categorical solution is rather unsuitable because of the sheer number of 
values that the relative frequencies can take. Therefore, the distributional modelling relying 
on the commonly adopted Gaussian distribution function (4) is chosen (Witten et al., 2017, 
pp. 100–103). 
Gaussian distribution function 
𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋|𝜇𝜇,𝜎𝜎) =
1
√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎2
exp �−
(𝑥𝑥 − 𝜇𝜇)²
2𝜎𝜎²
� (4) 
with mean 
𝜇𝜇 =
1
𝐼𝐼
�𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (5) 
and variance  
𝜎𝜎² =
1
𝐼𝐼 − 1
�(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇)2.
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (6) 
With the Gaussian kernel, the parameters that need to be estimated from the training data 
are the mean and the standard deviation for each class and variable, as depicted by formulas 
8 and 9 (John & Langley, 1995, pp. 339–340).  
𝛿𝛿() = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘, 𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 0 (7) 
?̂?𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘2 =
1
∑ 𝛿𝛿(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘)𝑗𝑗
�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗𝛿𝛿(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘)
𝑗𝑗
 (8) 
𝜎𝜎�𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘2 =
1
∑ 𝛿𝛿(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘)𝑗𝑗
�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 −
𝑗𝑗
?̂?𝜇𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘)²𝛿𝛿(𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 = 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘) (9) 
The advantages of this rather simplistic classifier are fast training and relatively small 
storage requirements (Barber, 2012). In contrast to other classifiers that rely on iterative 
                                                 
138 Relative frequencies of occurrence are used, because binary coded occurrences of n-grams could result in 
a bias, as larger companies tend to have larger reports, resulting in a higher possibility of including a greater 
fraction of the total qualitative features. This also solves potential pitfalls like the 1-of-m coding, resulting 
in highly dependent features (Barber, 2012, p. 169). 
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procedures, the training of this probabilistic classifier solves closed-form expression, 
resulting in good scalability. Under the theorem of “simple first”, Naïve Bayes is a good 
starting point for any classification scenario and is known for its ability to keep up with more 
sophisticated approaches, depending on the data set (Witten et al., 2017, p. 105). However, 
Naïve Bayes starts to lose its competitiveness on data sets with suboptimal feature 
characteristics, especially when compatible features are part of the data and the redundancy 
of similar features skews the results towards these features (Witten et al., 2017, p. 105). In 
the fraud detection scenario, particularly the qualitative features are assumed to occur in 
some sort of pattern and would in this case not be independent and might even be highly 
correlated.139 This also applies to quantitative features. Hence, the Naïve Bayes classifier 
can be expected to perform more poorly than the other approaches. 
4.2.7 K-Nearest Neighbour 
From a broader angle, the learning phase for k-nearest neighbour (KNN) approaches can be 
described as creating a lookup table and classify unknown observations using similar 
observations (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 99). This approach is referred to as a “lazy 
learner”. In more technical terms, k-nearest neighbour builds upon an n-dimensional space, 
constructed by the features of the underlying feature vector, with each observation 
representing one point in said space and being labelled according to the supervised learning 
strategy. 
K-nearest neighbour is a non-parametric approach. Therefore, no assumptions of the 
distributional characteristics of the data are made (Peterson, 2009, p. 1883). It can be used 
for the classification of bi- or multinomial class labels. The algorithm uses a predefined 
number of nearest neighbours (𝑘𝑘) of an observation to determine its class membership by 
majority vote. The nearest neighbours are selected by predefined similarity measures. Hence, 
the two parameters that are used to define the similarity of observations are the number of 
neighbours in conjunction with the respective distance measurement and need to be 
determined beforehand in order to achieve good classification results. 
There exist a multitude of similarity measurements, like distance, correlation, or cosine 
similarity. The most commonly applied distance measurements (Manhattan and Euclidean 
distance) can further be generalized under the Minkowski distance formalized hereafter 
                                                 
139 Choosing a different distributional kernel might also improve the results significantly, as shown by John 
and Langley (1995). 
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(Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, pp. 102–108). The distance 𝑑𝑑 between two points 
𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝1,𝑝𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛) and 𝑄𝑄(𝑞𝑞1, 𝑞𝑞2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛) in an n-dimensional space is depicted by equation 10. 
𝑑𝑑 = �� |𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖|
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
�
1
𝑏𝑏
 (10) 
For 𝑏𝑏 = 1 we attain the Manhattan distance, for 𝑏𝑏 = 2 the Euclidean distance. For a new 
observation, the predicted label 𝑐𝑐∗ is the majority vote over the class affiliation 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 of the i-th 
neighbour 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖.140 
𝑐𝑐∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑐𝑐1, 𝑐𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘) (11) 
To account for the degree of similarity in the majority vote, each neighbour that is part of 
the voting decision in the scenario for 𝑘𝑘 > 1 needs to be weighted (Kotu & Deshpande, 
2014, p. 105). Higher weights resemble higher similarities and the sum across all weights 
must be one. For a new observation 𝑥𝑥∗, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the weight of the i-th neighbour 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 with the 
total number of neighbours determined by k and the respective distance d. In this example, 
exponentially decaying weights following Kotu and Deshpande (2014, p. 205) are used. 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 =
𝑒𝑒−𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥∗,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖)
∑ 𝑒𝑒−𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥∗,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=1
 (12) 
After calculating the weight, the class majority vote can be adjusted accordingly. 
𝑐𝑐∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (𝑤𝑤1 ∗ 𝑐𝑐1,𝑤𝑤2 ∗ 𝑐𝑐2, … ,𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 ∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘) (13) 
Besides distance measurements, this study also tests the performance of cosine similarity 
and correlation as measures of similarity in order to rely on a comprehensive set of 
approaches. Correlation assesses the linear relationship between two observations P and Q. 
It ranges between -1 and 1, with higher absolute values representing a stronger relationship 
in a negative or positive direction and a value of zero indicating no relationship. A correlation 
coefficient of 1 would simply relate to a linear relationship, not ruling out the possibility to 
have of having a higher degree relationship (e.g. quadric) (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 106). 
To calculate the Pearson correlation 𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄 between P and Q, the covariance between both 
observations needs to be calculated and normalized using the standard deviation of P and Q. 
𝜌𝜌𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄 =
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄)
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝜎𝜎𝑄𝑄
 (14) 
                                                 
140  Besides the common majority vote, a number of alternative voting procedures have been proposed but will 
not be discussed hereafter (e.g. Coomans & Massart, 1982) 
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The covariance is formulated in equation 15. 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) =
1
𝐼𝐼 − 1
��𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑝𝑝� ∗ �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 − 𝜇𝜇𝑞𝑞�
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (15) 
The k-highest correlating observations represent the k-nearest neighbours and the class 
of a new observation is determined following equation 13. It is important to note that this 
study is interested in the correlation between two observations and not the correlation 
between variables (features). To clarify in brief, each observation is described by a vector of 
fixed size formed across the features. For the calculation of the correlation between the two 
observations, the values from the feature vectors are taken. 
Cosine similarity measures the angle between two vectors P and Q (Kotu & Deshpande, 
2014, p. 107). An angle of 90° would describe orthogonal vectors and result in a cosine of 
0. Parallel vectors with an angle of 0° or 180° would take the respective values of 1 and -1. 
The cosine similarity therefore is a measure of orientation, with higher values representing 
more similar vectors. 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑦𝑦 =
𝑃𝑃 ⋅ 𝑄𝑄
‖𝑃𝑃‖ ∗ ‖𝑄𝑄‖
=
∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
�∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ∗ �∑ 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1
 (16) 
Cosine similarity is often used in document classification settings, where absolute word 
counts represent the vectors that describe each observation (document) (Oduntan, 2018).141 
Determining the optimal number of neighbours requires some testing. The most 
straightforward approach with a single neighbour suffers from high variance and usually, 
high testing error, decreasing with higher values of k (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, 
pp. 260–264). This trend usually reaches a minimum level before classification quality 
decreases again. K-nearest neighbour is a conceptually simple classification approach, yet 
with considerable computational effort due to the requirements to stored data, especially 
during the testing phase, where the whole table of observations has to be stored in order to 
determine the nearest neighbours of the unknown observations (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-
David, 2014, p. 264). 
The parameters are optimized for each feature vector (qualitative, quantitative, and 
combined) and sampling approach (matched and realistic) via 5-fold cross-validation on a 
random data set. The parameters that have been tuned are the types of distances and the 
                                                 
141  Thereby, cosine similarity does not have to be incorporated into a KNN classifier but is often used in a one-
on-one comparison of documents (Oduntan, 2018, p. 60). 
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number of neighbours (k). Table 7 presents the results of the optimization process.142 For 
the realistic sampling approach, the Manhattan distance with a large number of neighbours 
yields the best results for each of the feature vectors. For the matched sampling approach, 
the Manhattan distance also scored the best results, albeit in conjunction with a lower number 
of neighbours compared to the realistic sampling setting. 
                                                 
142  See 4.2.5 for a detailed discussion of the underlying performance measures. 
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Matched sampling 
Quantitative feature vector 
  k 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.584 0.602 0.587 0.580 0.577 0.562 0.564 0.560 
Correlation 0.522 0.534 0.556 0.547 0.555 0.553 0.554 0.540 
Cosine 0.563 0.553 0.561 0.550 0.564 0.563 0.559 0.554 
Manhattan 0.641 0.638 0.628 0.622 0.612 0.603 0.587 0.579 
Qualitative feature vector 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.693 0.716 0.721 0.716 0.713 0.711 0.695 0.690 
Correlation 0.654 0.654 0.664 0.657 0.643 0.630 0.635 0.634 
Cosine 0.744 0.754 0.737 0.727 0.711 0.699 0.696 0.691 
Manhattan 0.823 0.817 0.806 0.799 0.790 0.782 0.775 0.774 
Combined feature vector 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.586 0.603 0.587 0.581 0.577 0.562 0.564 0.560 
Correlation 0.527 0.525 0.550 0.530 0.555 0.545 0.551 0.540 
Cosine 0.563 0.553 0.561 0.550 0.564 0.563 0.559 0.554 
Manhattan 0.651 0.641 0.630 0.626 0.609 0.601 0.591 0.583 
                  
Realistic sampling 
Quantitative feature vector 
  k 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.615 0.630 0.638 0.646 0.654 0.656 0.660 0.671 
Correlation 0.581 0.596 0.607 0.615 0.613 0.618 0.620 0.618 
Cosine 0.581 0.600 0.614 0.626 0.624 0.627 0.634 0.634 
Manhattan 0.654 0.666 0.679 0.691 0.693 0.700 0.707 0.710 
Qualitative feature vector 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.746 0.750 0.755 0.763 0.769 0.771 0.773 0.778 
Correlation 0.770 0.773 0.771 0.770 0.776 0.773 0.775 0.775 
Cosine 0.774 0.773 0.782 0.786 0.791 0.793 0.797 0.802 
Manhattan 0.793 0.798 0.799 0.800 0.811 0.812 0.816 0.816 
Combined feature vector 
  3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Euclidean 0.615 0.630 0.638 0.646 0.654 0.656 0.660 0.671 
Correlation 0.580 0.597 0.610 0.621 0.617 0.618 0.626 0.625 
Cosine 0.581 0.600 0.614 0.626 0.624 0.627 0.634 0.634 
Manhattan 0.659 0.673 0.683 0.697 0.696 0.707 0.718 0.710 
The table reports AUC values of parameter combinations for different feature vectors and sampling 
approaches. The parameter setup has been carried out on a random, unused dataset via stratified 5-fold cross-
validation (mean AUC values are reported). Darker grey areas indicate better detection performance. k: 
number of neighbours. 
Table 7 – KNN parameter optimization 
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4.2.8 Artificial Neural Networks 
The basic idea behind artificial neural networks (ANN) is taken from biology and roughly 
resembles the function of a neuron (Goodfellow et al., 2016, pp. 12–13). In biology, the 
neuron or nerve cell is the primary component of the nervous system that receives, processes 
and transmits electric and chemical signals (Zurada, 1992, pp. 26–30). A typical neuron 
consists of the cell body with the nucleus, which is surrounded by dendrites and a single 
axon with synapses (Jain, Mao, & Mohiuddin, 1996, p. 33). A neuron is connected to another 
neuron via the synapses. Thus, the synapses of the neuron are connected to the dendrites of 
another neuron, forming a complex communication network. 
 
Figure 18 – Schematic anatomy of a neuron143 
An artificial neural network is modelled in reference to this biological prototype. In its 
basic structure, it consists of neurons, also called nodes or units, which are arranged 
consecutively in multiple layers (Zurada, 1992, pp. 37–42). In terms of graph theory, a 
rudimentary artificial neural network resembles a directed graph with nodes being called 
neurons, while the links between them are edges (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, 
p. 268). The number of layers may vary: in its most simplistic form, an artificial neural 
network has two layers, an input, and an output layer. This type of ANN is called perceptron 
and is comparable to a linear classifier (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, pp. 124–125). With the 
                                                 
143 Modified from the original, designed by “brgfx / Freepik” in accordance with free-use terms. 
Dendrite
Nucleus
Axon
Synapse
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addition of further layers in between the input and output layer, called hidden layers, 
modelling non-linear relationships is possible. In feed-forward networks, the input travels 
one-directionally through the net without any loops between layers (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-
David, 2014, p. 269). Recurrent or feedback networks, in contrast, have feedback 
connections to initiate loops (Jain et al., 1996, pp. 34–35). 
The similarities can be seen when comparing the biological structure of a neuron as 
exemplified in Figure 18 to the basic design of a neuron (for example as part of a hidden 
layer) in an artificial neural network as in Figure 19. The neuron receives inputs, which are 
processed via an activation function and further transmitted in the network (Zurada, 1992, 
pp. 32–34). 
 
Figure 19 – Neuron of an artificial neural network 
Output 
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Input Activation 
𝑌𝑌 = 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
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Each neuron of the following layer is connected to each neuron of the previous layer. The 
value that is transferred from the neurons of the previous layer to a specific neuron in the 
following layer is the weighted sum of the inputs of the neuron (𝑌𝑌), where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 is the input 
from the 𝑖𝑖-th neuron of the previous layer and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the respective weight.144 To process the 
weighted sum of the inputs to an output, an activation function is used (Jain et al., 1996, 
p. 35). In biological terms, if a particular activation potential is achieved, the neuron fires 
over its axon to connected neurons. The mathematical equivalent is the output of the 
activation function. The weighted sum of the inputs defines the value that is processed by 
the activation function and the output determines the value, which is then the input for 
connecting neurons, again weighted accordingly. 
𝑌𝑌 = �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 + 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
 (17) 
As the activation function is used to transform the input of a neuron into an output, 
determining the type of function is crucial (Karlik & Olgac, 2011). The (uni-polar) sigmoid 
function, as expressed in equation 18, is a common activation function that is typically 
applied in binary classification scenarios, like that presented in this study (Karlik & Olgac, 
2011, pp. 112–113).145 Concerning the calculations, sigmoid functions tend to require more 
computational effort than, for example, the restricted linear unit function (ReLu), which is 
also commonly used. In general, the number of different applicable activation functions is 
manifold (Witten et al., 2017, p. 425). 
The activation functions may also vary between the layers. Therefore, it is possible to 
have a ReLu function in the hidden layer and a sigmoid function in the output layer. The 
simple ReLu function has an output of 0 if the respective input is less than 0 and the true 
output is otherwise (19). 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑒−𝑥𝑥
 (18) 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = max(𝑥𝑥, 0) (19) 
The size of the input layer (the number of neurons in the input layer) is determined by the 
size of the input vector. The input layer usually consists of 𝐹𝐹 or 𝐹𝐹 + 1 neurons, where 𝐹𝐹 is 
                                                 
144 The relevance of a bias term will be discussed later. 
145 The uni-polar sigmoid activation function takes values between 0 and 1, describing the output of a typical 
binary coded classification problem. The bi-polar sigmoid function takes values between -1 and 1 (Karlik 
& Olgac, 2011, pp. 112–113). 
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the number of features in the input vector (Zurada, 1992, p. 143). For this study, for the most 
part, three different-sized feature vectors are utilized.146 The quantitative feature vector 
consists of 19 features, the qualitative vector of 1,000 features, and the combined one of 
1,019 features. As a general rule of thumb, higher dimensional feature vectors and therefore 
larger input layers are said to be better suited to extract classification patters than smaller 
ones (Zurada, 1992, pp. 96–97). The number of features and therefore the input layer size 
directly influences the training time of the ANN. As a general rule of thumb, the length of 
the computation (time) L does increase by order of L² when adding new features, which 
would translate to quadruplicating the training time if the input layer size is doubled 
(Kavzoglu, 1999, p. 676). 
On the other hand, the output layer in the binomial classification scenario (non-fraudulent 
versus fraudulent) consists of two neurons that translate the inputs from the hidden layer 
neurons and assign each observation to one of the two groups. Usually, the number of classes 
imposes the number of output neurons. However, in multi-class scenarios, the output neurons 
can be pruned through distributed representation (Zurada, 1992, pp. 215–216).147 For 
example, four classes (0,1,2,3) could be represented via two neurons (00,01,10,11). 
However, pruning may lead to longer training cycles and less robust results (Zurada, 1992, 
p. 216). 
It has already been discussed that the input of a neuron represents the weighted sum of 
inputs of the neurons from a previous layer. Determining the weights is an essential part of 
the actual learning process. The learning process is carried out through a technique called 
backpropagation. Backpropagation is an iterative technique that updates the weights of the 
connections between the neurons. In this case, the network topology and the underlying 
activation function are already given. Backpropagation again resembles the biological 
process of signal transmission between neurons (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, pp. 127–128). 
The strength of the connections between the neurons is optimized by adjusting the weights 
of them based on their relevance for the resulting output, which can be done by gradient 
descent algorithms (Witten et al., 2017, pp. 266–268). Therefore, the labelled observations 
from the training set are used to determine the error (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒), where 𝑥𝑥 is the input, 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) is the 
output from the sigmoid function and 𝑌𝑌∗ is the true output.148 
                                                 
146  For answering enhancing question 2, the layer sizes of the quantitative and the combined vector are 
increased. See 5.2.3 for this special case. 
147 This is only possible if no class decoding is required (Zurada, 1992, p. 216). 
148 Despite error-correction rules, other learning algorithms like Boltzmann learning or the Hebbian rule 
(among others) have developed (Jain, Mao, & Mohiuddin, 1996, pp. 36–37). 
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𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑌𝑌∗ − 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) (20) 
Often the quadratic loss function is used instead of the absolute error loss function, as the 
latter is not differentiable at 0, leading to problems in the optimization procedure (Witten et 
al., 2017, pp. 177–178). 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = (𝑌𝑌∗ − 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥))² (21) 
By adjusting the weights continuously, the error is minimized. This correction rate of the 
weights is crucial to determine an optimized model without overcorrecting, which could lead 
to missing potential minima through larger steps (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 129). The old 
weights 𝑤𝑤′ are updated by a fraction 𝜆𝜆 of the error, which is called the learning rate, to 
calculate the updated weight 𝑤𝑤 (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, pp. 129–130). The learning rate 
can take values between 0 and 1. 
𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤′ + 𝜆𝜆 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (22) 
Under the gradient descent algorithm, the derivative of the squared error loss function 
with regard to the weights can be taken from equation 23.149 
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
= �𝑌𝑌 − 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)�𝑓𝑓′(𝑥𝑥)𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓′(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 (23) 
Where 𝑥𝑥 represents the weighted sum of the inputs, 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) is the output of the sigmoid 
activation function, f’(x) denotes the derivative of the sigmoid function and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is an input 
vector. The weight of the connection between the j-th input unit and the i-th hidden unit is 
denoted by 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. The weight from the i-th hidden unit to the output unit is denoted by 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖.150 
This derivative for the error function is calculated for every observation in the training set. 
The result after each iteration is then used to sum up the changes associated with the specific 
weights 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, multiplying the learning rate 𝜆𝜆 and subtracting the outcome from the current 
value of 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 129). 
The learning rate does not have to be static throughout the optimization process but can 
be adjusted gradually to move from higher values to smaller values later (Kotu 
& Deshpande, 2014, p. 129). It is conducted by adding a penalty to the error function, which 
is calculated as the square sum across all weights, thus also solving the problem of irrelevant 
connections that do not add to the error reduction. 
                                                 
149 See Witten, Frank, Hall, and Pal (2017, pp. 267–268) for the derivation of equation 23.  
150  In the case of a single output unit, which is feasible in a scenario with two classes. 
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The explanatory artificial neural network in Figure 20 illustrates a four-layer approach 
with 68 neurons. It is divided into an input layer with 20 neurons, two hidden layers with 23 
neurons each and an output layer with two neurons. The connections between the nodes (in 
the figure illustrated by grey lines) represent the weights. The darker the line, the greater the 
weight of the connection. Each neuron of a layer is connected to each neuron of the 
subsequent layer. The input nodes represent the 19 quantitative features as well as one 
additional node to capture bias. The bias neuron is similar to an absolute (constant) term of 
a regression function (Zurada, 1992, p. 165). It can be added to help shift the activation 
function to the left or to the right, which cannot be done solely by the weighting term. 
Changing the weight only adjusts the shape (steepness) of the activation function. When 
looking closely at Figure 20, the additional bias neuron can be identified, which is not 
connected to a previous layer. The subjective part of the topology of the network is 
constituted by the number of hidden layers and the respective size of each layer and is 
depending on the complexity of the task but sometimes regarded as an invariant concerning 
the parameter tuning (Zurada, 1992, p. 569). Hastie et al. (2016, p. 400) suggest to use rather 
too many than too few neurons in the hidden layer but also mention that topology is often a 
matter of experimentation or background knowledge. 
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Figure 20 – Example of an artificial neural network 
The parameter set-up for artificial neural networks will briefly be discussed hereafter. As 
with the other classifiers, the parameters have been tuned on a random data set using 5-fold 
cross-validation. The biggest problem when setting up artificial neural networks is the sheer 
number of possibilities when constructing the network. This study relies on general hints 
from the literature and tests a reasonable number of network sizes in combination with 
different parameter values. In comparison to the other classifiers, the ANN has the highest 
potential for further optimization. 
The first parameter of interest is the learning rate and related parameters, which influence 
the changes to learning rate during the training process. As the learning rate determines the 
sensitivity of the changes to weights, slowing down learning rate changes reduces the impact 
of outliers in later iterations (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 131). Moreover, weight decay 
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adds to generalization and limits overfitting (Krogh & Hertz, 1992). Hastie et al. (2016, 
pp. 398–400) also reveal the positive impact of small weight decays on the error rate and 
suggest to use this technique as a regularization to avoid overfitting. In addition to weight 
decay, the momentum parameter influences the learning rate by adding a fraction of the prior 
update to the current iteration, smoothening the optimization process and reducing the 
likelihood of becoming stuck in a local maximum (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014). Learning rate 
and momentum are interdependent and should be tuned in conjunction (Smith, 2018). At 
first glance, momentum and weight decay might work against each other; however, they 
serve different purposes and work very well together (Smith, 2018). Momentum adjusts the 
step heights continuously, whereas weight decay leads to different values throughout the 
training process. In this study, different learning rates and values for momentum have been 
tested while keeping the weight decay constant. 
Matched sampling   Realistic sampling 
Quantitative feature vector  Quantitative feature vector 
    Learning rate       Learning rate 
    0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7       0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
m. 
0.1 0.554 0.562 0.562 0.564   
m. 
0.1 0.695 0.711 0.712 0.711 
0.3 0.557 0.566 0.561 0.563   0.3 0.702 0.712 0.711 0.713 
0.5 0.559 0.562 0.562 0.563   0.5 0.705 0.711 0.713 0.717 
0.7 0.562 0.568 0.569 0.558  0.7 0.712 0.713 0.719 0.722 
Qualitative feature vector   Qualitative feature vector 
    Learning rate       Learning rate 
    0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7       0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
m. 
0.1 0.846 0.851 0.451 0.567   
m. 
0.1 0.649 0.717 0.720 0.723 
0.3 0.845 0.597 0.551 0.507   0.3 0.650 0.717 0.723 0.734 
0.5 0.849 0.425 0.461 0.478   0.5 0.686 0.720 0.735 0.749 
0.7 0.800 0.469 0.200 0.400   0.7 0.719 0.730 0.753 0.732 
Combined feature vector   Combined feature vector 
    Learning rate       Learning rate 
    0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7       0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 
m. 
0.1 0.838 0.842 0.851 0.859   
m. 
0.1 0.715 0.755 0.754 0.768 
0.3 0.844 0.846 0.847 0.851   0.3 0.731 0.753 0.762 0.780 
0.5 0.845 0.847 0.851 0.859   0.5 0.740 0.759 0.776 0.787 
0.7 0.844 0.852 0.852 0.836   0.7 0.754 0.775 0.771 0.775 
The table reports AUC values of parameter combinations for different feature vectors and sampling 
approaches. The parameter setup has been carried out on a random, unused dataset via stratified 5-fold cross-
validation (mean AUC values are reported). Darker grey areas indicate better detection performance. m: 
momentum. 
Table 8 – ANN parameter optimization 
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The results of the tuning test for learning and momentum rates are presented in Table 8. 
For the realistic sampling approach, higher values for learning rates and momentum seem to 
achieve the best results for each of the feature vectors, while the results for the matched 
sampling approach seem to follow no overarching pattern. 
The network architecture is the core of every ANN and theoretically allows for endless 
possible configurations. The two most important parameters regarding the architecture are 
the number of hidden layers and their respective sizes (Wilamowski, 2009, pp. 57–59). A 
very simplistic way to start is by using one hidden layer and increasing the number if the 
ANN is not able to produce reliable and satisfying results (Jain et al., 1996, pp. 38–39). The 
universal approximation theorem states that a single hidden layer with a finite amount of 
neurons can approximate arbitrary continuous functions (Cybenko, 1989, p. 312). The 
theorem was first proved by Cybenko (1989) for sigmoid activation functions. The 
assumption was later relaxed by Hornik (1991), who showed that feed-forward neural 
networks with a single hidden layer represented a potential universal approximator.151 
Further, Wilamowski (2009, p. 60) argues that for generalizability purposes an artificial 
neural network should have as few neurons as possible. Building upon this knowledge, the 
number of hidden layers was set to one, leaving only the hidden layer size open to tuning. 
The number of neurons in the hidden layer should not be too small, as this would lead to a 
loss of flexibility and the ANN may not be able to capture peculiarities, especially in the 
case of non-linearities in the data (Hastie et al., 2016, p. 400). The hidden layer size should 
furthermore be adjusted according to the size of the dataset and the number of input features. 
Both are varying considerably in this study with the dataset size being considerably 
influenced by the realistic and the matched sampling approaches, and the feature input size 
being influenced by the three different feature vectors. Therefore, the detection quality is 
tested for variations of the peculiarities for four different hidden layer sizes, ranging from 
100 to 800 neurons. The differences in detection performance between the results for larger 
networks and the ones presented in Table 8 are hardly noticeable in most cases. Table 9 
shows the single highest AUC values for different network sizes and feature vectors for the 
matched sampling process.152 As suggested by Zurada (1992, pp. 569–570), the network size 
was an invariant in the other parts of the parameter tuning procedure. 
                                                 
151 In practice, width (number of neurons in the hidden layer) cannot always substitute for depth (number of 
hidden layers) very well (Lu, Pu, Wang, Hu, & Wang, 2017). 
152 The parameter optimization in this scenario is carried out exactly as the one presented in table 8, with 
learning rate and momentum variations. To reduce the number of tables, only the highest AUC values, 
which are the most relevant, are shown in table 9. 
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Layer size Quant. Qual. Qual. & quant. 
100* 0.569 0.851 0.859 
200 0.567 0.856 0.864 
400 0.565 0.847 0.861 
800 0.571 0.851 0.857 
Highest AUC values for different-sized networks 
*100 hidden units as presented in Table 8  
Table 9 – ANN performance with different hidden layer sizes 
The results reveal that larger networks do not seemingly perform any better than smaller 
ones. Furthermore, to compare the highest AUC values, paired t-tests were conducted. 
Sizes Quant. Qual. Qual. & quant. 
200> 0.895 0.817 0.395 
400> 0.996 0.996 0.004 
800> 1.000 1.000 0.395 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results from the baseline 
network with 100 neurons to larger networks153 
Table 10 – Comparison of network sizes 
The tests compare the results regarding the learning rate and the momentum of the 
baseline network with 100 neurons to the larger ones. The results can be taken from Table 
10, which reports the respective p-values. From the nine additional tests (three compared 
network sizes for three feature vectors) for the matched sampling approach, only in one case 
is a larger network significantly better. For the realistic sampling approach, a similar 
procedure is undertaken. However, to keep computational effort reasonable, only three in 
contrast to nine additional combinations are tested.154 In none of the cases does the larger 
network achieve significantly better results.  
The network size has little impact on the performance, regardless of the feature vector 
and the sampling approach. This, at first glance counterintuitive result, has been proven to 
be true on different types of settings (e.g. Kavzoglu, 1999). In accordance with Occam’s 
principle, Wang, Venkatesh, and Judd (1994) demonstrate that if the network is large enough 
                                                 
153  The p-values are one-tailed for evaluating the alternate hypothesis of better performance of larger network 
sizes. The “>” sign indicates the respective direction. A similar notation will be chosen in the reporting of 
the results in chapter 5. 
154 At this point, it may be important to provide some context on the time requirements. For the realistic 
sampling approach, applying a 5-fold cross-validation on the random data set used for parameter 
optimization (size similar to one of the training sets of the initial sample), with qualitative features, 100 
neurons in the hidden layer and 16 parameter combinations, it took six days and 15 hours to attain a single 
output (matrix) as reported in Table 8. 
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to learn from the data, further increases to the size of the ANN play little role in the 
generalizability performance and therefore should be avoided.155  
To complement the aforementioned tuning parameters, some more general settings must 
be considered. The starting values of the weights are randomized near zero. Weights of zero 
would lead to zero derivatives, which in return would imply that the algorithm does not 
change accordingly in each step. Weights that are too big lead to poor performance due to 
larger differences in step size (Hastie et al., 2016, p. 398). Furthermore, normalizing the 
inputs on a scale from -1 to 1 leads to the eliminations of outlier inputs and translates to the 
domain of the sigmoid activation function (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 132). Furthermore, 
the models are trained with an early stopping rule (error epsilon of 1.0−5) to prevent the 
ANN from simply memorizing the data.156 Finally, the number of training iterations must be 
determined. The number of iterations determines the amount of each training cycle 
undertaken. It is largely contingent on the learning algorithm of the ANN (Wilamowski, 
2009, p. 57). Error backpropagation, which is used in this study, is a rather inefficient 
method that requires more iterations to achieve satisfactory error rates (Wilamowski, 2009, 
p. 57).  
The number of iterations is tested during the parameter optimization process. The AUC 
barely changes after around 1,000 iterations. An additional test was carried out for 5,000 
iterations to see if the results would considerably change after longer training, but no 
significant improvement was noticeable. Figure 21 depicts the results measured by the AUC 
for different numbers of iterations. 
                                                 
155 Occam’s principle or Occam’s razor is considered a fundamental tenant of science (see Domingos, 1999, 
for general effectuations and the adaption to knowledge discovery and machine learning in particular). The 
principle was postulated by William of Occam around the beginning of the 14th century and criticizes the 
trend of formulating theories that are more complex without generating much or any improvement over 
already existing, simpler ones. In simple terms, it comes down to the lesson that when one needs to consider 
different theories that are all making the same predictions, the simplest one is the best. Two interpretations, 
also known as the first and second Occam’s razor, are relevant for this study. The first Occam’s razor states 
that “given two models with the same generalization error, the simpler one should be preferred because 
simplicity is desirable in itself” and the second one that “given two models with the same training-set error, 
the simpler one should be preferred because it is likely to have lower generalizability error” (Domingos, 
1999, p. 410). Given both principles and the results of the parameter set-up, the simpler structured network 
will be preferred if performance is similar. Occam’s razor is not only applicable to neural networks but to 
every classifier that is applied in this study to a certain extent. 
156 When measuring the performance of ANNs, epsilons of ~1.0^-5 are considered very small errors 
(Wilamowski, 2009). 
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Figure 21 – Iterations and detection performance 
Like every other approach, artificial neural networks have their advantages and 
disadvantages in general as well as regarding their suitability in this study’s classification 
scenario. Besides this unusual and seemingly remarkable approach, artificial neural 
networks are at their core a non-linear classifier akin to a classification or a regression model 
with two stages (Hastie et al., 2016, p. 392). Finding the optimal combination of possible 
parameter set-ups with respect to typology, learning rate, activation functions, and iterations, 
among others, takes considerable time, especially compared to the other methods used in 
this study. Hastie et al. (2016, p. 397) have stated that training an artificial neural network is 
an art, given the number of possible parameter combinations and the overall architecture. 
Finding the optimal parameter set-up – if it even exists – is beyond the scope of this work. 
Depending on the set-up of an artificial neural network, computing effort during the training 
phase can be much greater compared to the other classifiers incorporated, but trained 
networks are very fast during the testing phase. Incremental error correction may cause the 
final model to fall into a local optimum. This is a general problem with the gradient descent 
algorithm, which can only find local minima when several minima are present and may not 
converge to the global minimum (Witten et al., 2017, pp. 265–266). 
4.2.9 Support Vector Machines 
The fourth classifier applied comprises support vector machines (SVMs). Like the naïve 
Bayes classifier and the artificial neural network, support vector machines are a commonly 
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used tool for machine learning tasks. Support vector machines reflect a younger development 
than the other techniques, although they adopt a basic idea that dates back to the early stages 
of pattern recognition. 
In 1936, Fisher proposed a first algorithm for pattern recognition, inspiring an emerging 
subfield of statistics. He used the Iris sample (one that is very popular today), which contains 
data on the measurements of flowers, to demonstrate its ability to discriminate different 
plants based on a set of attributes (Fisher, 1936). Fifty observations for each of the three 
plants Iris setosa, Iris versicolor and Iris virginica were collected and their sepal length and 
width, as well as their petal length and width, were measured.157 His idea of assessing linear 
functions to discriminate populations based on measured attributes was subsequently 
developed further to also take non-linear relationships into consideration, but it remains a 
fundamental approach even for modern techniques like support vector machines (Cortes & 
Vapnik, 1995). While working at AT&T Bell Labs, Cortes and Vapnik developed algorithms 
for pattern recognition and published one of the first formulated approaches of support vector 
machines, with the intention of solving binary classification problems (Kotu & Deshpande, 
2014, p. 134). 
Within the basic concept of support vector machines and as the name suggests, data points 
are represented in vector form. The set of attributes (features) defines the position of each 
data point in an n-dimensional space. The term “support” in the name “support vector 
machines” thus refers to the data points that determine the boundary between the groups 
(Cortes & Vapnik, 1995, p. 274). This boundary is called the hyperplane. To ensure the 
boundary not being biased (too close) towards one or another group, the average geometric 
distance (margin) is maximized (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 135). As illustrated in Figure 
22, the two groups represented by the black and grey dots are linearly separated by the fitted 
hyperplane, which is based on the marked support vectors (dots in the circle).  
                                                 
157 The sample was collected and published by Anderson (1935) but became even more popular through the 
work of Fisher (1936). 
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Figure 22 – SVMs in a two-dimensional space 
In the example depicted in Figure 22, the classes are perfectly separable by a linear 
function.158 However, finding the best possible hyperplane among all of the potential options 
is important for subsequent classification performance. The optimal hyperplane can be 
expressed as 
𝑥𝑥 = 𝛽𝛽 + �𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) ⋅ 𝑎𝑎
𝑖𝑖
 (24) 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the class label (in this case distinguishing the class affiliation through the 
values 1 and -1) of the input data point 𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) (Witten et al., 2017, p. 254). Support vectors are 
part of the training data and are indicated through 𝑖𝑖. The dot product of a support vector 𝑎𝑎(𝑖𝑖) 
and another vector 𝑎𝑎 is a measure of geometrical similarity between both data points. The 
parameters 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽 need to be determined through an optimization algorithm. They 
represent the “shape” of the hyperplane, in this form similar to the slope and absolute term 
of a linear function. With the help of the well-established field of quadratic constraint 
optimization, the optimization problem can be solved (Fletcher, 2010, pp. 165–214; Kotu 
& Deshpande, 2014, p. 140). 
                                                 
158 The convex hulls (polygons) formed when connecting the data points of each class do not overlap, as they 
are linear separable. Hence the optimal hyperplane is the perpendicular bisector of the shortest line 
connecting the hulls (Witten, Frank, Hall, & Pal, 2017, p. 253). 
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So far, the basic idea of support vector machines has been presented in a linearly separable 
environment but as stated earlier, SVMs are also capable of determining non-linear 
boundaries.  
 
Figure 23 – Data before transformation 
In comparison to Figure 22, Figure 23 depicts (at first sight) a non-linear separable data 
set. With the help of the so-called “kernel-trick”, the initial structure of the data is 
transformed by an a priori specified kernel function (Shalev-Shwartz & Ben-David, 2014, 
pp. 217–222). The basic idea is to map the data points to a higher dimensional space and 
thereby make them linearly separable (Cortes & Vapnik, 1995, p. 274). After the 
transformation process, the gap between the hyperplane and the data points is maximized, 
like in the case without kernel transformation. In this schematic example, a kernel function, 
as described in equation 25, provides a data transformation for the two groups, resulting in 
a solution separable by a linear function again, which schematically can be seen in Figure 
24. 
𝑧𝑧 = �𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑦𝑦² (25) 
x
y
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Figure 24 – Data after transformation 
In most classification scenarios, both groups will not be linearly separable owing to the 
presence of data points lying inside the decision boundary or in the opposite group, resulting 
in misclassification. When determining the shape of the hyperplane, misclassified instances 
are taken into consideration when assessing the hyperplane parameters. For each 
classification error, a penalty is calculated (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, p. 136). The penalty 
value (often abbreviated with a 𝐶𝐶) must be determined beforehand and assessed by cross-
validation (James et al., 2017, p. 358). The parameter reflects the bias-variance tradeoff. 
Small thresholds of 𝐶𝐶 result in smaller margins and thus hyperplanes leading to fewer 
violations, whereas large values of 𝐶𝐶 result in softer margins with more potential 
violations.159 Therefore, larger values of 𝐶𝐶 result in a greater number of support vectors, with 
more bias but less variance. With the characteristic of a permeable boundary, the support 
vector machine is also referred to as a soft margin classifier (James et al., 2017, p. 345).  
Support vector machines tend not to overfit as easily as other techniques (Witten et al., 
2017, p. 255). The hyperplane is defined by a fraction of the complete data set, making sure 
to generalize the underlying discriminate. Adding or deleting data points only changes the 
                                                 
159 𝐶𝐶 can also be regarded as costs of misclassification. Moreover, high values of 𝐶𝐶 are associated with smaller 
margins and vice versa for lower values of 𝐶𝐶 (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2016, p. 420). The technical 
implementation in this study’s case builds upon the initial explanation for the parameter 𝐶𝐶. 
x
z
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underlying hyperplane, when support vectors are concerned (Kotu & Deshpande, 2014, 
p. 147). Furthermore, the robustness to smaller changes in the underlying data results in 
faster remodelling when additional instances are added. A disadvantage of support vector 
machines is the computational complexity, depending on the implementation (Kotu 
& Deshpande, 2014, p. 148; Witten et al., 2017, p. 255). Vector operations in a high-
dimensional space require computational effort during the training and testing phase. 
Computational costs increase considerably with higher-order SVMs (Kotu & Deshpande, 
2014, p. 147). 
To ensure good classification results, choosing the “best” kernel function and 
misclassification penalty is critical. Moreover, the parameters of the kernel functions need 
to be considered as well. As is commonplace in machine learning tasks, the parameter set-
up of SVMs is contingent on the underlying data and needs to be determined for the 
individual problem beforehand (Ben-Hur & Weston, 2010, pp. 230–234). Hastie et al. (2016, 
pp. 421–422) highlight the importance of cross-validated determination for 𝐶𝐶 for each kernel 
function individually. Hence, for the complex classification problem, several kernels and 
values for 𝐶𝐶 are tested here on a random data set using 5-fold cross-validation. To limit the 
parameters, this study relies on generalizable hints and practical guides from the literature. 
Kernel function Mathematical expression Additional parameters  
Dot product 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = 𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑦𝑦  (26) 
Radial basis function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = exp (−𝛾𝛾‖𝑥𝑥 − 𝑦𝑦‖2) 𝛾𝛾 (27) 
Polynomial function 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = (𝑥𝑥 ⋅ 𝑦𝑦 + 1)𝑛𝑛 𝐼𝐼 (28) 
Table 11 – Kernel functions 
The kernel functions exploited in this study range from polynomials of degree 1-4, to 
radial and dot kernels. Witten et al. (2017, pp. 255–256) suggest that small values of 𝐼𝐼 suffice 
for polynomials, while Ben-Hur and Weston (2010, p. 226) and James et al. (2017, pp. 352–
354) note that especially for high-dimensional data sets (with many features), one should 
start with a linear kernel as a benchmark before beginning to exploit non-linear kernels. Hsu, 
Chang, and Lin (2003) have empirically tested different kernels on a range of data sets and 
have extracted baseline rules to initialize the parameter optimization process, recommending 
that one start with radial basis functions. The optimization parameter of interest for the radial 
basis function, as depicted in Table 9, is 𝛾𝛾, which accounts for flexibility and complexity. 
Low values of 𝛾𝛾 result in low flexibility, meaning that the function is unlikely to incorporate 
complex structures, whereas high values stimulate the function to reach out to individual 
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data points, enabling it to capture complex data structures. Balancing 𝛾𝛾 is another important 
task to avoid running into overfitting (Hsu et al., 2003, pp. 4–6). Table 11 presents the 
exploited kernel functions with the respective additional parameters that need to be 
established. As Hsu et al. (2003) suggest, several grids with 𝐶𝐶, 𝛾𝛾 and 𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼 are tabulated to 
find suitable combinations of the parameters.  
Table 12 presents the results of the parameter optimization process. This study does not 
undertake optimization through additional iterations in optimal areas of the grid with smaller 
steps of parameter values. The results in Table 12 suggest that a polynomial kernel function 
of degree two is best suited for both feature vectors containing qualitative features. The 
results hold for the realistic and matched sampling approach, with greater values for 𝐶𝐶. For 
the quantitative feature vector, a high-complexity radial basis function (high values of 𝐶𝐶 and 
𝛾𝛾) scores the best results. 
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Matched sampling 
Quantitative feature vector Qualitative feature vector Combined feature vector 
            Polynomial kernel function             
    n     n     n 
    1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4 
C 
-1 0.555 0.564 0.545 0.524 
C 
-1 0.847 0.780 0.602 0.500 
C 
-1 0.845 0.784 0.572 0.500 
0 0.555 0.564 0.545 0.519 0 0.847 0.780 0.602 0.500 0 0.845 0.784 0.572 0.500 
5 0.556 0.594 0.557 0.590 5 0.786 0.862 0.745 0.528 5 0.792 0.859 0.692 0.511 
10 0.556 0.548 0.557 0.590 10 0.786 0.862 0.745 0.528 10 0.792 0.859 0.692 0.511 
            Dot kernel function             
C 
-1 0.556       
C 
-1 0.858       
C 
-1 0.861       
0 0.556       0 0.858       0 0.861       
5 0.554       5 0.787       5 0.797       
10 0.553       10 0.787       10 0.797       
            Radial kernel function             
    γ     γ     γ 
    0 0.5 2 4     0 0.5 2 4     0 0.5 2 4 
C 
-1 0.500 0.689 0.689 0.689 
C 
-1 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 
C 
-1 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 
0 0.702 0.703 0.712 0.712 0 0.581 0.581 0.581 0.594 0 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 
5 0.712 0.711 0.711 0.706 5 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.605 5 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 
10 0.706 0.706 0.708 0.708 10 0.602 0.602 0.602 0.605 10 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.502 
Realistic sampling 
Quantitative feature vector Qualitative feature vector Combined feature vector 
            Polynomial kernel function             
    n     n     n 
    1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4 
C 
-1 0.588 0.598 0.635 0.632 
C 
-1 0.700 0.824 0.573 0.500 
C 
-1 0.776 0.829 0.607 0.500 
0 0.588 0.598 0.635 0.632 0 0.700 0.824 0.573 0.500 0 0.776 0.829 0.607 0.500 
5 0.540 0.606 0.643 0.680 5 0.727 0.859 0.619 0.500 5 0.745 0.829 0.625 0.500 
10 0.511 0.600 0.643 0.680 10 0.726 0.873 0.619 0.500 10 0.748 0.829 0.625 0.500 
            Dot kernel function             
C 
-1 0.632       
C 
-1 0.750       
C 
-1 0.775       
0 0.632       0 0.750       0 0.775       
5 0.540       5 0.656       5 0.696       
10 0.539       10 0.656       10 0.696       
            Radial kernel function             
    γ     γ     γ 
    0 0.5 2 4     0 0.5 2 4     0 0.5 2 4 
C 
-1 0.500 0.650 0.722 0.735 
C 
-1 0.498 0.798 0.802 0.709 
C 
-1 0.500 0.509 0.504 0.501 
0 0.500 0.650 0.722 0.735 0 0.500 0.804 0.802 0.712 0 0.500 0.509 0.504 0.501 
5 0.500 0.695 0.725 0.734 5 0.500 0.804 0.802 0.702 5 0.500 0.510 0.504 0.502 
10 0.500 0.700 0.720 0.733 10 0.500 0.863 0.802 0.702 10 0.500 0.510 0.504 0.502 
The table reports AUC values of parameter combinations for different feature vectors and sampling approaches. The 
parameter setup has been carried out on a random, unused dataset via stratified 5-fold cross-validation (mean AUC values are 
reported). Darker grey areas indicate better detection performance. n: polynomial degree; C: penalty value; γ: flexibility 
parameter for radial kernel function. 
Table 12 – SVM parameter optimization  
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5 Results 
The results are presented next, structured in accordance with the research goal outlined in 
section 3.3 and the related design and enhancing questions. Having presented the results 
covering the eight design and three enhancing questions, these will be compared with similar 
studies. 
5.1 Results for Design Questions 
The design questions cover tasks related to the setup of the fraud detection model. They help 
to understand how fraud can be captured best using the available data from annual reports 
and examine the performance of the final model in several dimensions like feature vector 
performance, sampling design implications, and classifier performance. 
5.1.1 Size of the Qualitative Feature Vector 
The results presented hereafter are organized in accordance with the design and enhancing 
questions in Figure 10. In the first step, the feature vector size is examined. Thus, this study 
tests the detection performance of different-sized qualitative features vectors to shed light 
on the influence of the number of clues from textual parts on the detection results. 
Presumably, larger vectors, which capture more clues based on the textual information, score 
better detection results (Cecchini et al., 2010a, p. 172). This is not only true for fraud 
detection but for pattern recognition in general (Zurada, 1992, pp. 13–17). From the 
perspective of crime detection theory, capturing a typically weak signal is difficult and 
requires a detector that can rely on numerous clues while being able to distinguish between 
signal and noise.160 Therefore, the tendency can turn at some point, where adding additional 
features might actually reduce performance because the decisiveness of the vector is blurred 
by the sheer number of different clues, although it is hardly possible to determine at which 
point or even whether the effect will occur in the scope of this study’s analysis. Accordingly, 
H1 was formulated as follows: larger qualitative feature vectors result in better detection 
performance. 
The general procedure starts at the end of the feature extraction process, as described in 
section 4.1 and Figure 11. All possible n-grams of the fraudulent and non-fraudulent reports 
                                                 
160  See section 2.4.1 for additional information on crime signal detection theory. 
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are generated from the observations of the training set (the procedure is carried out for every 
training set). To determine the size of the qualitative feature vector, which translates to the 
number of textual clues, an assessment of different vector sizes needs to be performed. 
Therefore, the discriminatory power of each of the qualitative features (each 5-gram) has to 
be assessed and the features ranked by their individual discriminatory power. In this study, 
the information gain ratio is used as the measurement of discriminatory power. The 
information gain ratio assigns a value to each feature that represents the feature’s ability to 
reduce the level of entropy in the classification setting, with higher values representing better 
discriminatory power (e.g. Lee & Lee, 2006, p. 158; Goel et al., 2010, p. 33). The concept 
of information gain (IG) or its derivative, the information gain ratio (IGR), has found its way 
into the fraud detection literature and is used for feature selection purposes, among others 
(e.g. Cecchini et al., 2010a; Abbasi et al., 2012; Purda & Skillicorn, 2015).The number of 
features used in the detection models of similar studies varies considerably, such as 200 for 
Purda and Skillicorn (2015) and 10-1,200 for Cecchini et al. (2010a). Similarly to Cecchini 
et al. (2010a), this study tests the results for different amounts of features to determine the 
optimal vector size from a feature perspective, as a dynamic design with less static elements 
is preferable. The IGR is calculated for each feature of the training set, ranking the features 
from highest to lowest IGR. 
The information gain for a single feature 𝜏𝜏 on a set of observations (data set) 𝑆𝑆 is a 
measurement of the reduction of entropy, which is an indicator of impurity or disorder 
(Quinlan, 1986, p. 90). 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆) − 𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏) (34) 
The binary classification problem is characterized by fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
observations, with 𝑝𝑝0 as the portion of non-fraudulent observations and 𝑝𝑝1 as the portion of 
fraudulent cases. Entropy is calculated for the whole subset of observations as follows: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆) = −𝑝𝑝0 log2 𝑝𝑝0 − 𝑝𝑝1 log2 𝑝𝑝1 (35) 
To assess performance on a feature level, the weighted average across the groups 𝑖𝑖 needs 
to be calculated for each feature (𝜏𝜏). 
𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏) = �
|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖|
|𝑆𝑆|
∗ 𝐸𝐸(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
 (36) 
The basic concept of information gain is biased towards features that can take a lot of 
different values, which can be fixed using the information gain ratio instead (Quinlan, 1986, 
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pp. 101–102). In the extreme case, a feature has a different value for each observation. The 
information gain ratio is calculated by dividing the intrinsic information (IntI) from the 
information gain. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏) =
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏)
 (37) 
The intrinsic information 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 deals with the size of the subsets 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 that are created from 
splitting the data set 𝑆𝑆 according to the values of a feature 𝑎𝑎. 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑆𝑆, 𝜏𝜏) = −�
|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖|
|𝑆𝑆|
𝑖𝑖
log2 �
|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖|
|𝑆𝑆|
� (38) 
In the next step, the feature vectors are created, starting with the top 100 and increasing 
the vector size in increments of 100 features. To test the influence of different vector sizes 
in line with the general research design of detecting cases from an unknown future, a random 
data set covering a 10-year timeframe is generated, divided in training and holdout sets. To 
avoid overfitting onto a fixed holdout set, five random subsets are drawn from the holdout 
set to assess the average performance. During the random sampling process, the class 
distribution is kept in line with the initial holdout set. The classifier applied here was an 
SVM.161 The results are reported in Table 13 and indicate an upward trend, as expected when 
increasing the vector size. However, the trend seems to diminish and ultimately stop. For the 
matched sampling approach, the initial performance and the following increase is greater 
than for the realistic sampling approach. The results support H1 and are in line with the 
limited evidence of previous studies. 
 Number of features 
  100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 
m 0.653 0.688 0.721 0.735 0.750 0.753 0.760 0.764 0.770 0.770 
r 0.757 0.768 0.768 0.767 0.782 0.784 0.790 0.792 0.793 0.792 
The table reports AUC values for different sized qualitative feature vectors. m: matched sampling 
approach, r: realistic sampling approach. 
Table 13 – Detection results for different-sized qualitative feature vectors 
Cecchini et al. (2010a) have reported detection results for 11 different-sized vectors in a 
matched sampling setting (10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500 and 1,200 features). 
Their results generally suggest that larger vectors are better suited to detecting anomalies, 
                                                 
161 The parameter combinations of the machine learning techniques are assessed using a 5-fold cross-validation 
on a separate data set. This is done for all classifiers in accordance with the discussions in sections 4.2.7-
4.2.9. Based on the hyperparameter optimization, SVMs are utilized as a classifier with good runtime and 
detection performance. A detailed test of the classifier is carried out in section 5.1.8. 
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with a vector comprising 500 features from narratives scoring the best results in the fraud 
detection context and the biggest vector scoring the best results in the bankruptcy detection 
context. A similar saturation effect is found in this study. For the following parts of the 
investigation, the qualitative feature vectors rely on the aforementioned results and comprise 
1,000 features each, both for the realistic and matched sampling approach. 
5.1.2 Intertemporal Stability of Qualitative Features 
The following section examines the intertemporal stability of the qualitative features, before 
assessing the influence of time gaps on the detection results. The training sets represent the 
known universe of cases, which are used to extract the qualitative features and train the 
detection models. The holdout sets are constituted of observations from subsequent years 
and therefore contain unknown observations, which lie in an artificial future. The starting 
point of the analysis is the initial sample illustrated in Figure 25, which captures five rolling 
subsamples (i1-i5), each made up of an eight-year subset for feature extraction and model 
training. The detection models are tested on independent holdout sets from the subsequent 
three years of each training set. 
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The basic feature generation process, presented in steps 2 and 3 of Figure 11, results in 
five qualitative feature vectors based on the narratives of the underlying annual reports for 
each training timeframe of the subsample i1-i5. Based on the previous results, the qualitative 
feature vectors comprise the 1,000 5-grams with the highest discriminatory power. To assess 
the intertemporal stability of the vectors, their composition across all five training sets is 
compared. Therefore, the 1,000 qualitative features of each subsample are compared to each 
other. Only exact matches, which concern the entire string, are regarded as consensus. The 
procedure is carried out both for the realistic and the matched sampling approach, as the 
feature extraction is conducted separately for both sampling designs due to differences in 
sample generation and the intention to control for size and industry effects. Each training set 
overlaps with the following set in six years and with the one after that in five years and so 
forth. 
Subsamples i2 i3 i4 i5 
i1 18%/10% 31%/16% 42%/22% 54%/29% 
i2   21%/9% 33%/17% 46%/23% 
i3    21%/10% 36%/18% 
i4       24%/10% 
          
Time difference 2 years 4 years 6 years 8 years 
Percentage of new features in the feature vectors extracted from the training sets for the 
matched/realistic approach. 
i1: 1996-2003 i3:1998-2005 i5: 2000-2007   
i2: 1997-2004 i4: 1999-2006    
Figure 26 – Intertemporal stability of qualitative features 
Figure 26 documents the changes in the composition of the qualitative feature vectors and 
is reinforced by the results of Brown et al. (2018), who have suggested comparable changes 
in the topics discussed in annual reports over a similar timeframe.162 The results reveal a 
significant difference between realistic probability sampling and the pair-matched sampling 
approach, with the latter denoting that a greater portion of features changes for every 
subsample and time gap. For the largest time gap between the vectors of i1 and i5, more than 
                                                 
162 The changes are even bigger when reducing the sample length, as can be seen in Figure 32 for the final 
sampling approach. 
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50% of the features are replaced, whereas in the realistic probability approach, less than 30% 
change from the same time gap. When exploring the magnitude of the changes from year to 
year, the one-year gap indicates the biggest change. The differences might be explained by 
the underlying sampling procedures: whereas the realistic sampling approach relies on every 
available report and therefore results in a greater variety of companies, pair-matching is 
carried out by identifying similar companies in terms of size and industry. This results in the 
absence of size- and industry-related predictors, which have already been identified as strong 
and consistent predictors regardless of the timeframe. Overall, these results support H2 and 
the assumption that predictors from the narratives change considerably over time. 
5.1.3 Detection Results with Time Gaps 
Having demonstrated the changes to the feature vectors over time, the influence on the 
detection results is tested. Therefore, the detection performance for all possible time gaps 
between the trained models and future holdout sets is assessed. According to H3 and based 
on the findings from the previous section, time gaps should cause a loss in detection quality 
due to the intertemporal instability of qualitative features. The test is carried out on the initial 
subsamples i1-i5. All possible time gaps between training sets and holdout sets are taken 
into consideration. The time gaps range from one to four years.163 Figure 27 reports the 
respective AUC values. 
          Holdout 
Training 2004-2006 (i1) 2005-2007 (i2) 2006-2008 (i3) 2007-2009 (i4) 2008-2010 (i5) 
1996-2003 (i1) 0.861 0.697 0.656 0.623 0.581 
1997-2004 (i2)  0.807 0.710 0.643 0.529 
1998-2005 (i3)   0.750 0.627 0.591 
1999-2006 (i4)       0.746 0.598 
            
Time gaps No time gap  1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
AUC values for detection performance with time gaps between training and holdout sets. 
Figure 27 – Detection results with time gaps 
                                                 
163  The classifier was an SVM. 
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The results indicate a considerable drop in the AUC values for the one-year gap for all 
models. Afterwards, detection performance becomes more stable, with smaller declines in 
the AUC for the following gaps. To better understand the initial drop in the first year, the 
trend in Figure 25 should be mentioned, where the biggest change in the composition of the 
feature vectors can be found for the first year gap, regardless of the starting point 
(subsample). This initial drop hints at the relevance of qualitative features capturing time-
dependent textual patterns, as bigger time gaps result in comparatively smaller drops in 
predictive power. The results reveal the importance of the topicality and actuality of features 
when constructing detection models, which rely on bag-of-words and support H3. 
5.1.4 Model Size Implications 
With the aforementioned results in mind, in the next step an understanding of the influence 
of sample sizes for model building (especially with regard to training and holdout set sizes) 
on the detection results as mentioned in design question 4 will be examined. Given that the 
detection models of all studies presented so far encompass a rather arbitrarily chosen number 
of years for training and detection purposes, this study seeks to shed light on the 
consequences of changes to the sampling design on the results. The basic assumptions are 
again related to changes to the narratives over time and the indications that were received 
via the prior results. Larger training sets would cover more years with more cases from which 
the detection models are trained. However, larger training sizes may not per se yield better 
detection quality. As they grow in length, the time difference between early cases of the 
training set and later cases of the holdout set cover a significant time span. For example, the 
training of a detection model with data from 10-year-old cases might lead to suboptimal 
results due to changes in predictor characteristics. Combined with the abovementioned 
changes to the narratives in general and the assumption that fraud is a less generalizable 
concept and is constantly changing, this may become a problem when relevant predictors 
are replaced over time or when the characteristics of fraudulent/non-fraudulent observations 
change. It may furthermore be suggested that under a fixed vector size, which for most 
studies is the typical research design approach, the number of features per clue decreases, 
resulting in a suboptimal representation. Moreover, in a real-world application, testing the 
annual reports of the current year would translate into a design where the detection 
performance of the models developed is tested on a one-year holdout set comprising the 
observations from the subsequent period. Keeping the aforementioned discussion and the 
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explorative nature of the question in mind, making an assumption about the outcome is rather 
difficult. 
The analysis consists of two parts in which the sizes of the training and the holdout sets 
are altered separately. In the first step, the size of the training set is reduced from the initial 
eight years in one-year intervals to three years. In the next step, the size of the previously 
determined training length is fixed and the holdout set is altered from the initial three years 
to a one-year length. The procedure can be seen in Figure 28. To avoid overfitting onto the 
holdout set, we draw five random subsets for each iteration and report the average AUC 
values. During the random sampling process, the class distribution is kept in line with the 
initial holdout set. Figure 28 presents the underlying subsamples for the examination of 
design question 4. To ensure a comprehensive insight, the test is conducted across all feature 
vectors for both sampling approaches.164 
 
                                                 
164  Like for the previous tests, the classifier was an SVM. 
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The results depicted in Table 14 reveal consistent detection quality measured by the AUC 
regardless of the length of the training set. The results appear to be robust for the different 
feature vectors and for both sampling approaches. 
   Subsample Length Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Mean 
Realistic 
vt1 8 0.831 0.656 0.861 0.783 
vt2 7 0.823 0.656 0.852 0.777 
vt3 6 0.826 0.655 0.853 0.778 
vt4 5 0.820 0.654 0.849 0.774 
vt5 4 0.818 0.655 0.844 0.772 
vt6 3 0.838 0.651 0.868 0.786 
Matched 
vt1 8 0.740 0.617 0.768 0.708 
vt2 7 0.743 0.617 0.770 0.710 
vt3 6 0.737 0.625 0.787 0.716 
vt4 5 0.742 0.621 0.761 0.708 
vt5 4 0.776 0.643 0.842 0.754 
vt6 3 0.786 0.602 0.799 0.729 
  Mean   0.790 0.638 0.821   
The table reports AUC values for varying subset sizes of the training set. 
Table 14 – Detection results for varying training lengths 
However, when decreasing the size and therefore the number of years of the holdout set 
in the second step, detection performance increases. This holds for both the realistic and the 
matched sampling approach, as indicated in Table 15. When comparing the different feature 
vectors, those with qualitative features show a considerable increase in the AUC, whereas 
the quantitative feature vector in the matched sampling approach hardly changes. The only 
decrease in detection performance is found for the quantitative feature vector under the 
realistic sampling approach. The mean AUC values across the three feature vectors reveal 
an upward trend, regardless of the one declining anomaly, which sets the final sampling 
approach for answering the remaining design questions at a training set length of three years 
and a holdout set length of one year. Regarding real-world applicability, a one-year holdout 
set represents the cases of the current year that need to be tested and hence offers greater 
insights for practitioners.  
The tests for this design question are carried out for one point in time, meaning that the 
artificial future always starts with the year 2004. Therefore, the results are not controlled for 
time-dependent changes that might occur when choosing a different timeframe. Testing at 
different points in time can reveal disparate implications for the model set-up. However, the 
 
172 
 
examination offers some sort of rationale to determine the subsample sizes, without the 
rather arbitrary decisions of previous studies and with the 3/1 split (three years of training, 
one year of testing), representing a design that captures the practical relatability and 
understandability. 
  Subsample Length Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Mean 
Realistic 
vt6 3 0.838 0.651 0.868 0.786 
vh1 2 0.888 0.597 0.891 0.792 
vh2 1 0.901 0.597 0.907 0.802 
Matched 
vt6 3 0.786 0.602 0.799 0.729 
vh1 2 0.782 0.590 0.796 0.723 
vh2 1 0.842 0.589 0.847 0.760 
  Mean   0.840 0.604 0.851  
The table reports AUC values for varying lengths of the holdout set. 
Table 15 – Detection results for varying holdout lengths 
5.1.5 Detection Results over Time 
The final detection approach, which builds upon the previous findings and the outcomes of 
design questions 1 to 4 along with their respective hypotheses, will be discussed in the 
following sections. Figure 29 presents the rolling subsamples over the timeframe from 1996 
until 2010 that result from design question 4. Each of the 12 subsamples consists of a three-
year-long subset, representing the timeframe in which the qualitative and quantitative 
features are extracted and the models are trained. The subsequent year of each training set is 
used as a holdout set for detection purposes. The number of observations in each subset f1 
to f2 varies considerably, especially regarding the number of fraudulent cases, which 
additionally influences the relative frequency of occurrence of fraud in each subset. In the 
holdout sets, the relative frequency ranges between around 0.4% (22 fraudulent 
observations) and 1.8% (111 fraudulent observations). 
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A small number of positives (actual fraudulent observations) may negatively influence 
the expressiveness of the AUC, which depicts the ratios of true positive rates and false 
positives rates over the discriminatory thresholds (Hanczar et al., 2010, p. 829). Smaller 
absolute and relative frequencies of occurrence of one group may lead to larger steps per 
TPR/FPR ratio, distorting the overall AUC. However, as the sampling represents the closest 
approximation of the true population of fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations and the 
feature vectors and classifiers are compared on common ground, this problem should hardly 
affect the overall conclusiveness of the results. 
Figures 30 and 31 depict the highest AUC values for each of the subsamples f1-f12 across 
all feature vectors and classifiers for the matched and realistic sampling approaches. An 
AUC of 0.5 represents the detection performance of a random classifier, indicating that every 
feature vector is able to perform above the minimum margin across all subsamples. So far, 
the detection results of previous studies seem to be rather static and commonly have only 
been tested for certain selected points in time. However, given that this study strives to build 
a reliable and robust detection model capable of detecting fraudulent cases at any given time, 
the results are tested on the 12 different subsamples over the rolling 15-year timeframe and 
for both sampling approaches. 
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Subsample Training Holdout Subsample Training Holdout 
f1 1996–1998 1999 f7 2002–2004 2005 
f2 1997–1999 2000 f8 2003–2005 2006 
f3 1998–2000 2001 f9 2004–2006 2007 
f4 1999–2001 2002 f10 2005–2007 2008 
f5 2000–2002 2003 f11 2006–2008 2009 
f6 2001–2003 2004 f12 2007–2009 2010 
The training includes the model generation process with individual feature extraction and 
model training. The holdout set comprises unknown observations from the subsequent period. 
Figure 30 – Results for pair-matched sampling approach 
The results reveal a consistent detection quality for all feature vectors across the matched 
and realistic sampling approaches. Throughout the analysis, the results for both sampling 
approaches share a similar trend, with the best performances being achieved on the holdout 
sets during the middle of the timeframe, while earlier and later years are seemingly more 
difficult for the models. Assuming that an AUC of 0.8 represents very good detection 
performance, the qualitative and combined feature vector score an average AUC of above 
0.81 (stdev. 0.05) in the matched sampling approach, while the quantitative feature vector 
reaches only an average value of about 0.68 (stdev. 0.04) across the entire timeframe. 
0,3
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0,7
0,8
0,9
1
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Subsample Training Holdout Subsample Training Holdout 
f1 1996–1998 1999 f7 2002–2004 2005 
f2 1997–1999 2000 f8 2003–2005 2006 
f3 1998–2000 2001 f9 2004–2006 2007 
f4 1999–2001 2002 f10 2005–2007 2008 
f5 2000–2002 2003 f11 2006–2008 2009 
f6 2001–2003 2004 f12 2007–2009 2010 
The training includes the model generation process with individual feature extraction and 
model training. The holdout set comprises unknown observations from the subsequent period. 
Figure 31 – Results for the realistic sampling approach 
For the realistic sampling approach, a similar result can be observed. Both the qualitative 
and combined feature vectors score average AUC values of above 0.83 (stdev. 0.06), 
representing a very good detection performance. The quantitative vector also scores good 
results and an average AUC of 0.72 (stdev. 0.06). 
Overall, the results indicate that the models are able to score very good detection 
performances across the overall timeframe and at no point in time drop under an 
unreasonable margin. The drop in detection performance resulting from time gaps between 
feature extraction, model training, and fraud detection (as discussed in design question 3) 
can be mitigated through the use of a design that includes regular model updates. The 
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aforementioned trend in detection performance may be seen as a regular variation due to 
different cases, rather than as a potential deteriorating performance for later periods. 
5.1.6 Feature Vector Performance 
The previous section has presented the baseline outcome of the different feature vectors for 
the entire timeframe and for the matched and realistic sampling approaches. This section 
will examine and highlight individual performance on a less aggregated level. Thus, 
hypotheses H4a and H4b regarding the feature vector performance are tested. Paired t-tests 
are conducted to compare the detection outcomes based on the 12 subsamples and the 
classifiers utilized (e.g. Abbasi et al., 2012, p. 1311 for the comparison of different feature 
sets or p. 1313 for different classifier peculiarities). 
First, the performance of the quantitative feature vector is compared to those 
incorporating qualitative features in order to test hypothesis H4a. Quantitative features are 
assumed to be less suitable for detecting financial statement fraud. Empirical evidence from 
other studies has already hinted at their baseline poor detection performance relative to 
approaches that exploit other data types (e.g. Dong et al., 2016). Previous results have 
implied the potential confirmation of this hypothesis, albeit under a limited test bed (e.g. 
Figure 30, average AUC for quant. 0.781, qual. 0.832, qual. & quant. 0.839). Table 16 reports 
the p-values from paired t-tests for the entire set of results (n=48; 4 classifiers, 12 
subsamples). 165 
Realistic 
 Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> <0.001 
Qual.> <0.001 
Matched 
 Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> <0.001 
Qual.> <0.001 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results of 
the quantitative feature vector to the qual. and 
qual. & quant. feature vectors 
Table 16 – Results of t-tests for quantitative feature vectors 
                                                 
165  The p-values are one-tailed for evaluating the alternate hypothesis of better performance of feature vectors 
constructed from qualitative features. The “>” sign indicates the respective direction. A similar notation 
will be chosen in the reporting of the results in subsequent sections. 
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The results support hypothesis H4a and show significantly better detection performance 
for the feature vectors that rely on extracted patterns from the narratives. The results also 
hold when comparing detection outcomes on the level of individual classifiers, as can be 
seen in Table 17. 
Realistic Matched 
SVM SVM 
 Quant.   Quant. 
Qual.> <0.001 Qual.> <0.001 
Qual. & quant.> <0.001 Qual. & quant.> <0.001 
ANN ANN 
 Quant.   Quant. 
Qual.> 0.003 Qual.> <0.001 
Qual. & quant.> <0.001 Qual. & quant.> <0.001 
KNN KNN 
 Quant.   Quant. 
Qual.> <0.001 Qual.> <0.001 
Qual. & quant.> 0.089 Qual. & quant.> 0.039 
NB NB 
 Quant.   Quant. 
Qual.> 0.020 Qual.> 0.011 
Qual. & quant.> <0.001 Qual. & quant.> 0.001 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing detailed results of the quantitative 
feature vector to the qual. and qual. & quant. feature vectors for 
individual classifier 
Table 17 – Results of t-tests for quantitative feature vectors per classifier 
The p-values in Table 17 report significantly better detection performance for the text-
based feature vectors on the 10% level for every possible combination and for both sampling 
approaches. 
In the next step, hypothesis H4b, which is concerned with detection performance 
improvements with a combination of qualitative and quantitative features, is tackled. Table 
18 reports the p-values of two-sided t-tests (n=12), comparing the results of the combined 
feature vector (qual. & quant.) to those scored by the baseline feature vectors constructed 
from only one data type for each individual classifier across the 12 subsamples. 
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Realistic Matched 
SVM SVM 
 Qual. Quant.   Qual. Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> 0.010 <0.001 Qual. & quant.> 0.297 <0.001 
ANN ANN 
 Qual. Quant.   Qual. Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> 0.018 <0.001 Qual. & quant.> 0.027 <0.001 
KNN KNN 
 Qual. Quant.   Qual. Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> 1.000 0.089 Qual. & quant.> 0.998 0.039 
NB NB 
 Qual. Quant.   Qual. Quant. 
Qual. & quant.> 0.793 <0.001 Qual. & quant.> 0.953 0.001 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results of combined feature vectors to the baseline 
feature vectors for individual classifier 
Table 18 – Results of t-tests for combined feature vectors 
On average, for the previously reported results, the combined feature vector scores an 
AUC of 0.839, which is slightly better than the qualitative vector (AUC of 0.832) and 
considerably better than the quantitative vector (AUC of 0.718) (see Figures 30 and 31 for a 
similar result using the matched sampling approach). Moreover, the combined feature vector 
scores the highest result for the subsample ranging from 2002 until 2005, with an AUC of 
0.939. However, the comparison between the combined feature vector and the baseline 
vectors on the level of the individual classifier depicts rather mixed results. Despite the fact 
that the combined vector scores superior results against the quantitative vector of the 
matched and the realistic sampling approaches (10% level), the results of the qualitative 
feature vector are less conclusive. For the more sophisticated classifier like SVMs and 
ANNs, the combined vector scores significantly better results across the 12 subsamples than 
for KNN or NB. Especially for the realistic probability of fraud sampling, which is closest 
to a real-world application, the combined feature vector seems to be slightly superior. Due 
to the mixed results, hypothesis H4b cannot be confirmed in its entirety but rather with a 
constraint regarding the classifier choice and the sampling approach. 
The rather small jump in additional detection performance after the combination of both 
data types may be explained by the relative individual discriminatory power of the 
quantitative features in the combined feature vector, which will be highlighted further in 
section 5.2.1. 
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5.1.7 Matched and Realistic Sampling 
In this section, the results of the matched and realistic sampling approaches are discussed. 
In contrast to the majority of previous research, this study has relied on both sampling 
approaches to produce robust and comparable evidence regarding the effectiveness of fraud 
detection models. In terms of hypothesis H5, the results should be lower under pair-
matching, due to limitations regarding industry- and size-related predictors and the overall 
more complicated setting related to the less decisive characteristics of the observations. 
Despite these constraints, a sound detection model should still be able to distinguish reliably 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations over the respective timeframe. 
Therefore, the additional sampling approach also serves the purpose of testing robustness to 
a certain extent. The difference is tested using paired t-tests. 
 SVMs 
 Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
Realistic> 0.078 0.132 0.061 
 ANN 
 Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
Realistic> 0.894 0.007 0.691 
  KNN 
 Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
Realistic> 0.085 <0.001 <0.001 
 NB 
 Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
Realistic> 0.026 0.004 0.002 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results of the realistic sampling 
approach to the matched sampling approach across feature vectors and 
classifier 
Table 19 – Results of t-tests for matched and realistic sampling approaches 
The detection performance across all feature vectors and classifiers (n=144: 12 
subsamples, three feature vector, four classifiers) is significantly better (p<0.001) for the 
realistic sampling approach compared to the matched sampling approach. Table 19 presents 
the p-values resulting from t-tests comparing isolated feature vector and classifier results 
between the matched and realistic sampling approaches (n=12). In nine out of 12 cases, the 
results in the realistic sampling context are significantly (10% level) better. With regard to 
the results in 5.1.5 and the detection performance over time, the realistic feature vector 
achieves significantly better results for each of the three feature vectors at the 10% level for 
the highest single-scoring outcomes, overall confirming hypothesis 5. 
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Besides the expected inferior outcome, the matched sampling approach on average results 
in a 5% drop in detection performance. For a potent classifier like an SVM, this drop does 
not reduce the results under an AUC of 0.8, which still depicts very good detection 
performance. A similar trend can be postulated for the other classifiers as well, indicating 
that the detection performance holds for the matched sampling approach, albeit leading to 
the expected small but significant decline. 
The results are assumed to be in line with findings from the literature, although evidence 
is scarce and hardly comparable. Purda and Skillicorn (2015) have conducted pair-matching 
besides a rather realistic sampling (less strictly balanced) approach and have reported AUC 
values for both, based on a logit model, which was used to estimate the coefficients of 
independent variables capturing different textual peculiarities. Similarly to this study, 
detection performance under pair-matching was lower, indicating difficulties in 
distinguishing between fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations in an artificial setting. 
5.1.8 Classifier Performance 
So far, each of the four distinct classifiers has been used to detect fraudulent observations in 
the matched and realistic sampling approaches for each of the 12 rolling subsamples 
covering the 15-year timeframe. This section will highlight the performance of the individual 
classifiers in the context of three different feature vectors in order to determine which is best 
suited for each task. The classifiers represent different levels of complexity and 
computational effort. It is the goal of this study to develop an effective fraud detection 
approach that can attain reliable and robust results and that can be run (including training, 
validation and testing) in reasonable time on contemporary and universal hardware.166 
According to hypothesis H6a, more sophisticated classifiers like ANNs and SVMs should 
generally score better results than KNN and NB. Moreover, H6b postulates that differences 
regarding the performance of each classifier for individual feature vectors due to underlying 
data peculiarities can be assumed. Table 20 presents the detection performance measured by 
the AUC for each classifier in the realistic and matched sampling approaches and for every 
feature vector. The results depict the average detection performance across the 12 
subsamples. 
                                                 
166 The major part of the analysis has been run on an Intel i5-4210m @ 2.6 GHz with 8 GB DDR3 RAM and 
an Intel Xeon Silver 4116 @ 2.1 GHz with 100GB DDR3 RAM. No GPU-centered architecture has been 
utilized. 
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Sampling Classifier Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Mean 
Realistic 
SVN 0.826 0.680 0.834 0.780 
ANN 0.759 0.651 0.781 0.731 
KNN 0.792 0.705 0.717 0.738 
NB 0.676 0.632 0.663 0.657 
Matched 
SVM 0.802 0.653 0.805 0.753 
ANN 0.785 0.565 0.792 0.714 
KNN 0.749 0.640 0.660 0.683 
NB 0.636 0.561 0.591 0.596 
The table reports average AUC values for each classifier across all feature vectors. 
Table 20 – Average AUC values for classifier and feature vectors 
Based on Table 20, support vector machines score the best results, followed by artificial 
neural networks and k-nearest neighbour. Naïve Bayes seems to be less potent in the fraud 
detection setting of this study, although it is still more capable of distinguishing between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations than a random classifier (AUC=0.5). To further 
clarify the outcome, paired t-tests were conducted to compare the performance of the 
different classifiers against one another. Table 21 presents the p-values for paired t-tests for 
the entire non-aggregated results (n=36; 12 subsamples, three feature vectors). 
Realistic 
 ANN KNN NB 
SVM> <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 KNN NB  
ANN> 0.684 <0.001  
 NB   
KNN> <0.001     
Matched 
 ANN KNN NB 
SVM> <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 KNN NB  
ANN> 0.043 <0.001  
 NB   
KNN> <0.001   
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results of the realistic sampling 
approach to the matched sampling approach for different classifiers 
Table 21 – Results of t-tests for all feature vectors per classifier 
In addition to confirming the superior performance of SVMs and the inferior performance 
of NB, KNN and ANNs are found to occupy the middle ground. For the pair-matched 
sampling, KNN and ANNs score very similar results, while ANNs are slightly ahead in the 
case of the matched sampling approach. With regard to the superior performance of SVMs 
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and the case that ANNs are on par with KNN in the realistic approach but potentially ahead 
(5% significance level) in terms of matched sampling, H6a can be partially confirmed. 
However, the results vary when only highlighting particularly isolated feature vectors. 
Although SVMs outperform every other classifier in the matched sampling approach and for 
feature vectors incorporating qualitative features in the realistic sampling approach, they are 
not superior to KNN when only quantitative features are used. Table 22 presents the p-values 
to compare KNN against the remaining classifiers for the quantitative feature vector. 
 SVM ANN NB 
KNN> 0.014 0.018 0.001 
p-values for paired t-tests comparing results of the KNN 
classifier to the remaining classifiers for the quantitative 
feature vector 
Table 22 – Results of t-tests for quantitative feature vectors and KNN 
Clearly, KNN performs significantly better here (5% significance level). Thus, when 
restricted to quantitative data, KNN in a realistic probability of fraud environment may 
outperform more sophisticated classifiers like SVMs or ANNs. Regarding hypothesis H6b, 
the results reveal that SVMs score best for scenarios in which textual information is utilized 
for fraud detection purposes, whereas financial metrics are seemingly better under KNN, 
supporting the hypothesis of classifier dependent feature vector performance. Overall, when 
seeking to compare the results of this section to similar studies, a certain degree of overlap 
regarding the relative performance of SVMs, ANNs and NB can be found with Abbasi et al. 
(2012). Indeed, these authors have found varying performances of classifiers across different 
feature vectors compositions, with different types of support vector machines achieving 
relatively good results in each of them. 
As a side note, the two more sophisticated approaches using the support vector machines 
and the artificial neural networks represent state-of-the-art approaches in the machine 
learning domain. Under the prerequisites of reasonable training, validation and testing effort 
on current hardware, the artificial neural network may underperform and not reach its full 
potential. This may additionally be influenced by the limited hyperparameter optimization 
procedure. The artificial neural network cannot reach the detection performance of the 
SVMs, although it nearly reaches very good results (average AUCs above 0.8). Despite 
having the highest detection performance, SVMs are also comparably fast, meaning that they 
should be the go-to approach based on this study’s results. This may also account for the 
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extensive use of SVMs in the fraud detection literature, especially when qualitative features 
are incorporated. 
5.2 Results for Enhancing Questions 
The enhancing questions comprise of tasks to improve the results further and increase 
comprehensibility. However, before discussing the related outcomes, the section starts with 
an evaluation of the qualitative and quantitative features, which helps to understand the 
previous results and opens the possibility to relate the models to comparable studies. 
5.2.1 Characteristics of Feature Vectors 
Before diving into enhancing questions 1-3, it may be helpful to examine the qualitative 
features across the final subsample (f1-f12) in greater detail. Firstly to back up the findings 
of the intertemporal stability of qualitative features discussed in design question 2 and 
secondly to shed additional light on the characteristics of the extracted patterns based on 5-
grams, the foundation of the previous results. Therefore, the changes in qualitative feature 
vector composition will be examined and the reoccurring features identified, before 
exploring the distribution of IGR values that represent the discriminatory power of 
individual features over time. The sampling approaches, in this regard the relative 
performance of quantitative features, will also be discussed. Finally, the qualitative feature 
vectors of this study will be compared to those from other studies, analyzing similarities and 
differences in the extracted patterns from the textual parts of corporate disclosure. 
To support the previous findings, the composition (5-grams) of the qualitative feature 
vectors of different subsamples is compared. The time gaps range from single years to a 
maximum of 11 years when comparing the qualitative features of the first and last vectors 
from the respective subsamples. As already explained, the feature vectors are always 
constructed from training sets, capturing a timeframe of three years and consisting of 1,000 
qualitative features. Figure 32 presents the percentage of new features in the vectors of the 
subsamples. 
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Figure 32 – Temporal stability of features for final sample 
The results confirm the previous findings and present similar differences between the 
realistic probability and pair-matched sampling approaches, with the latter revealing a 
greater proportion of features that change for every subsample and time gap. However, the 
extent to which the features change is significantly larger here than compared to the eight-
year-long subsamples. For both sampling approaches, around half of the features (43% for 
realistic and 55% for matched) are replaced after one year, reaching a maximum of almost 
96% after six years in the case of the matched sampling approach and 10 years for the 
realistic sampling approach. When examining the magnitude of the changes from year to 
year, the one-year gap indicates the largest change, followed by a diminishing trend, in line 
with previous results. 
In the next part, the differences between the qualitative feature vectors are examined in 
detail to further examine the differences between the realistic and matched sampling 
approaches. The IGR represents the discriminatory power of each qualitative feature and is 
calculated for every feature in the entire sample. Figures 33 and 34 present the distribution 
of the discriminatory power, divided into 10 bins, each consisting of 100 features, ranked 
from highest to lowest for each of the final subsamples f1-f12. 
The differences between the sampling approaches are obvious. The realistic sampling 
approach seems to rely on a few qualitative features with high individual discriminatory 
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power, whereas the biggest part of the vector possesses comparatively low individual power. 
In contrast, features from the matched sample seem to be rather stable concerning their 
individual potential of reducing entropy. For both sampling approaches, the trend is 
consistent over time, as represented by subsamples f1-f12. The phenomenon might be 
explainable by the abovementioned linguistic variety that may be required in the case of the 
matched sampling to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations, 
without being able to rely on size- or industry-related clues as in the case of the realistic 
approach. Furthermore, this may explain the differences in detection performance being 
lower for the matched sampling approach due to the aforementioned difficulties in 
classifying observations owing to a lack of truly decisive features. 
 
Figure 33 – Discriminatory power of qualitative features for matched sampling 
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Figure 34 – Discriminatory power of qualitative features for realistic sampling 
Before evaluating the consistency of the textual predictors, it is necessary to highlight the 
value of the quantitative features compared to the qualitative features in order to shed 
additional light on the previous results, especially regarding feature vector performance and 
therefore the overall relevance of quantitative features in the combined feature vector. Table 
23 displays the average ranks of the quantitative features in the combined feature vector 
across the 12 subsamples.  
The combined vector comprises 1,000 5-grams and 19 quantitative financial metrics. For 
the realistic sampling approach, the highest individual ranking features are the size proxy, 
followed by a variable capturing capital structure and performance. Despite their size, the 
first eight features are relatively stable, as are the bottom five features. The quantitative 
features seem to be rather unimportant compared to the qualitative features, with only one 
being located in the top 200 bracket, which might explain the rather small jump in detection 
performance when combining both types and the relatively bad detection performance for 
only quantitative features. 
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Realistic Matched 
Feature Mean Stdev. Feature Mean Stdev. 
logat 184 47 reta 72 74 
tlta 251 7 tlta 99 29 
reta 257 7 cogssal 184 39 
opxsal 258 7 gp 185 39 
opisal 268 8 opxsal 186 39 
cogssal 283 6 opisal 187 39 
gp 284 6 arta 264 71 
arta 293 6 ietl 537 249 
salta 349 23 nisal 538 58 
ietl 423 275 salta 539 166 
btm 453 50 logat 871 99 
salar 819 230 accr 993 8 
nisal 937 40 salar 996 7 
de 988 40 btm 998 6 
nita 1,011 2 invsal 999 7 
invta 1,013 4 into 1,003 7 
accr 1,014 1 nita 1,004 5 
invsal 1,015 2 de 1,006 6 
into 1,016 3 invta 1,007 8 
Table 23 – Average rank of quantitative features 
For the matched sampling, it would appear that even fewer quantitative features are 
relevant. Interestingly, despite the fact that size is one of the pair-matching variables, it 
scores better than eight other features in the analysis of individual discriminatory power. 
Comparing the results to similar studies is rather difficult, as related feature selection 
techniques – or feature selection techniques at all – have rarely been utilized in the case of 
quantitative features so far. Chen (2016) has tested two feature selection algorithms (with 
similar IGR measures) for the purpose of financial statement fraud detection and listed the 
top ranking quantitative features. The results suggest that out of 30 financial and non-
financial predictors, only four for the first and respectively six for the second selection 
algorithm were selected by the algorithms to be incorporated into the detection model (due 
to overlapping only eight distinct features). In general, this result confirms the rather 
uncertain detection power of baseline quantitative features. When ignoring the two features 
based on cash-flow metrics, which have not been adopted in this study, four out of the six 
remaining ones from Chen (2016) are similarly or identically incorporated in this study. 
Kotsiantis, Koumanakos, Tzelepis, and Tampakas (2006) have relied on a relief score to 
assess the individual discriminative power of their quantitative features. According to their 
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results, from the 25 tested features (22 individual predictors, three related to previous 
periods) only eight have been selected by their feature selection approach to be part of the 
final detection model. Six of the eight variables are also part of this study’s quantitative 
feature vector, whereas the remaining two are referring to cash-flow related data. Overall, 
the comparison across studies confirms the severe differences in individual discriminatory 
power of quantitative features that can be taken from table 23. Unfortunately, to my 
knowledge, no study exists that also compares the differences across qualitative and 
quantitative features on an individual feature basis. 
In the next step, the consistency of the features in subsamples f1-f12 is examined and 
presented in Table 24. Overall, the 12 feature vectors comprise 5,265 unique features in the 
case of the realistic sampling approach and 6,408 unique features in the pair-matching 
approach, again hinting at the linguistic variety that is required to distinguish the more 
similar observations in the matched sampling approach.167 
 Frequency 
Number of occurrences Realistic Matched  
1 2,514 3,434 
2 1,128 1,522 
3 688 788 
4 355 376 
5 223 161 
6 130 72 
7 84 34 
8 60 15 
9 56 4 
10 21 0 
11 3 1 
12 3 1 
Total 5,265 6,408 
Table 24 – Frequency of qualitative features 
Only three features occur in all of the 12 feature vectors for the realistic sampling 
approach (acquisition complete, gross margin and integration). For the matched sampling, 
only one feature (conduct operation) is consistently found.168 The matched sampling vectors 
are less persistent than the realistic ones, with a lower number of features with an occurrence 
greater than four and more features occurring only one to four times. Of the realistic vectors, 
357 features occur more than six times, while of the vectors constructed under the matched 
                                                 
167  The feature vector size was determined in 5.1.1 and fixed to 1,000 qualitative features. 
168  The 5-grams also incorporate 1-grams to 4-grams. 
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sampling, only 127 can be found in half of the samples. The results may hint at the fact that 
generalizable qualitative features can hardly grasp financial statement fraud and that a 
greater number of clues is necessary. To further elaborate on the results, differences in the 
discriminatory power of the respective features with different occurrences are assessed by 
calculating the average rank in the feature vectors (as of the IGR) for each number of 
occurrence. It may be the case that a few qualitative features that often occur and that also 
have a high rank in the feature vector, represent the generalizable qualitative clues. However, 
the results do not support this claim. The average rank barely changes for different numbers 
of occurrences of 5-grams for both sampling approaches. 
Finally, it may be interesting to examine whether similar studies that rely on textual 
analysis for fraud detection purposes demonstrate some overlap in their qualitative features. 
Therefore, a comparison of the publicly available qualitative features of other studies has 
been undertaken. Three similar studies have reported the composition (or at least an excerpt) 
of their qualitative feature vectors. The features are compared on a relatable basis, as 
preprocessing such as the elimination of stop words or stemming of texts differs across 
studies as well as in terms of the length of the qualitative features. For example, if one of 
this study’s features is regarded as “additional capital require”, a study reporting only 
“require” or “required” would be counted as an overlap.  
Purda and Skillicorn (2015) utilize 200 single words (also containing the symbols $, %, 
& and the single letter s, most certainly referring to the possessive “s”), of which 170 (85%) 
can also be found in this study’s overall qualitative feature vector. Goel et al. (2010) have 
reported two lists, each containing the 25 highest ranked single words by information gain. 
The overlap covered about 80%, most differences being associated with features that capture 
country or city names like Venezuela or Manhattan, which were not part of this study’s 
highest-ranking features. Chen et al. (2017) have reported a list of 240 qualitative features 
based on Chinese characters while also delivering an idiomatic English translation. In 
contrast to the two aforementioned studies and the present investigation, they relied on a 
Chinese/Taiwanese rather than the commonly used US setting. Interestingly, the overlap was 
considerably high, standing at about 79%. 
In sum, it can be ascertained that qualitative features are rather unstable over time, 
supporting the previous findings and again hinting at the necessity of regular updates, as 
depicted by the small number of reoccurring features. Moreover, the overlap of qualitative 
features across different studies, even for examinations in different languages, is surprising. 
 
191 
 
5.2.2 First Instance of Fraud Detection 
Finally, the three enhancing questions should help to improve the reliability of the results, 
detection performance, and assessment of the models’ economic benefits, rendering them 
more relatable as a result. The initial question deals with a first instance of fraud detection 
approach. 
In the financial statement fraud detection scenario, it is important to control for cases that 
span across multiple firm years and therefore observations in the sample. If not, the detection 
model may be biased towards repeatedly occurring observations of the same firms, meaning 
that the model identifies the respective firms rather than the general concepts that distinguish 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent reports. Especially when dividing cases into training 
and holdout sets, those that reach across subsamples may lead to biased results. This is 
mainly caused by the time gap between the release of the misstated reports and the issued 
AAERs, as the latter are issued during or at the end of an investigation, leading to the 
possibility of consecutively misstated reports. For fraud detection models, the goal should 
be to identify misstatements at their first occurrence. Therefore, this study controls for first 
instance misreporting, similar to Brown et al. (2018). It may be expected that the detection 
proves slightly worse than the original approach. However, the models should still be able 
to score results at a reasonable level. 
For each case spanning across multiple years, the initial year is identified and the 
consecutive years are separated from the sample. This procedure has been carried out for the 
realistic and matched sampling approaches for subsamples r1/m1. For the pair-matching 
process, the deletion of cases with multiple instances of fraud (multiple firms years of the 
same company) leads to a slight shift in both groups, altering the relative group sizes from 
50/50 to 40/60 (fraud/non-fraud), which is not rebalanced afterwards. The detection results 
are tested for the realistic, and the pair-matched approach. In accordance with the previous 
results, SVMs have been chosen as the default classifier. The results are presented in Table 
25. 
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Sampling Design Qual. Quant. Quant. & qual. 
Realistic 
Original 0.809 0.687 0.817 
First instance 0.720 0.639 0.730 
Matched 
Original 0.755 0.657 0.771 
First instance 0.668 0.599 0.686 
The table reports AUC values for the test of first instance of fraud detection. 
Table 25 – First instance of fraud detection 
According to expectations, the results reveal that detection performance decreases for the 
three feature vectors in both sampling approaches. The decline in the case of feature vectors 
constructed from qualitative features may be mitigated for both sampling approaches when 
qualitative feature selection is carried out separately for the first instance of fraud detection, 
which has not been done but rather the qualitative features from the original versions of the 
subsamples have been utilized for the test. This results in potentially party suboptimal feature 
vector compositions, especially for the matched sampling approach (for which greater 
linguistic variety can be assumed necessary), as shown previously. Overall, the results seem 
to hold for the first instance of fraud detection and detection performance above the random 
classifier can be achieved, in the case of the realistic sampling even on a satisfactory level 
with AUCs above 0.7. 
5.2.3 Quantitative Feature Vector Enhancements 
The basic performance of the quantitative feature vector is intrinsically bad, especially when 
compared to the results of the qualitative feature vectors. Abbasi et al. (2012) and Dong et 
al. (2016) have shown that a baseline detection model that relies on annual financial ratios 
yields rather unsatisfying results, consistent with the results of the present study. 
To improve the detection quality of the quantitative feature vector, the features must be 
better contextualized to increase the detection potential. In addition to the use of vertical 
financial statement analysis, as partially covered through the financial ratios so far, 
horizontal analysis for every observation might provide greater context for the classifier 
(Gee, 2015, p. 320; Wells, 2017, pp. 354–355). Dechow et al. (2011) have shown that their 
set of variables (F-score) demonstrates a particular trend prior to misstatement events, which 
may be captured by additional quantitative features from previous years. Abbasi et al. (2012) 
have presented similar results when boosting their baseline annual financial ratios through 
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additional information from previous quarterly reports. In this regard, it can be assumed that 
the augmented quantitative feature vector will score better detection results. 
Observation Fraud 5-gram 1-1000 Quant. 1 (t) Quant. 2 (t) … Quant. 19 (t) … 
A(2010) 0 5-grams (t) 0.3 0.0  1.1  
A(2011) 0 5-grams (t) 0.9 0.1  0.8  
A(2012) 1 5-grams (t) 0.5 0.15  0.7  
B(2011) 0 5-grams (t) 1.0 0.3  0.55  
Observation Fraud 5-gram 1-1000 Quant. 1 (t) Quant. 1 (t-1) Quant. 1 (t-2) 
Quant. 1 
(t-3) … 
A(2010) 0 5-grams (t) 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1  
A(2011) 0 5-grams (t) 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.4  
A(2012) 1 5-grams (t) 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.2  
B(2011) 0 5-grams (t) 1.0 0.5 0.8 0.2  
Table 26 – Feature vector design comparison 
Table 26 depicts the structure of the feature vectors being compared. The upper half of 
the table illustrates the combined feature vector utilized so far, which comprises 1,000 
qualitative and 19 quantitative features. The highlighted cells represent the incorporation of 
time effects in the variables, which are only based on the current measurement for every 
observation. In the bottom half, the boosted quantitative feature vector structure is presented, 
which still consists of 1,000 qualitative features but now also has 76 quantitative features. 
As for each quantitative feature, three previous values from prior years are taken into 
consideration for each observation. Therefore, the highlighted cells now represent the 
augmented version, which additionally incorporates the changes in the measurements in a 
horizontal way. 
The test has been conducted by utilizing both the quantitative and the combined feature 
vector to examine the influence first on an isolated level using only quantitative features and 
then by adding them to the previously assessed best-performing feature vector. Both tests 
have relied on the matched and the realistic sampling approach. Support vector machines 
have been chosen as the classifier in accordance with previous results. The test has been 
undertaken for the entire 12 subsamples.169 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that the results will improve when the additional feature 
enhancements are incorporated. Table 27 presents the average AUCs across the 12 
                                                 
169 To ensure comparability, parameter combinations of the SVM have been assessed in accordance with the 
procedure of the original feature vectors. The results can be seen in Appendix D. 
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subsamples. Surprisingly, the only feature vector that scored better on average was the 
combined one in the realistic sampling approach. 
 Original Enhanced 
  Quant. Quant. & qual. Quant. Quant. & qual. 
Realistic 0.680 0.834 0.655 0.836 
Matched 0.653 0.805 0.640 0.795 
The table reports AUC values for the comparison of original and enhanced quantitative feature 
vectors. 
Table 27 – Feature vector enhancement 
Paired t-tests for the results over the 12 subsamples for enhanced versus original feature 
vectors have been computed. In none of the comparisons is the enhanced feature vector 
significantly better at the 5% level, leading to the rejection of hypothesis 7. An explanation 
might be that the additional features convolute the vectors, resulting in less decisive patterns. 
Although the enhanced feature vector scores the best result of this study comprising 
qualitative and quantitative features with an AUC of 0.939, across the entire timeframe the 
results are not significantly better than for the original design. 
5.2.4 Cost-Sensitive Results 
In the final step, a cost matrix is introduced to assign weights to the classified observations 
based on artificial costs. The cost matrix should increase the understandability and 
relatability of the results and serve as an additional metric to assess detection performance 
and to compare the different feature vectors on a practical basis. 
In the binary classification scenario, there exist two possible misclassified outcomes: an 
actual non-fraudulent observation being classified as fraudulent (false positive) and an actual 
fraudulent case being classified as non-fraudulent (false negative). The costs are assumed to 
be asymmetric, as false positives are less costly than false negatives (e.g. Hansen, 
McDonald, Messier, & Bell, 1996; Abbasi et al., 2012). Moreover, the costs vary for 
different stakeholder groups, like regulators or investors (e.g. Beneish, 1999). An investor 
who invests in a fraudulent company incurs losses that are attributable to the reduction in 
share prices after the fraud is unveiled (fraud classified as non-fraud). If the investor had not 
been investing in a company due to its wrongful classification as fraudulent, he or she would 
have incurred opportunity costs, which are likely to be smaller than for the first error. For 
investors, Cox and Weirich (2002) have estimated the impact on market capitalization for 
cases of fraud between 1992 and 1999. After being released to the public (based on Wall 
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Street Journal articles that were confirmed by SEC releases), the average negative impact 
on market capitalization was 23.2%. According to Beneish (1999), the loss accumulates on 
average 40% on a risk-adjusted basis for the quarter following the discovery of the fraud. 
Taking both studies into consideration and assuming that the change in market capitalization 
for a non-fraudulent company would be insignificantly small (an appreciation of around 1-
2%), a cost ratio of 1:10 – 1:40 can be assumed for investors.170 
From a regulator’s perspective, balancing the costs of wrongfully accusing a firm of 
fraudulent manipulations and thus investigating the case, to costs of not protecting the 
market participants, is similarly delicate. However, both perspectives share in common that 
the costs of wrongfully classifying an actual fraudulent observation are considerably higher 
than the other way around. The literature has suggested considerably different ratios, which 
can be seen in Table 28. 
Studies Cost ratios 
Persons (1995) 1:1 1:5 1:10 1:20 1:30    
Beneish (1999) 1:1  1:10 1:20 1:30 1:40 1:60 1:100 
Abbasi et al. (2012)   1:10 1:20     
Perols et al. (2017)     1:30    
Cost ratio: costs per false positive/costs per false negative 
Table 28 – Cost ratios of previous studies 
The ratios from the literature also differ with regard to specific stakeholder groups. 
Beneish (1999) considers costs for regulators to be around 1:20 – 1:30 (cost of a false 
positive to costs of a false negative), while costs for investors range between 1:1 – 1:100. In 
contrast, Abbasi et al. (2012) suggest that the cost ratio is 1:10 for regulators and 1:20 for 
investors. Both studies have estimated the costs based on empirical justifications, illustrating 
the difficulty in determining the cost ratio for this study.171  
In the next step, the costs of misclassified observations for this study will be determined 
based on empirical evidence. To determine the audit costs, the results from the Financial 
Executives Research Foundation (FERF) are taken into consideration. In their 2017 Audit 
Fee Survey Report, the median audit fee for public companies in 2016 was around $523,000, 
according to an examination of SEC filings; moreover, this was rather stable in previous 
                                                 
170 Assuming the equity appreciation rates from Beneish (1997). 
171 For example, Abbasi et al. (2012) derive the median loss for a financial statement fraud case from the 
ACFE’s Report to the Nation in 2010, which was $4.1 million; however, the current estimated loss as 
published in 2018 was only $0.8 million. Taking these changes into consideration results in severe 
differences in the underlying misclassification costs. 
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years, with only slight increases.172 The losses of cases of financial statement fraud have 
been determined based on the ACFES’s reports to the nation 2008–2018. On average, across 
the reports, the losses of financial statement fraud were estimated at approximately $1.6 
million (min: $800,000; max: $4.1 million). Taking the empirical justification and hints from 
previous literature into consideration, the cost ratios may be assumed to range between 1:2 
and 1:10, without factoring hardly quantifiable negative effects like market participants’ loss 
of trust. For this study, the two cost ratios 1:3 and 1:10 with the associated costs based on 
the regulators perspective will be used. 
The above discussion indicates the difficulties in assessing reasonable ratios. Given that 
the cost ratios significantly influence the results, the findings must be interpreted with 
caution. Another problem with the costs of misclassification is associated with the 
underlying sampling approach. In a realistic sample, the costs of misclassification may 
largely be driven by the huge amount of non-fraudulent observations. Correctly classifying 
one additional fraudulent case may be associated with a larger amount of wrongfully 
classified non-fraudulent observations, especially compared to the matched sampling 
approach. Therefore, a fixed cost ratio will likely result in varying outcomes for different 
sampling approaches, rendering them difficult to compare. 
To obtain cost-sensitive results, different threshold values for each model have been 
examined, ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1.173 Each of the resulting confusion 
matrices has been used to compute the total amount of misclassification costs. The 
classification errors have been measured based on the empirically estimated costs, as 
previously discussed: $523,000 per wrongfully classified non-fraudulent observation and 
$1.6 million per wrongfully classified fraudulent case, resulting in a cost ratio of about 1:3. 
In addition, a cost ratio of 1:10, based on $523,000 for false positives and $5.23 million for 
                                                 
172 The report of the FERF is available at https://www.workiva.com/resources/2017-audit-fee-survey-report. 
173 At this point, it is important to recall the foundation of the AUC as presented in section 4.2.5, which 
represents the results across varying discriminatory thresholds, each representing an individual confusion 
matrix. The AUC values for each model represent the final results of this study. The AUCs are obtained by 
testing the trained model on an unseen holdout set. Nine different thresholds (0.1-0.9) have been used to 
compute individual cost matrices for each AUC. The threshold resulting in the lowest costs of 
misclassification relative to the two baseline strategies (naïve and surveillance) is chosen to reflect the 
highest possible cost-saving potential. It is important to clarify that the following results are solely based 
on the aforementioned procedure and therefore do only depict a cost saving potential, which does not 
necessarily reflect the true cost savings. This is due to the fact, that for the assessment of true cost savings, 
the optimal threshold had to be determined beforehand and not on the holdout set. However, as the outcomes 
in the form of AUC values are correctly validated, the highest cost-saving potential rather serves as a 
translation of an abstract concept into an economically relatable measure of the detection performance, 
rather than finding one best confusion matrix for each case, which is questionable anyway, due to the 
subjective way of identifying correct cost ratios. 
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false negatives, has been created, to additionally control for a larger negative impact of 
misclassified fraudulent cases.174 To incorporate the costs into the classification results, the 
number of false positives has been multiplied by $523,000 and the number of false negatives 
by $1.6 million (or $5.23 million for the 1:10 ratio). The total costs of each classification 
result have been compared to a naïve strategy, in which all observations are regarded as non-
fraudulent (costs of model compared to naïve strategy, e.g. Persons, 1995; Beneish, 1999; 
Abbasi et al., 2012). In addition, they are also compared to a surveillance strategy, in which 
all observations are investigated (costs of model compared to surveillance strategy, e.g. 
Abbasi et al., 2012). With regard to both strategies, a successful detection model should 
achieve considerably lower total costs. 
To generate comprehensive results and to be able to compare the outcome to the previous 
tests of the hypothesis concerning the feature vector performance, the results have been 
calculated across the three feature vectors and for both sampling approaches. Based on 
previous findings, the chosen classifier was an SVM.175 In contrast to the aforementioned 
studies like Abbasi et al. (2012), this study relies on a design using 12 rolling subsamples, 
to test the detection power over the 15-year timeframe. Therefore, the average costs of 
misclassification have been computed for the 12 results for each feature vector and sampling 
approach. 176 Table 29 presents the results. 
For the realistic sampling approach, the surveillance strategy results in an enormous 
amount of total costs due to a large number of observations, which need to be investigated, 
whereas comparatively small total costs are estimated for the naïve strategy in which no 
investigations are conducted, due to the relatively small number of fraudulent cases. This is 
true for both cost ratios investigated in this study but might change when immensely high 
costs are assumed for false negatives relative to false positives. To sum up, achieving 
superior results to the strategy in which nothing is investigated is more difficult than 
achieving superiority to the surveillance strategy (for example, investigating every 
observation in subsample 1 would amount to total costs of around $3,477 million, while not 
investigating would lead to total costs of $118 million for the 1:3 cost ratio).  
                                                 
174  Taking the discussion about prominent cases of financial statement fraud from section 2.1.3 into 
consideration, outliers may very well exceed losses, amounting to a few billion rather than million USD. 
175 The results may furthermore be increased by searching for the optimal threshold that minimizes the costs. 
This study only focuses on nine different thresholds, but searching in smaller increments in areas of the 
AUC with FPR/TPR ratios resulting in low costs would probably improve the results. 
176 This resulted in the evaluation of a total of 648 computed cost matrices: 2 sampling approaches, 3 feature 
vectors, 9 thresholds and 12 subsamples over the entire timeframe. 
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In comparison, the matched sampling approach – or any other sample balancing – leads 
to a distortion of total costs for both strategies. Especially the pair-matched outcome shifts 
towards an artificial reality, in which it is more difficult for the detection model to 
outperform the naïve strategy than to refrain from investigating (for example, investigating 
every observation in subsample 1 would amount to total costs of around $75 million, while 
desisting from investigating would lead to total costs of $115 million for the 1:3 cost ratio). 
Again, this is the case for the cost ratios assumed in this study. Interpreting the matched 
sampling results is rather unintuitive. However, the feature vector performance in the 
artificial environment in which fraudulent cases are much more likely than in reality can still 
be assessed. 
Realistic sampling 
Cost ratio Feature vector 
Costs of model errors 
relative to naïve 
strategy 
Costs of model errors 
relative to surveillance 
strategy 
1:3 
Quant. 0.928 0.027 
Qual. 0.671 0.019 
Quant. & qual. 0.657 0.019 
1:10 
Quant. 0.875 0.083 
Qual. 0.571 0.054 
Quant. & qual. 0.565 0.053 
    
Matched sampling 
Cost ratio Feature vector 
Costs of model errors 
relative to naïve 
strategy 
Costs of model errors 
relative to surveillance 
strategy 
1:3 
Quant. 0.308 0.470 
Qual. 0.254 0.388 
Quant. & qual. 0.251 0.384 
1:10 
Quant. 0.095 0.474 
Qual. 0.089 0.446 
Quant. & qual. 0.089 0.443 
The table reports outcomes compared to different detection strategies. 
Cost ratio: costs per false positive/costs per false negative 
Naïve Strategy: no investigation, all observations are regarded as non-fraudulent 
Surveillance strategy: every observation will be investigated 
Table 29 – Results for highest cost-saving potential 
The results in Table 29 confirm the outcome of H4a and H4b. The quantitative feature 
vector is hardly better than a strategy in which no investigation would be carried out (which 
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would result in values of >=1 in the column costs of model errors compared to naïve 
strategy). In contrast, the qualitative and combined feature vectors present considerably 
superior results for the more practically oriented realistic probability of fraud sampling 
approach.177 In line with previous results, the combined feature vector is best suited for the 
fraud detection purpose. This holds for both sampling approaches.  
A final conclusion can be made by estimating the absolute potential of savings that would 
be possible by utilizing the best performing feature vector and classifier that this study has 
identified for the 12 subsamples covering the 15-year timeframe. In this way, the absolute 
costs of misclassification are deducted from the absolute costs of both strategies. The savings 
compared to the naïve strategy accumulate to $1.6 billion for the cost ratio of 1:10 ($409 
million for the cost ratio of 1:3). For the surveillance strategy in which every observation is 
investigated, $33.4 billion for the cost ratio of 1:10 could be saved ($34.7 billion for the cost 
ratio of 1:3).178 Higher estimated costs of fraudulent cases, which is arguably reasonable, 
would only increase the absolute cost savings and therefore increase the relevance of this 
study’s results. 
5.2.5 Results Comparison 
Comparing the results of this study with other fraud detection studies is hardly feasible, due 
to considerable differences regarding research design, especially sampling. Furthermore, the 
results are often reported in vastly different ways, which in conjunction with sampling 
differences causes even more problems when directly comparing the outcomes. Most likely, 
a research design that exploits common cross-validation and therefore does usually not rely 
on a holdout set comprise future, unseen observations, would report overly confident results 
compared to a real-world application of the respective model, as carried out in this study.179 
Table 30 captures the primary results of studies on fraud detection that have reported 
comparable detection performance metrics. The studies with the highest similarity regarding 
research design will be discussed hereafter. 
                                                 
177 In the matched sampling approach, classifying everything as fraudulent often results in the lowest absolute 
costs because of the asymmetric cost structure. In this case, an accuracy of 50% and a recall of 100% are 
scored due to the equal size of both groups. The quantitative feature vector often reports this result when 
searching for the lowest total costs of misclassification. The combined feature vector, which reaches an 
accuracy of 72% and a recall of 92% in similar cases, results in rather small cost savings. Thus, Table 29 
barely reveals the true cost saving potential of the feature vectors in the matched sampling approach. 
178  A detailed summary of the determination of the absolute costs can be found in Table 35 in Appendix E. 
179  See for example section 4.1.3 and 4.2.2 for further substantiations on the relevance of a separation of feature 
extraction, model training and testing. 
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The study that comes closest to this one is Brown et al. (2018) owing to similarities 
regarding the examination of qualitative data and the sampling design. This enables to report 
results that come close to a practical, real-world application, with the detection of multiple 
single-year holdout sets over a larger and in this case similar timeframe. Brown et al.’s 
highest average AUC of 0.778 is considerably worse than the 0.836 scored in this study, 
most likely attributable to their topic modelling design that limits the number of features 
through aggregation compared to the raw n-gram approach. 
Cecchini et al. (2010a) have presented another of the few studies that utilize combined 
feature vectors in their detection model. Cecchini et al. (2010a) were constrained by the 
small sample size with only 61 fraudulent and 61 non-fraudulent observations between 1993 
and 2002 and therefore had to rely on a leave-one-out analysis, which did not incorporate 
the assessment of the results on future unknown observations from subsequent years. With 
an accuracy of 81.97% and a recall of 80.77%, they have shown high discriminatory power 
for the model relying on quantitative and qualitative features. For a similar timeframe, under 
matched sampling and for the qualitative and quantitative feature vector, this study achieves 
an accuracy of 70.83% with a recall of 91.67%, but on a holdout set covering future unseen 
observations. 
Cecchini et al. (2010b) and Abbasi et al. (2012) are similar to this study with regards to 
the detection of future unknown cases but differ as both studies utilize only quantitative 
features to create their detection models. Cecchini et al. (2010b), like Abbasi et al. (2012), 
validate their models on a holdout set covering the years 2001 to 2003 and a training set 
covering the years 1991 to 2000. Cecchini et al. (2010b) created their so called financial 
kernel that transforms input attributes into features for the classification via SVMs. With an 
AUC of 0.878, the detection performance of their financial kernel model based on 
quantitative features can be regarded as one of the highest available. In line with Abbasi et 
al. (2012), when limiting this study’s results to the respective years, the performance 
accumulates to 0.891 for the subsamples with observations from 2001 to 2003. 
Abbasi et al. (2012) have adopted a similar research design and have reported very high 
AUC values for their comprehensive MetaFraud framework. The main differences can be 
found in the use of quarterly and annual reports, the feature vector being derived solely from 
quantitative data, the sampling design encompassing a slightly different timeframe and the 
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sample being subdivided into training and testing, cut off at the year 2000.180 Furthermore, 
their sample has a 10% fraction of fraudulent observations (815/8,191), which does certainly 
not reflect the true occurrence of fraud. For their best model, an AUC of 0.931 indicates 
outstanding detection performance. On average across the 12 subsamples, a similar result 
could not be achieved by this study’s models, but when limiting the 12 subsamples to reflect 
similar years to the testing set of Abbasi et al. (2012), an average AUC of 0.888 was achieved 
(including subsamples with only observations from 2000–2008), even peaking at 0.938 for 
the subsample starting in the year 2002. This was also the highest result achieved in this 
study under a realistic sampling approach and the combined feature vector with enhanced 
quantitative features utilizing an SVM. The high results may therefore be attributable to a 
sampling effect. 
The problem with studies that report accuracy and recall or similar confusion matrix-
based metrics rather than AUC values can be exemplified as follows. When determining the 
minimal costs of misclassification, different confusion matrices are generated based on 
various classification thresholds for every model, each representing an individual 
classification outcome. By using the empirically determined costs of false positives and false 
negatives, the lowest total costs are assessed. For the realistic sampling approach and a cost 
ratio of 1:10, this results in an average accuracy of above 99%, with a respective recall of 
48%.181 By choosing different thresholds, the recall may be increased, but accuracy would 
be decreased during the course, resulting in higher total costs, thus constituting an 
unsatisfactory result (e.g. subsample 4, optimal: accuracy of 99% and recall of 58%; 
suboptimal: accuracy of 96% and recall of 75%). In simple terms, sacrificing recall for 
additional accuracy is necessary owing to the large number of non-fraudulent observations 
relative to fraudulent cases in the sample. 
Besides comparing raw detection outputs measured in abstract concepts like the AUC, it 
is also possible to compare the results to studies focussing on more economically relatable 
measures like the cost-saving potential resulting from the application of the detection 
models. In section 5.2.4, the costs of misclassification of the detection models were 
compared to costs of a surveillance and naïve a strategy, which investigate all or none of the 
observations respectively. This reflects one of the most common procedures when the 
                                                 
180 Although their adaptive learning algorithm takes the evaluation of future observations at continuous points 
in time into consideration. 
181 Given that the AUCs vary over the 12 subsamples, so do accuracy and recall. For similar thresholds, the 
highest AUC of 0.93 resulted in an accuracy of 99% and a recall of 78%, while the lowest of 0.736 reported 
an accuracy of 99% and a recall of 29% for optimal thresholds in the 1:10 cost ratio setting. 
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performance of detection models is assessed based on the associated misclassification costs 
and allows to compare results across different sample sizes, which is not possible if absolute 
cost savings are reported. Persons (1995) reported costs of model errors relative to the naïve 
strategy of 0.971, indicating that the model is only slightly better than the naïve strategy in 
their matched sample for a cost ratio of 1:10. When recreating their findings with a similar 
cut-off probability, the quantitative feature vector in this study hardly reaches better results 
with around 0.931, however considerably better results are possible if choosing different 
threshold (around 0.1).182 Beneish (1999) reported a cost of model error relative to the naïve 
strategy for a cost ratio of 1:10 of 0.680 for their model tested in a rather realistic probability 
of fraud sample.183 Thereby, the model from Beneish beats the quantitative feature vector of 
this study, which reported an outcome of 0.875; however, the combined feature vector shows 
considerably better performance with a ratio of 0.565. 
Summarizing the comparison, the detection performance of this study’s models can be 
assumed to be at least on par with similar studies and usually scores even better than most 
of them when adjusting the overall results to comparable subsets. Furthermore, this study 
has proven to yield a reliable detection performance of the developed models over a 
timeframe of 15 years, through developing a comprehensive fraud detection approach that 
relies on thorough design and that is found to be robust on a matched and realistic sampling 
approach and close to real-world application. Especially the detection of fraud within 
unknown observations of future periods is a fundamental design decision that combines 
practical application and validation of the models and yields a decisive insight into the true 
detection performance. Overall, the developed models in this study yield high and reliable 
detection results, in a realistic setting on a generalizable level, which in conjunction has not 
been achieved so far. Furthermore, the study contributes to the financial statement fraud 
detection literature in numerous areas according to the 11 design and enhancing questions, 
while presenting one of the most comprehensive overviews of financial statement fraud 
detection to this date. 
                                                 
182  Section 5.2.4 has already discussed the rather unintuitive nature and questionable usefulness of cost ratios 
in matched samples. 
183  The result has been chosen from the estimation sample of Beneish (1999) to account for similarities of this 
study’s assessment of cost-saving potentials. 
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Quantitative features Fraud Non-fraud Setting AUC acc. (%) rec. (%) val. f. t.s. 
Loebbecke et al., 1989 77 305 USA   86 Training   
Persons, 1995 100 100 USA  72 64 Holdout   
Hansen et al., 1996 77 305 USA  89  Holdout   
Green & Choi, 1997 46 49 USA  72 68 Holdout   
Fanning & Cogger, 1998 102 102 USA  63 66 Holdout Yes  
Summers & Sweeney, 
1998 51 51 USA  60 68 Training   
Beneish, 1999 74 2,332 USA  90 54 Holdout   
Lee et al., 1999 56 60,453 USA   73 Holdout   
Bell & Carcello, 2010 77 305 USA  73  Holdout   
Feroz et al., 2000 42 90 USA  94  Holdout   
Spathis, 2002 38 38 Greece  84 84 Training   
Spathis et al., 2002 38 38 Greece  75 64 Holdout   
Lin et al., 2003 40 160 USA  86 35 Holdout   
Kaminski et al., 2004 79 79 USA  54 22 Holdout   
Kirkos et al., 2007 38 38 USA  90 92 Holdout   
Gaganis, 2009 199 199 USA  87 88 Holdout   
Lou & Wang, 2009 94 467 Taiwan  87  Holdout   
Cecchini et al., 2010(b) 132 3,187 USA 0.878 90 80 Holdout Yes  
Dikmen & 
Küçükkocaoğlu, 2010 17 109 Turkey  67 81 Holdout Yes  
Dechow et al., 2011 293 79,358 USA  64 69 Holdout Yes  
Ravisankar et al., 2011 101 101 China 0.981 98 98 Holdout   
Alden et al., 2012 229 229 USA  76  Holdout   
Abbasi et al., 2012 815 8,191 USA 0.931  82 Holdout Yes (Yes) 
Liu et al., 2015 138 160 China  88  Holdout   
Perols et al., 2017 51 15,934 USA 0.762   Holdout   
Qualitative features                   
Goel et al., 2010 450 622 USA  89 89 Holdout   
Glancy & Yadav, 2011 11 20 USA  84 90 Holdout   
Humpherys et al., 2011 101 101 USA  65 71 Holdout   
Purda & Skillicorn, 2015 1,407 4,708 USA 0.890 83 81 Holdout   
Chen et al., 2017 45 135 China/Taiwan  85  Holdout   
Qualitative and quantitative features combined 
Cecchini et al., 2010(a) 61 61 USA  82 84 Holdout   
Dong et al., 2016 805 805 USA  82 92 Holdout   
Brown et al., 2018 459 37,806 USA 0.778   75 Holdout Yes Yes 
This study’s results          
Average* 805 84,960 USA 0.836   Holdout Yes Yes 
Highest**    0.938 99** 59** Holdout Yes Yes 
acc. (accuracy): fraction of correctly classified observations rec. (recall): fraction of correctly classified fraudulent 
observations 
val. (validation): the results are achieved by classifying the observations of the training or holdout set, for example 
through cross-validation 
f. (future): where the design explicitly states that the observations of the holdout set are from future periods and feature 
extraction is limited to previous years 
t.s. (time series): the results are assessed at different points in time in order to create a reliable detection model over the 
course of time 
*Average performance across the final sample **Threshold resulting in the lowest absolute costs of misclassification for a 
single subset 
Table 30 – Results comparison 
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5.3 Limitations 
The interdisciplinary approach of this study involves a number of limitations in different 
areas. The majority of the limitations can be divided into either limitations concerned with 
validity and reliability of the measurements and the results or machine learning related 
limitations. Each limitation may be targeted by further research and will be discussed and 
complemented in detail in the subsequent section. 
One of the most apparent limitations of this study concerns the reliability and validity of 
the results. As discussed in chapter 4.2.1 machine learning is often regarded as a black-box, 
where the relationship between the features and the relationship between the features and the 
outcome is difficult to observe. Although this study has tried to make the features relateable 
as depicted for example in chapter 5.2.1 and created the models based on elaborated fraud 
theories, it is still questionable how exactly fraud is expressed in the textual components of 
annual reports. Especially the qualitative features seem to be highly abstract and according 
to the results do vary considerably over the examined timeframe, which most likely indicates 
that little generalizable clues exist. Efforts to examine the textual components on a more 
relatable level are rather scarce (e.g. Goel et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2018) and often with 
narrow focus. Further examination with state of the art natural language processing methods 
and in conjunction with fraud factors operationalized from fraud theory could enhance the 
understanding of fraud considerably and most likely have a positive impact on detection 
results. 
Regarding the temporal instability of the qualitative features, the study is furthermore 
limited through potential countermeasures by companies occurring over time. These 
countermeasures could involve adapting the reports to drop clues associated with known 
ones that are hinting at fraudulent manipulations, thus rendering it more difficult if not 
impossible to be detected. Although this study advocates updating qualitative features 
regularly to solve the problem to a certain extent, companies may find a way to mask 
themselves. Furthermore, the models require a solid data foundation, which this study 
achieved by limiting the final year of the sample to 2010, providing enough time for as many 
fraudulent cases as possible to be reported in the meantime. Having limited amounts of 
fraudulent cases each year because of ongoing investigations may hamper the detection 
results and make it more difficult to update the features as suggested. 
Another limitation concerns the identification of fraudulent observations. Although 
AAERs are a common way of identifying fraudulent manipulations to financial statements 
 
205 
 
in the literature, two problems arise from the fraud proxy. The first deals with the legal 
construct of fraud. Dechow et al. (2011) desist from using the term “fraud” and instead use 
“misstatement” for their AAER-based sample. They argue that although alterations to 
documents have been uncovered, managers rarely admit guilt with respect to allegations. 
Perols et al. (2017) suggest to only include firms for which fraud has been explicitly stated 
in SEC releases or other sources, reducing the sample considerably.184 This procedure results 
in a precisely identified fraud group, in which it is likely that no wrongfully labelled 
fraudulent observations exist. In return, the non-fraud group might contain wrongfully 
labelled fraudulent observations due to the rather strict identification process. When looking 
into alternative fraud proxies like shareholder lawsuits, SOX internal control violations or 
restatements, it becomes apparent that neither is without limitations (Dechow et al., 2011, 
pp. 18–19). Shareholder lawsuits are biased towards firms with larger stock value declines, 
SOX violations do not capture older observations and often comprise younger or smaller 
firms with less developed accounting infrastructure and restatements are not strict in 
capturing fraud, which goes beyond honest mistakes and implies a level of intentionality.185 
The second problem results from the imperfect fraud proxy in terms of coverage. Samples 
relying on SEC enforcements are generally biased towards the SEC’s activity level (Dyck et 
al., 2017, p. 5). The amount of fraudulent cases hidden in the group of non-fraudulent 
observations is unknown and can hardly be estimated, potentially leading to a suboptimal 
identification of features used to distinguish between both groups. Dyck et al. (2017) 
estimate that for their sample of cases between 1996 and 2004, two-thirds of cases go 
undiscovered by common fraud proxies. However, according to Karpoff et al. (2017), 
samples constructed using AAERs possess, in comparison to other common sources used in 
financial misconduct research, the largest scope based on the fraction of cases they cover 
and one of the highest coverages of fraudulent cases in accordance with applicable fraud 
definitions. Summarizing, the imperfect identification of fraudulent observations and the 
associated unknown number of hidden fraud cases in the non-fraud group is rather a general 
problem in the financial statement fraud detection literature and not specific for this study. 
The selection of the quantitative features represents another limitation that this and similar 
studies are concerned with. This study has focused on incorporating predictors that capture 
                                                 
184  Perols et al. (2017) follow the sampling design of Beasley (1996). 
185  See section 2.1.2 for a discussion of intentionality of the misstatement in the identification of fraud and 
4.1.1 for a comparison of data sources of financial misconduct research referring to Karpoff, Koester, Lee, 
and Martin (2017). 
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a large number of fraud factors based on elaborated fraud theories, predictors that have been 
commonly applied successfully in similar studies and that do not lead to a significant drop 
in sample size. This combination in conjunction with the data coverage in the Compustat 
universe has limited the scope to rather simple predictors from company financials, which is 
similar to other studies that have exploited quantitative and qualitative features like Cecchini 
et al. (2010a) or Brown et al. (2018). In both studies, the quantitative features are rather seen 
as a benchmark for the comparison of textual and combined models. However, Abbasi et al. 
(2012) for example have shown that complex quantitative features like features that compare 
the companies to industry means and others that create a direct relationship between the 
observations, or additional non-financial features can considerably improve detection 
performance, which was then partly addressed in this study’s second enhancing question, as 
discussed in section 5.2.3, but certainly not to the greatest extent. Examining a combination 
of both, complex quantitative and qualitative features alike in one study would certainly 
contribute towards a better detection performance and allow a comparison of the two types 
of models on a more similar level. 
Moreover, with regard to data availability, the fraud factors discussed in section 2.2 can 
hardly be implemented holistically into the detection models with the most commonly 
utilized data sources. Fraud theories offer a broad scope of factors and associated clues that 
may help to detect fraudulent actions (e.g. Feroz, Kwon, Pastena, & Park, 2000). However, 
this study and others have rarely attempted to operationalize them in greater detail, especially 
on the level of fraud perpetrators. Some management-specific, personal characteristics are 
potentially publicly available, although most likely not in annual reports and instead in other 
corporate communication sources, such as websites or outside of the company sphere in 
social networks.186 Even the SAS No. 99 – Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (AU §316.85 and AU §316.86) hints at the attitude of top-level employees as a 
relevant source of clues. Incorporating data sources beyond the commonly utilized ones 
could not only increase detection performance but may also provide empirical justification 
for the applicability of fraud theories in the financial statement fraud context. 
In addition to data availability and coverage, data authenticity may also influence the 
results, especially when relying on secondary data like Compustat instead of the actual data 
from the annual reports. Chychyla and Kogan (2015) examine the differences between 
                                                 
186  To a certain extent, personal characteristics may also found in AAERs if an enforcement action directly 
concerns an officer. 
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Compustat data items and the applicable 10-K data. The results reveal significant differences 
between both sources. These differences may lead to the misrepresentation of peculiarities 
in the quantitative data, hinting at fraudulent manipulations and thus reducing the reliability 
and performance of the quantitative features. According to the authors’ results, the 
divergence is furthermore industry- and size-specific. In the case of fraud, where subtle hints 
are supposedly relevant, it may be more appropriate to rely on the information as it is given 
in the annual report than use secondary data sources as commonly applied in the literature 
and in this study. Validating the results using the actual data source has so far not been 
carried out in the financial statement fraud detection context. 
The generalizability of this study’s results may also be limited as the sample is solely 
drawn from companies required to disclose their annual report on Form 10-K, resulting in 
mostly public US companies. In this regard, the detection models have also only been tested 
on texts from annual reports in the English language, although it might work equally well 
for related languages if the processing of texts in general and the preprocessing like stop 
word elimination and stemming, in particular, are adapted accordingly. The comparison of 
the qualitative features to different studies in section 5.2.1 has already hinted at a certain 
level of consensus in the identification of qualitative features even across languages. 
A number of limitations also concern the machine learning methodology. The 
hyperparameter optimization was carried out once on a random dataset via 5-fold cross-
validation for each feature vector and sampling approach. Detection performance would 
likely be improved if optimization were conducted via cross-validation on each training set 
individually across the different timeframes that were chosen. However, the computational 
effort must be limited and the optimization process needs to be reduced due to the large 
number of different tasks and controls this study aims for. The computational effort also 
limits the results for the artificial neural network. A more in-depth optimization procedure 
covering a larger number of parameter combinations would most likely lead to considerably 
better results for this classifier especially. Given that most studies report their classifier set-
up only very superficially, it is hardly possible to ascertain whether similar constraints 
concern other studies, but it seems to be very likely. 
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Derived from the limitations specifically, and the interdisciplinary nature of the fraud 
detection problem in general, the possibilities for further research are manifold. Thereby, the 
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literature could focus on two areas. The first revolves around the theoretical concept of 
financial statement fraud, especially how it is conducted, who conducts it and the underlying 
reasons behind the fraud, while the second one is concerned with improving research 
methodologies and thereby the detection performance of models while ensuring reliability 
and validity. 
Fraud theories lay the conceptual ground that can be used as the basis to develop detection 
models. However, most of the fraud theories, especially the less prevalent ones, are lacking 
empirical justification. The literature and practitioners are often only referring to the fraud 
triangle if adopting fraud theory at all into their work. Recapitulating section 2.2, the 
shortcomings of the fraud triangle coupled with the amount of elaborated offspring offers an 
array of fraud factors that may be operationalized in future research. Moreover, the 
development of new fraud theories precisely focussing on financial statement fraud may 
enhance the understanding of the subject and offer a better basis compared to the prevalent 
ones that are usually concerned with all kinds of fraud and often derived from one specific 
type, potentially limiting their direct applicability to financial statement fraud. 
Besides the development or operationalization of new or unused fraud theories, the 
findings so far could also use additional confirmation from different data sources. The hints 
and clues of manipulation are supposed to be of subtle nature, so they may be best studied 
using the primary source, rather than potentially distorted databases. This study has partly 
achieved the goal of authenticity by relying on the very texts from annual reports, however 
constructing the quantitative features using data from the Compustat universe.187 Utilizing 
for example XBRL data could shed additional light on the true nature of quantitative 
predictors and potentially reveal the required subtle insights. 
Moreover, not all factors of fraud theories can be equally well operationalizable by the 
data sources commonly relied on. Examining different publically available sources of 
corporate communication for the purpose of identifying and extracting patterns that hint at 
accounting fraud – which could also be done in conjunction with for example annual reports 
– offers new research possibilities. Especially sources with less prescribed and standardized 
information (like information on websites) could supposedly contain vital hints on its own 
or in conjunction with financial information (e.g. Brazel et al., 2009). This could also involve 
examinations beyond textual and numerical data and capture for example graphical 
                                                 
187  See Figure 11 in section 4.1.1 for a basic overview. 
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presentation styles or evaluate the availability or absence of information voluntarily provided 
in the respective sources. 
Another area for further research is concerned with the specific creation of the detection 
models and may furthermore be separated into feature related improvements and classifier 
improvements. Regarding the latter, some studies have already adopted classifier 
enhancements like ensemble methods, where several single classifiers are combined to form 
a meta classifier, which for financial statement fraud detection but also in other contexts has 
already shown to be able to improve the results (e.g. Kotsiantis et al., 2006).188 Evolutionary 
algorithms could also find increased usage in the context of financial statement fraud 
detection, especially when relying on predictors from textual data, where the algorithms can 
help identify the relevant patterns in the complex, and according to the results of this study, 
changing feature space when textual predictors are concerned (e.g. Alden et al., 2012). 
The other potential field for improvements in this area is concerned with the way textual 
data is examined. So far, bag-of-words or bag-of-n-grams approaches (e.g. Purda 
& Skillicorn, 2015) besides topic modelling (e.g. Brown et al., 2018) and presentation styles 
(e.g. Goel & Gangolly, 2012) have been utilized for the examination of financial statement 
fraud. Fisher et al. (2016) or Lewis and Young (2019) discuss the implementation of textual 
analysis of corporate texts and propose roadmaps for future research, which implies avoiding 
pitfalls and relying on relevant, state of the art methods. Thereby, natural language 
processing offers great possibilities which in conjunction with the free availability of textual 
information and the access to tools and the required hardware can improve the understanding 
of financial statement fraud and its detection considerably.  
                                                 
188  At first glance, this study’s methodology would be predestined for ensemble learning, as multiple classifiers 
have been utilized from the beginning. After initial tests on a random dataset using 5-fold cross-validation, 
stacking and voting did not significantly beat the single best classifier, which is why further implementation 
has not been carried out. This may be because of the low number of classifiers (4 in the case of this study) 
utilized for the construction of the ensemble learners, which are usually more plentiful (e.g. 7 in the case 
of Kotsiantis, Koumanakos, Tzelepis, & Tampakas, 2006; 14 in the case of Abbasi, Albrecht, Vance, & 
Hansen, 2012). 
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6 Summary and Conclusion 
Academics and practitioners alike have long been striving for approaches to identify 
financial statement fraud using publicly available data. Starting with financial ratios, toolkits 
have developed substantially over time. The relevance of truthful corporate reports for 
capital market efficiency is unquestionable. Capital market supervision and auditors are 
concerned with identifying fraudulent manipulations to ensure the trust of market 
participants in audited financial statements. Fraud theory suggests that complex models are 
necessary in order to capture fraudulent behaviour in its entirety. In recent years, the 
examination of textual information has become more popular and technological progress 
provides easier access to text analysis methods. The availability of machine-readable 
corporate texts and opportunities to process an increasing amount of textual data has opened 
the door for advancements in the area of accounting and finance research. In the domain of 
financial statement fraud detection, patterns extracted from textual data even seem to be 
superior to solely quantitative data like financial ratios. 
The primary research goal of this study was the detection of future financial statement 
fraud using textual and financial data. A sound analysis of applicable fraud theories and a 
detailed assessment of financial statement fraud schemes have laid the basis for the 
development of a comprehensive detection approach. Therefore, 11 design questions refined 
by seven hypotheses have been formulated and answered by conducting an empirical 
analysis to create reliable fraud detection models that can efficiently distinguish fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent reports over a timeframe of 15 years, which can be seen in figure 35. The 
design questions, besides serving to build, improve, and assess the detection models, have 
also helped to explain financial statement fraud and add to the general understating of the 
clues in annual reports that can hint at fraudulent manipulations. 
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Goal: Detection of future financial statement fraud exploiting qualitative and 
quantitative information from annual reports. 
Design questions 
1. Size of qualitative feature vector 
  Larger qualitative feature vectors score better results 
2. Stability of qualitative features over time 
  Qualitative feature are time-dependent 
3. Varying time gaps between training and holdout sample 
  Time gaps lead to deteriorating results 
4. Varying training and holdout set sizes 
  Sample sizes influence results 
5. Detection rates over time 
  Reliable detection performance over the entire timeframe 
6. Feature vector performance 
  Combined feature vectors score best results 
7. Matched and realistic sampling 
  Results hold for both sampling approaches 
8. Classifier performance 
  SVMs superior 
Enhancing questions 
1. First instance of fraud detection 
  Results hold for first instance of fraud detection 
2. Quantitative feature vector enhancements 
  Enhancements do not lead to significantly better results 
3. Cost-sensitive results 
  Models are cost-efficient 
Figure 35 – Summary of research goals 
This study contributes in numerous areas to the financial statement fraud detection 
literature. To date, this is the first study to use longer multi-word phrases to identify 
accounting fraud from corporate texts. The methodology has facilitated the capturing of 
larger patterns in the narratives and has partially addressed context in order to reflect 
linguistic and narrative peculiarities more precisely. Furthermore, the texts were 
preprocessed by eliminating stop words and a word stemmer was introduced in accordance 
with empirical evidence regarding increased detection performance for preprocessed texts. 
In contrast to the rather static sampling designs of most studies, changes to detection results 
were assessed when the timeframe for pattern extraction and model building varied. In this 
regard, this study has also examined how text-based patterns alter over time and has shed 
light on the importance of updating qualitative features resulting from the textual analysis 
on a regular basis. In this way, it is possible to incorporate potential changes to narratives 
from corporate disclosure in general as well as to absorb fraud-relevant patterns, which are 
also assumed to be time-dependent. A failure to update regularly or to avoid time gaps 
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between model building with pattern extraction and training and the actual fraud detection 
of unknown cases in future periods can seriously compromise detection performance. 
Thereby, the detection model is automated from the initial data gathering until the final 
results and compared to other techniques like topic modelling free from human involvement 
and the associated subjectivity. 
This study’s reference to practical applicability constitutes one of its most important 
traits, as previous literature has tended to empirically test fraud detection models on 
constructed, balanced samples alone, without creating a test environment that comes close 
to a real-world scenario. To thoroughly test the models, both a balanced sample through pair-
matching fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations as well as a realistic probability of 
fraud sample, in which all available annual reports are taken into consideration, has been 
utilized. This research design decision has made it also possible to compare the results with 
previous studies, to examine potential differences in the evidence while maintaining the 
advantage of the control environment that the matched sampling generated and to present an 
outcome, based at the level of practical implementation. The study’s sampling approaches 
have laid the foundation for its pivotal results, in which the detection performance of 
financial metrics, textual patterns and a combination of both have been tested, adopting a 
range of classifiers from basic techniques like naïve Bayes and k-nearest neighbour to more 
sophisticated ones like support vector machines and artificial neural networks, providing 
detection results over a 15-year timeframe using rolling subsamples. Moreover, by applying 
the matched sampling approach and an additional first instance of fraud detection test, the 
validity of the results has been assessed as effectively as possible, which has not been done 
to this extent in the literature so far. 
In line with Cecchini et al. (2010a), Purda and Skillicorn (2015) or Brown et al. (2018) 
this study’s results support the view that textual information is superior to financial ratios in 
identifying accounting fraud. Detection performance can also be slightly increased by 
combining both data types, yielding significantly better results for the realistic probability 
of fraud sampling approach and the best classifier. With an average AUC of 0.836 across 12 
rolling subsamples between 1996 and 2010 and a single highest result of 0.939 for the 
subsample covering the years 2002 to 2005, high and reliable detection performance has 
been demonstrated. Due to design differences regarding sampling approaches, examined 
timeframes, the explicit design of trying to detect future fraudulent cases, and the fact that 
this study is solely focussing on cases in the SEC’s regulatory sphere, the comparability to 
other studies is limited to a cursory view, which is a general constraint in the field of financial 
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statement fraud detection. Nonetheless, the reported results of similar studies regarding the 
aforementioned design peculiarities reveal the potential improvements this study’s results 
offer, being at least on par with the highest reported ones and even topping them on isolated, 
similar timeframes. The eminent detection performance becomes also apparent when 
examining the associated costs of misclassification. Besides reporting the rather abstract 
detection performance measures, this study facilitates on empirically derived cost ratios to 
assess the cost saving potential of the underlying detection models, scoring considerably 
better results than comparable studies and amounting to an absolute cost saving potential of 
$34.7 billion over the entire timeframe under an conservative estimation of misclassification 
costs. 
The results of this study can be especially relevant for everyone concerned with the 
identification of fraudulently altered financial statements. For example auditors, regulators 
and enforcement agencies can be supported by an automated detection system that helps to 
allocate resources to high risk targets and therefore increase efficiency. Auditors, for 
example, can identify needs for in-depth audits, while regulators and enforcement agencies 
can use the system for supervision purposes. This may also increase and restore the trust in 
audited financial statements and decrease the chances of severe accounting scandals like 
during the early 2000s. Supervision agencies may even benefit in the case of auditor 
involvement in accounting fraud or auditor inability to detect fraud and still secure trust in 
financial statements. Thereby, the detection models are not only serving as a source of fraud 
detection but may also deter fraud from happening when chances of getting caught are 
increased. 
Despite the aforementioned obvious groups, all stakeholders may benefit from the 
detection models alike. For example, investors or cooperating companies could utilize the 
detection models to control the reported company financials, therefore reduce uncertainty 
and the risk to fall for manipulated numbers. As the detection system has been created to be 
as free as possible from human subjectivity and involvement and works on current hardware 
it hardly accrues additional costs. 
Altogether, it can be concluded that the current stage of the development of financial 
statement fraud detection models that solely rely on publicly available data permits the 
identification of fraudulent cases with high accuracy, efficiency, and reliability. This study’s 
unique research design and scope have not only demonstrated outstanding detection 
performance but furthermore increased the understanding of setting up detection models and 
thereby shed additional light on the way financial statement fraud expresses itself in the 
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manipulated disclosure. In order to ensure the validity, practical application, and 
comparability of the results, future studies should try to rely on a comprehensive research 
design based on the findings of this and similar studies. The field of textual analysis for fraud 
detection (as well as in other areas of accounting and finance) offers great possibilities to 
study corporate disclosure and to ensure that its standards are high. 
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Appendix 
The appendix contains tables with detailed results, covering design questions 5 to 8 and 
enhancing questions 2 and 3. The Appendix serves to avoid the convoluted description of 
results for the design and enhancing questions. The computations of design questions 5 to 8 
and the respective hypothesis tests rely on the detailed results presented in Tables 31-33. 
To create a comparable basis for the quantitative feature vector enhancements, a 
hyperparameter tuning akin to the initial three feature vectors has been carried out for an 
SVM and is reported in Table 34. The SVM was chosen due to its superior performance, as 
the results of design question 8 have shown. Table 35 supports the findings of enhancing 
question 3 and provides detailed results for the absolute cost saving potential. 
• Tables 31-33: Detailed results for the final sample. 
• Table 34: SVM hyperparameter tuning for quantitative feature enhancements. 
• Table 35: Determination of absolute cost savings. 
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 SVM 
   Matched     Realistic   
Subsample Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 0.755 0.657 0.771 0.809 0.687 0.817 
f2 0.767 0.673 0.765 0.766 0.603 0.783 
f3 0.748 0.698 0.719 0.799 0.680 0.808 
f4 0.803 0.731 0.803 0.853 0.720 0.862 
f5 0.786 0.706 0.767 0.856 0.760 0.873 
f6 0.842 0.706 0.849 0.901 0.740 0.907 
f7 0.837 0.619 0.889 0.931 0.746 0.930 
f8 0.882 0.615 0.892 0.821 0.738 0.821 
f9 0.819 0.585 0.819 0.879 0.755 0.907 
f10 0.802 0.595 0.808 0.727 0.583 0.736 
f11 0.762 0.634 0.777 0.787 0.537 0.776 
f12 0.818 0.618 0.802 0.783 0.616 0.783 
 ANN 
Subsample Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 0.759 0.556 0.787 0.689 0.731 0.740 
f2 0.745 0.560 0.758 0.741 0.734 0.788 
f3 0.727 0.561 0.717 0.752 0.750 0.797 
f4 0.794 0.533 0.822 0.744 0.738 0.816 
f5 0.758 0.597 0.764 0.775 0.688 0.791 
f6 0.862 0.554 0.864 0.788 0.688 0.822 
f7 0.845 0.592 0.841 0.822 0.696 0.825 
f8 0.841 0.588 0.861 0.751 0.623 0.721 
f9 0.771 0.523 0.764 0.789 0.539 0.763 
f10 0.824 0.589 0.831 0.685 0.513 0.692 
f11 0.723 0.616 0.729 0.840 0.503 0.840 
f12 0.769 0.510 0.773 0.738 0.614 0.781 
AUC values for individual subsamples f1-f12 
Subsample Training Holdout Subsample Training Holdout 
f1 1996–1998 1999 f7 2002–2004 2005 
f2 1997–1999 2000 f8 2003–2005 2006 
f3 1998–2000 2001 f9 2004–2006 2007 
f4 1999–2001 2002 f10 2005–2007 2008 
f5 2000–2002 2003 f11 2006–2008 2009 
f6 2001–2003 2004 f12 2007–2009 2010 
The training includes the model generation process with individual feature extraction and 
model training. The holdout set comprises unknown cases from the subsequent period. 
 
Table 31 – Appendix A: Detailed ANN and SVM final results 
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 KNN 
  Matched Realistic 
Subsample Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 0.727 0.604 0.616 0.743 0.700 0.708 
f2 0.711 0.608 0.619 0.723 0.688 0.684 
f3 0.756 0.650 0.651 0.787 0.711 0.725 
f4 0.825 0.723 0.749 0.874 0.790 0.786 
f5 0.793 0.710 0.718 0.833 0.743 0.747 
f6 0.857 0.676 0.651 0.905 0.747 0.747 
f7 0.899 0.746 0.760 0.913 0.725 0.824 
f8 0.784 0.649 0.651 0.803 0.733 0.736 
f9 0.632 0.642 0.644 0.831 0.772 0.771 
f10 0.822 0.624 0.638 0.627 0.605 0.604 
f11 0.527 0.537 0.649 0.725 0.602 0.603 
f12 0.657 0.512 0.573 0.735 0.643 0.668 
 NB 
Subsample Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 0.684 0.530 0.625 0.690 0.676 0.717 
f2 0.598 0.565 0.571 0.665 0.690 0.700 
f3 0.576 0.577 0.588 0.661 0.715 0.729 
f4 0.591 0.519 0.538 0.691 0.650 0.678 
f5 0.608 0.566 0.580 0.668 0.655 0.679 
f6 0.636 0.545 0.571 0.701 0.618 0.675 
f7 0.637 0.543 0.566 0.754 0.622 0.691 
f8 0.690 0.616 0.664 0.647 0.675 0.686 
f9 0.618 0.502 0.523 0.595 0.563 0.575 
f10 0.698 0.548 0.607 0.636 0.565 0.588 
f11 0.552 0.715 0.717 0.670 0.581 0.634 
f12 0.748 0.506 0.537 0.737 0.572 0.601 
AUC values for individual subsamples f1-f12 
Subsample Training Holdout Subsample Training Holdout 
f1 1996–1998 1999 f7 2002–2004 2005 
f2 1997–1999 2000 f8 2003–2005 2006 
f3 1998–2000 2001 f9 2004–2006 2007 
f4 1999–2001 2002 f10 2005–2007 2008 
f5 2000–2002 2003 f11 2006–2008 2009 
f6 2001–2003 2004 f12 2007–2009 2010 
The training includes the model generation process with individual feature extraction and 
model training. The holdout set comprises of unknown cases from the subsequent period. 
 
Table 32 – Appendix B: Detailed NB and KNN final results 
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 Aggregated best results over time 
  Matched Realistic 
Subsample Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual. Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 0.759 0.657 0.787 0.809 0.731 0.817 
f2 0.767 0.673 0.765 0.766 0.734 0.788 
f3 0.756 0.698 0.719 0.799 0.750 0.808 
f4 0.825 0.731 0.822 0.874 0.790 0.862 
f5 0.793 0.710 0.767 0.856 0.760 0.873 
f6 0.862 0.706 0.864 0.905 0.747 0.907 
f7 0.899 0.746 0.889 0.931 0.746 0.930 
f8 0.882 0.649 0.892 0.821 0.738 0.821 
f9 0.819 0.642 0.819 0.879 0.772 0.907 
f10 0.824 0.624 0.831 0.727 0.605 0.736 
f11 0.762 0.715 0.777 0.840 0.602 0.840 
f12 0.818 0.618 0.802 0.783 0.643 0.783 
 Quantitative feature enhancement 
  Matched Realistic 
Subsample Qual.* Quant. Qual. & quant. Qual.* Quant. Qual. & quant. 
f1 - 0.637 0.770 - 0.612 0.819 
f2 - 0.654 0.762 - 0.605 0.776 
f3 - 0.643 0.718 - 0.614 0.797 
f4 - 0.686 0.786 - 0.645 0.870 
f5 - 0.645 0.763 - 0.671 0.872 
f6 - 0.731 0.843 - 0.700 0.908 
f7 - 0.657 0.888 - 0.793 0.939 
f8 - 0.690 0.884 - 0.707 0.827 
f9 - 0.581 0.806 - 0.710 0.893 
f10 - 0.544 0.839 - 0.602 0.744 
f11 - 0.627 0.701 - 0.617 0.780 
f12 - 0.586 0.779 - 0.577 0.812 
AUC values for individual subsamples f1-f12 
*The quantitative feature enhancements did not affect the qualitative feature vector. 
Subsample Training Holdout Subsample Training Holdout 
f1 1996–1998 1999 f7 2002–2004 2005 
f2 1997–1999 2000 f8 2003–2005 2006 
f3 1998–2000 2001 f9 2004–2006 2007 
f4 1999–2001 2002 f10 2005–2007 2008 
f5 2000–2002 2003 f11 2006–2008 2009 
f6 2001–2003 2004 f12 2007–2009 2010 
The training includes the model generation process with individual feature extraction and 
model training. The holdout set comprises unknown cases from the subsequent period. 
 
Table 33 – Appendix C: Aggregated best results over time and feature enhancements 
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  Matched sampling approach 
Boosted quantitative feature vector Boosted combined feature vector 
  Polynomial kernel function 
    n     n 
    1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4 
C 
-1 0.463 0.571 0.501 0.500 
C 
-1 0.938 0.850 0.818 0.500 
0 0.463 0.571 0.501 0.500 0 0.938 0.850 0.818 0.500 
5 0.440 0.550 0.558 0.549 5 0.918 0.896 0.874 0.500 
10 0.440 0.539 0.558 0.549 10 0.918 0.896 0.874 0.500 
                        
  Dot kernel function 
C 
-1 0.468       
C 
-1 0.955       
0 0.468       0 0.955       
5 0.443       5 0.931       
10 0.443       10 0.931       
  Radial kernel function 
    γ     γ   
    0 1 2 4     0 1 2 4 
C 
-1 0.500 0.560 0.510 0.513 
C 
-1 0.500 0.560 0.510 0.505 
0 0.500 0.560 0.510 0.573 0 0.500 0.560 0.510 0.513 
5 0.500 0.517 0.505 0.573 5 0.500 0.517 0.510 0.513 
10 0.500 0.522 0.505 0.573 10 0.500 0.522 0.505 0.516 
                        
  Realistic sampling approach 
Boosted quantitative feature vector Boosted combined feature vector 
  Polynomial kernel function 
    n     n 
    1 2 3 4     1 2 3 4 
C 
-1 0.630 0.555 0.500 0.500 
C 
-1 0.849 0.871 0.500 0.500 
0 0.630 0.555 0.500 0.500 0 0.849 0.871 0.500 0.500 
5 0.627 0.568 0.585 0.530 5 0.814 0.787 0.728 0.500 
10 0.627 0.568 0.585 0.530 10 0.814 0.787 0.728 0.500 
  Dot kernel function 
C 
-1 0.631       
C 
-1 0.865       
0 0.631       0 0.865       
5 0.631       5 0.781       
10 0.631       10 0.781       
  Radial kernel function 
    γ     γ   
    0 1 2 4     0 1 2 4 
C 
-1 0.500 0.520 0.508 0.503 
C 
-1 0.500 0.505 0.502 0.501 
0 0.500 0.520 0.508 0.503 0 0.500 0.505 0.502 0.501 
5 0.500 0.524 0.504 0.501 5 0.500 0.506 0.502 0.501 
10 0.500 0.521 0.502 0.507 10 0.500 0.506 0.502 0.501 
The table reports AUC values of parameter combinations for different feature vectors and sampling approaches. 
The parameter setup has been carried out on a random, unused dataset via stratified 5-fold cross-validation (mean 
AUC values are reported). Darker grey areas indicate better detection performance. n: polynomial degree; C: 
penalty value; γ: flexibility parameter for radial kernel function.  
Table 34 – Appendix D: SVM parameter optimization for feature vector enhancements 
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Cost 
Ratio Sample 
Error costs of 
model (in 
million USD) 
Costs of 
surveillance 
strategy (in 
million USD) 
Costs of naïve 
strategy (in 
million USD) 
Costs of 
model errors 
relative to 
surveillance 
strategy 
Costs of 
model errors 
relative to 
naïve 
strategy 
1:3 
f1 82.40 3,476.90 118.40 0.024 0.696 
f2 100.06 3,399.50 148.80 0.029 0.672 
f3 114.92 3,201.81 177.60 0.036 0.647 
f4 76.98 3,033.92 142.40 0.025 0.541 
f5 80.24 2,792.30 136.00 0.029 0.590 
f6 44.95 2,780.79 96.00 0.016 0.468 
f7 27.01 2,743.66 72.00 0.010 0.375 
f8 32.95 2,704.96 49.60 0.012 0.664 
f9 31.91 2,695.02 38.40 0.012 0.831 
f10 29.82 2,837.28 35.20 0.011 0.847 
f11 29.82 2,857.67 35.20 0.010 0.847 
f12 26.03 2,836.23 36.80 0.009 0.707 
Total 677.09 35,360.03 1,086.40 - - 
Mean - - - 0.019 0.657 
Saved - 34,682.94 409.31 - - 
1:10 
f1 238.49 3,476.90 387.02 0.069 0.616 
f2 303.34 3,399.50 486.39 0.089 0.624 
f3 343.61 3,201.81 580.53 0.107 0.592 
f4 211.29 3,033.92 465.47 0.070 0.454 
f5 229.07 2,792.30 444.55 0.082 0.515 
f6 103.03 2,780.79 313.80 0.037 0.328 
f7 66.94 2,743.66 235.35 0.024 0.284 
f8 94.66 2,704.96 162.13 0.035 0.584 
f9 80.02 2,695.02 125.52 0.030 0.638 
f10 91.53 2,837.28 115.06 0.032 0.795 
f11 84.73 2,857.67 115.06 0.030 0.736 
f12 73.22 2,836.23 120.29 0.026 0.609 
Total 1,919.93 35,360.03 3,551.17 - - 
Mean - - - 0.053 0.565 
Saved - 33,440.10 1,631.24 - - 
The table reports absolute and relative costs. The costs are based on the classification outcome of the 
holdout subsets of the samples f1-f12, weighted according to the empirically estimated costs from section 
5.2.4 ($0.52 million for per wrongfully classified non-fraudulent observation, $5.23 million per 
wrongfully classified fraudulent case for the cost ratio of 1:10 and $1.6 million for the cost ratio 1:3). The 
applied detection model consisted of the combined feature vector and an SVM classifier in accordance 
with the previous results. The naïve strategy classifies all observations as non-fraudulent whereas the 
surveillance strategy investigates every observation. The absolute cost-saving (saved) potential is 
calculated by deducting the error costs of the model from the costs of the naïve and the surveillance 
strategy respectively for each cost ratio (for example $677.09 million - $35,360.30 million = $34,682.94 
million for the cost ratio of 1:3 and the surveillance strategy as a benchmark). 
Table 35 – Appendix E: Determination of absolute cost-saving potential 
